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Abstract 
Questions about regulatory effectiveness arise in the wake of catastrophic events 
involving technological risk. Criticism is often couched in terms of ‘regulatory failure’ 
or ‘regulatory capture’, reproducing discourses of responsibility that take regulatory 
failure for granted. These discourses black box ideas of ‘failure’ and ‘capture’ and, in so 
doing, fail to address a range of alternative, albeit largely underexplored, discourses and 
assemblages implicated in the power relationships that shape regulatory knowledge and 
practices. 
This thesis explores such discourses and assemblages employing a critical and empirical 
approach inspired by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the concept of Foucauldian 
power-knowledge. It asks how power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation is 
performed by and around regulators in the Australian pipeline industry, and how the 
process of power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation might be improved. 
Key themes that emerged from the research include: the logics that underpin multiple 
regulatory assemblages across Australian states; the regulatory apparatuses through 
which regulation is enacted; technical-regulatory specifications; deregulation; and 
energy privatisation. Broadly, the findings indicate a number of incoherences of 
knowledge and practices in relation to risk regulation throughout the regulatory process. 
Regulators have a certain logic of thinking and doing in relation to safety practices. This 
logic comprises the largely taken-for-granted assumptions that: the regulation of 
pipeline risk revolves around two interdependent parties – pipeline regulators and 
pipeline industries; pipelines are physically safe; risks can be regulated using technical-
physical controls; regulation inevitably relies on industry knowledge and activities; and 
regulation depends on the establishment of good relationships with industry. This logic 
is, however, inadequate for dealing with differences of regulatory practices across 
Australian states and the challenges of adopting a harmonised Australian pipeline 
standard. 
The regulatory apparatuses considered here included Safety Plans, risk-based regulation, 
and social-regulatory controls. Actual field safety practices were found to manifest 
differently from the text in Safety Plans – documents that contain regulatory 
requirements mandating pipeline industries to identify and control risks. These 
differences were associated with: (a) organisational factors such as cost-cutting; (b) 
safety plans being seen as bureaucratic red-tape undertaken to secure pipeline licenses; 
(c) insufficient understanding of technical safety knowledge in relation to accountability 
in lieu of regulatory complexity; and (d) misunderstandings around the intentions and 
principles of workforce engagement.  
Limitations in risk-based practice were evident in the contradiction between regulators’ 
reliance on industrial knowledge and self-regulatory activities when managing pipeline 
risks and industries’ reluctance to share safety knowledge with regulators. Regulators 
were able only to partially inspect risky activities due to limited resources. At the same 
time, potential to utilise social-regulatory controls was not realised due to limited 
familiarity among pipeline professions with opportunities for workforce and trade union 
engagement. Workforces were involved in the assessment and management of personal 
safety (low risk) but not in assessing major hazards (high-level process risk).  
Investigation of technical-regulatory specifications revealed that knowledge about 
pipeline dangers was incoherent among actors. The ‘measurement length’ specification 
(referred to in lay terms as a ‘blast zone’) obfuscates understanding of pipeline dangers 
and leads to mismatching practices in risk accountability, risk assessment and risk 
communication. Knowledge about pipeline dangers in relation to measurement length 
tends to be limited to those involved with the encroachment of interested third parties 
(pipeline industries, associated authorities and entities) but not with those groups who 
live, study and work within danger zones.  
Regulators face difficulties in using regulatory tools to cope with newly emergent risks 
arising from the complexity of pipeline ownership shaped by deregulation and energy 
privatisation. Regulators have become less effective in regulating pipeline risk in the 
face of multiple ownership and operation arrangements involving different companies. 
The effects of novel risk have also shaped the knowledge of other actors outside of 
regulatory control. The public lacks knowledge of additional costs for services, and of 
which institutions they can rely on to seek advice for gas repairs. The transferal of 
safety knowledge has become disassociated among pipeline engineers, field pipeline 
managers and pipeline technicians. As a consequence, regulators are enmeshed in 
incoherent discourses and practices involving deregulation, privatisation and the 
conduct of conduct within a ‘precarious regulatory regime’.  
 ix 
Finally, with the aim of improving risk regulation, the incoherences summarised above 
are re-framed into three stages: (a) re-arranging the risk knowledge of regulators;  
(b) co-producing regulatory practices with diverse actors apart from pipeline industries; 
and (c) strengthening the co-accountability of regulators and pipeline industries.  
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Chapter 1 
Research setting, problems and questions 
1.1 Research into energy pipelines 
On Thursday evening the 6th of September 2010, a massive ambient temperature 
difference occurred in San Bruno, California, USA: massive, that is, compared to 
temperatures experienced on other nights. It was a generally peaceful evening: residents 
were cooking dinner, some were relaxing with their families, others were just arriving 
home. The sudden rupture of an interstate national gas transmission pipeline (Line 132) 
owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) transformed their evening into 
a chaotic event (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010b, p. 1). Initially, the 
residents could not comprehend what had happened. One person described it as ‘[w]hen 
you’re in a dream and you try to run as fast as you can but feel like you’re getting 
nowhere, like you’re in quicksand — that’s how it felt’ (Rebecca & Lisa, 2015, para. 3). 
The release of natural gas ignited resulting in an explosion that triggered an intense fire. 
The latter burned for two days, killed eight people, injured many, and destroyed 38 
homes (Hayes, 2014, p. 1). Most of the buildings in the suburb of San Bruno were 
damaged (ibid).  
Catastrophic events associated with energy pipeline industries have occurred in many 
countries. Ramírez-Camacho, Federica, Elsa, Roberto, and Joaquim (2017, p. 36) report 
that according to the Major Hazardous Incident Data Service (MHIDAS), 1,431 pipeline 
accidents (both on-shore and off-shore pipelines) were recorded in 95 countries between 
the beginning of the 20th century and November 2006. Energy accidents involving 
pipelines have resulted in massive social and economic costs. These accidents caused 
182,156 deaths (Sovacool, 2008, p. 1802). The preliminary study conducted by 
Sovacool (2008) calculated the cost of failures resulting in 279 major global energy 
accidents, including natural gas pipelines, coal, nuclear, oil, hydroelectric, and 
renewable sources at approximately US$41 billion in property damage (p. 1802). 
 
2 
This study’s review of catastrophic energy accidents 1 , including pipeline energy 
industries, raised two important questions: (a) who has been made responsible when 
industrial risks become manifest (discussed in Section 1.1.1); and (b) who have become 
the focal actors for risk reduction (discussed in Section 1.1.2)? 
1.1.1 Who has been made responsible?  
When accidents involving energy industries occur, discourses of risk that are critical of 
regulatory failures gain prominence. This phenomenon is observable in many 
catastrophic energy accidents. An assessment of the San Bruno incident investigation 
reads as follows: 
The pipeline safety regulator within the state of California failed to detect 
the inadequacies in PG&E’s integrity management program and that the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration integrity 
management inspection protocols need improvement (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2010b, p. xi). 
An evaluation by the Deepwater Horizon Study Group of the Deepwater Horizon 
incident claimed that:  
There was not any effective industry or regulatory checks and balances in 
place to counter act [sic] the increasingly deteriorating and dangerous 
situation on Deepwater Horizon. Thus, as a result of a cascade of deeply 
flawed failure and signal analysis, decision-making, communication, and 
organisational-managerial processes, safety was compromised to the point 
that the blowout occurred with catastrophic effects (Deepwater Horizon 
Study Group, 2011, p. 9). 
Subsequent to the Fukushima incident in 2011, the following report was issued: 
A major factor that contributed to the accident was the widespread 
assumption in Japan that its nuclear power plants were so safe that an 
                                                 
1 Examples of catastrophic energy accidents include: the 2004 Ghislenghien pipeline incident (Belgium) (Hayes & 
Hopkins, 2014a); the 2010 Marshall pipeline incident (USA) (ibid); the 1980 offshore Alexander Kielland Flotel 
incident (Norway) (Lindøe, Baram, & Renn, 2014); the 1988 offshore Piper Alpha incident (UK) (ibid); the 2009 
offshore Montara incident (Australia) (ibid); the 2010 offshore Deepwater Horizon incident (USA) (ibid); the 2010 
Pike River Mine incident (New Zealand) (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012) and the 
2011 Fukushima incident (Japan) (Wang & Chen, 2012).   
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accident of this magnitude was simply unthinkable. This assumption was 
accepted by nuclear power plant operators and was not challenged by 
regulators or by the Government. As a result, Japan was not sufficiently 
prepared for a severe nuclear accident in March 2011 (Amano, 2015, p. 
Foreword). 
An evaluation of the 2010 Pike River Mine incident in New Zealand reported that:  
There was inadequate regulatory oversight of the electrical system from 
2009 onwards, owing to a lack of expertise within the DOL mines 
inspectorate (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 
2012, p. 154). 
The Royal Commission investigating New Zealand’s 2010 Pike River Coal Mine 
accident summarised the main themes appertaining to regulatory problems that occurred 
in mining cases. They included: ‘an insufficient regulatory framework and the health 
and safety regulator not properly conducting inspections nor ensuring legislative 
compliances’ (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, p. 261). 
In light of these and other catastrophic accidents, the contemporary literature 
consistently targets the failures of regulators and regulatory frameworks (see for 
example: Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012, pp. 154, 261; 
Sanjour, 2012; Wang & Chen, 2012). Regulators are criticised for exercising inadequate 
regulatory oversight, for exhibiting insufficient regulatory expertise; and for enacting 
either weak or unduly complex regulatory frameworks.  
In brief, a review of catastrophic accidents reveals that regulatory failures feature 
among the foremost causal themes peculiar to catastrophic accidents. It thus comes as 
no surprise that regulators have been made responsible for catastrophic accidents. 
However, such discourse has become problematic in research exploration and analysis, 
a controversy I address in Section 1.1.3. Next, the question of ‘who have been the focal 
actors for risk reduction?’ will be discussed. 
4 
1.1.2 Who have become the focal actors for risk reduction?  
It is not unusual in the aftermath of catastrophic accidents to note a trend emerging vis-
à-vis a particular discourse that renders certain types of actors the central focus for risk 
reduction.  
After the pipeline explosion in Kern County in the US, it was reported that:  
Dozens of families in a rural California town had to evacuate their homes 
after a natural gas pipeline under their neighbourhood started leaking toxic 
gas, the families claim[ed] in court. The families, including several minor 
children [sic], sued the owner of the pipeline, Petro Capital Resources, in 
Kern County Superior Court Thursday, claiming that Petro never disclosed 
that the pipeline ran under their Nelson Court neighbourhood in Arvin. "This 
is a legitimate case in which people were harmed with personal injury and 
property damage. Bottom line, they did nothing to cause this to happen," 
attorney Steven Archer told Courthouse News (Kearn, 2016, paras 1-3) 
Omodanisi, Eludoyin, and Salami (2014) examined a pipeline explosion associated with 
pipeline vandalisation that impacted on the Ilado-Odo community in Lagos State in 
Nigeria. They stated that:  
Our study involves the use of satellite imageries, ecological sampling, 
questionnaire and personal interaction with some of the victims of the 
December 2006 pipeline fire in Ilado-Odo community in Lagos State, 
Nigeria. We attributed the causes of pipeline fires to poor pipeline network 
monitoring, poor communication and transportation in the vulnerable 
communities, and the inability of the pipeline management agency to ensure 
adequate community participation. We found that the biotic and abiotic 
components of the Ilado-Odo community were severely impaired, and we 
think that the impact may last for a long time if there is no post-disaster 
recovery programme (Omodanisi et al., 2014, p. 1635). 
Research exploring the BP Deepwater Horizon event concluded the following: 
The BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill is recognized as the largest marine oil 
spill in U.S. history. In this article, we examine the impact of the BP oil spill 
on directly affected commercial fishers and indirectly affected residents of 
 5 
the greater New Orleans metropolitan area. A sample of 148 participants 
responded to an open-ended question on the impact of the oil spill on self, 
family, and their community at least 12 months after the oil spill began. 
Content analysis of their narrative text yielded four emergent themes which 
we present here: 1) Economic Impact on the Seafood Industry and Local 
Businesses; 2) Commercial Fishers’ Financial Future; 3) BP’s Response: 
“Making it Right” or Making it Worse?; and 4) Lingering Worries and 
Fears: Threats to Fishers’ Health and Lifestyle. Implications of these 
findings for individuals and families exposed to a decade of natural and 
technological disasters are considered (Cherry et al., 2015, p. 576). 
An assessment of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear meltdown incidents asked:  
What, then, have we learnt so far from the experiences of the Chernobyl and 
Fukushima accidents? For sure, confirmation that high whole-body doses 
received over a brief period will produce acute radiation syndrome and death 
if the doses are sufficiently high, and that high doses to the thyroids of 
children will increase the risk of thyroid cancer. Also, that unless the effect 
is clear (as with thyroid cancer among those exposed as children), obtaining 
reliable results from epidemiological studies of populations is challenging in 
countries where accurate and uniform tracing of individuals, and diagnosis 
and recording of diseases, is uncertain (Wakeford, 2016, p. E4). 
My review of industrial catastrophe cases shows that there are certain types of actors 
who have become the focus of attention among social movements and social research. 
According to the statements above, they include: (a) affected residents; (b) affected 
communities; (c) affected fishers; and (d) affected children. In addition, I have found 
that affected groups in general have become the entry points for the investigation of risk 
around energy industries, both by social movements and social research. In contrast, 
research into regulatory institutions and the utilisation of their regulatory devices in 
regulating technological risks has remained relatively underexplored.  
1.1.3 A black box of discourses associated with regulatory failures 
Certain issues emerged from my review of the literature on catastrophic energy 
accidents (see Sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2.). First, the discourses that circulate around 
catastrophic accidents focus consistently on the question of who is responsible. These 
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discourses of responsibility (or culpability) typically critique regulatory experts (or 
elite-expert institutions) and the regulatory devices (or regulatory apparatuses) they 
utilise. These instruments are problem solving tools that regulators use to regulate risk 
posed by energy industries. The majority of criticism targets the failures of regulators 
and their approaches to controlling risk. In a corresponding discourse involving the 
affected actors alluded to earlier, the ameliorative actions of relevant social movements 
and subsequent social research tend to focus on reducing the risks faced by affected 
groups of actors rather than on exploring what has been happening within the elite-
expert institutions they critique. Questions that are not typically asked include: what 
forms of regulatory knowledge and practices are being implemented to regulate risk, 
what has worked well and what has not worked well, and how and in what way can 
regulatory knowledge and practices in relation to the regulation of risk (hereafter risk 
regulation) be improved? Furthermore, discourses pertinent to responsibility tend to set 
distinctions among experts, the public, affected groups, technical devices, society etc. 
Does the value and contribution of knowledge to reduce risk, as associated with these 
distinctive entities, become relatively isolated from the relational network and set of 
entities in which it is embedded?  
Perhaps more importantly, do the discourses of responsibility alluded to above ‘black 
box’ the role of regulatory failure, in the process failing to address the power 
relationships that shape regulatory outcomes? In other words, has knowledge and 
practice around the processes of risk regulation in elite-expert institutions become 
disassociated from and unacknowledged in the existing literature detailing catastrophic 
events in energy industries? 
This thesis is concerned with how regulatory entities interact through relationships of 
power to perform risk regulation and shape regulatory outcomes (the terminology 
associated with ‘perform’ is explained in Section 2.2.1.2). My approach and analysis, 
which are based on the notion that these entities are blended in heterogeneous 
assemblages, are underpinned and inspired by Actor-Network Theory (ANT). Latour 
(1996) suggests that: ‘it is utterly impossible to understand what holds society together 
without reinjecting in its fabric the facts manufactured by natural and social sciences 
and the artefacts designed by engineers’ (p. 370).  
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I argue the need to open up the black box of discourses of responsibility relevant to both 
elite-expert institutions and their technical-regulatory devices. To this end, I engage in a 
process of analysing two key research questions. The first asks: how is power and 
knowledge in relation to risk regulation performed by and around regulators in a case 
study of pipeline industries in Australia? The first key question aims to investigate the 
process of involving power relationships that shape knowledge and practices in relation 
to regulatory outcomes (hereafter power-knowledge practices (discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.3). This leads to the second key question: how can the 
processes of power and knowledge in relation to risk regulation be improved? These 
two research questions are explored with the goal of improving the process of risk 
regulation so as to improve regulatory practices and effectiveness (or regulatory 
outcomes). 
This thesis adopts a critical and empirical approach. This thesis takes a stance derived 
from the critical theoretical approach of poststructuralism. It uses empirical findings to 
critically question and thence to propose a reconfiguration of existing theories and 
thinking. It utilises a critical process of analysis based on empirical grounds to explore 
assemblages of human and non-human entities and the ways in which they interact with 
regulators. These interactions are traced and re-traced with the intention of 
comprehending and mapping-out how power-knowledge relationships involving 
regulators are performed. Throughout this investigation, a number of research themes 
and assemblages implicated in knowledge practices vis-à-vis regulatory outcomes were 
revealed. In turn, the emergent themes and assemblages were empirically and 
theoretically reoriented with a view towards informing the performance of new power-
knowledge practices in the process of risk regulation, the aim being to identify practical 
recommendations for improving regulatory practice.  
The research setting used to explore the power-knowledge relationships that 
characterise the process of risk regulation takes the form of the Australian energy 
pipeline industry, a subject I discuss in the following section.  
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1.2 Research setting 
1.2.1 Energy pipeline industries  
Of all of the industries in the energy sector, energy pipelines attract by far the least 
attention including the attention of researchers. Pipelines are typically buried and, being 
physically invisible to the public eye, elicit comparatively little sense of risk or danger 
(McCutcheon & Skoien, 2017; Papadakis, 1999). Examples of the invisibility of 
pipelines are presented in Figure 1.1, and compared to other types of energy industry in 
Figure 1.2.  
Some invisible hazards – such as the radiation associated with nuclear power plants – 
often elicit dread reactions and high levels of public concern (see for example: Hecht, 
2012; Kuchinskaya, 2013; Reicher, Podpadec, Macnaghten, Brown, & Eiser, 1993). 
They are perceived as insidious as a consequence of their ability to affect our bodies 
without us being aware of them. The scale of nuclear accidents at Chernobyl and 
Fukushima reinforce these perceptions. Familiarity, however, can alleviate concern over 
hazardous facilities and normalise the presence of risk. 
Members of the public are often familiar with using gas in domestic situations and, 
while they may be aware of risks associated with gas, it is reasonable to expect this 
familiarity will offset the potential for heightened perceptions of risk. Indeed, a 
common concern among members of the pipeline industry is ‘third party interference’; 
that is, damage to pipelines caused by incautious, dangerous activity. 
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Figure 1.1: The relative invisibility of pipeline risks.  
Note: The photo on the left hand side was taken on the 10th September 2014. The photo on the right hand side was 
taken on the 1st April 2016. Photos by Dolruedee Kramnaimuang King.  
Where are the energy pipelines in the above photos? Pipelines are invisible to the 
ordinary eye. They are indicated only by signposts such as those labelled ‘danger high 
pressure gasline’ or a sign on the path indicating ‘gas’. The image on the left hand side 
of Figure 1.1 shows the electricity line, which is part of the energy sector. But unlike 
electricity wires, energy pipelines are not visible to the public eye. They are out of sight, 
buried under the ground, despite traversing through densely- populated urban areas. 
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Figure 1.2: Examples of highly visible energy industries: nuclear power plants and coal mines.  
Note:  Photo on the left from: PressTV (22 February 2015). 
 Photo on the right from: Lawford (13 August 2005). 
The majority of energy pipelines are invisible because they are commonly buried either 
underground or in the ocean. They pass quietly through towns, cities, regions and across 
countries and nations where they play their invisible roles in maintaining hydrocarbon 
economies and transmitting energy resources. Worldwide, approximately 3,500,000 km 
of transmission pipelines are transporting gas and oil (Hopkins, 2007b). Pipelines are 
‘in between’ industries, transporting gas and oil and petroleum products from sites of 
energy production (e.g., drilling rigs both in offshore and onshore petroleum platforms, 
coal seam gas, and shale gas) to distribution points (e.g., petroleum refinery plants, 
power stations, pipeline pumping stations, and domestic households).  
Pipelines are generally considered to be a safe approach to the transportation of 
dangerous substances (COWI, 2011, p. 27). Nevertheless, there are difficulties. As the 
majority of pipelines are buried underground or under water and oceans (Kandiyoti, 
2008; Papadakis, Porter, & Wettig, 1999; Pates, 1996), and hence invisible to the 
human eye, people are not generally aware of their existence (Papadakis et al., 1999, p. 
86). There is a particular concern that unacknowledged defects leading to pipeline risks 
can be obscured to detection by regulatory institutions and pipeline industries: 
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potentially leading to pipeline leaks, explosions, and posing a threat to the general 
public (Hayes & Hopkins, 2014a).  
Although catastrophic pipeline accidents have occurred in many of the world’s 
countries, this section will briefly review three historical events only, including the San 
Bruno case and the Enbridge case (both in the USA), and the Ghislenghien case in 
Belgium. These events are chosen since they have been addressed comparatively by 
both pipeline scholars and practitioners. 
The San Bruno (California, USA) event of 2010, described earlier, caused eight deaths 
and damaged much of the surrounding suburb. It was caused by an engineering error 
dating back to 1956 which had remained undiscovered by the operating company for 
over five decades despite significant regulatory oversight during the intervening period 
(Hayes, 2014). The Enbridge (Michigan, USA) pipeline rupture, which occurred in the 
same year as the San Bruno event, resulted in 320 people suffering serious health effects 
from crude oil exposure (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010a, p. xii). 
Following the accidental release of approximately 843,444 gallons of crude oil, the 
clean-up cost exceeded $US767 million (ibid). The Enbridge pipeline rupture was 
caused by external corrosion which had been identified in 2004, years before the rupture 
in 2010 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010a, p. 37). And, while the regulator 
requirements were deemed adequate, the pipeline defects were overlooked (ibid).  
The Ghislenghien (Belgium) incident in 2004 is considered by many to have been the 
worst natural gas accident in Europe (COWI, 2011, p. 27). It caused 24 fatalities, 
including five fire-fighters, and one police officer and five employees who were killed 
at the site of the explosion. One hundred and thirty-two people were injured (French 
Ministry for Sustainable Development, 2009, p. 3). In addition, the explosion resulted in 
material damage worth over $160 million and in addition to lost economic productivity 
(AFESAC, 2014a, p. 15). This incident was indirectly caused by previous disturbances 
associated with excavation activity during the final stages of constructing a car park 
(Stancliffe, circa 2008). 
According to AFESAC (2014b), the Ghislenghien disaster was caused by a lack of 
understanding of simple policies and procedures Other causes were related to the 
inadequacy of knowledge transferred from the sub-contracting chain to workers, as well 
as insufficiency of pipeline operator supervision at the site (Stancliffe, circa 2008).  
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The European Commission and the Directorate-General for Environment claimed that a 
number of crucial issues – such as risk training for technicians – remained poorly 
addressed seven years after the accident (COWI, 2011, p. 29). Moreover, some evidence 
indicated that details of the number and the locations of underground pipelines were 
poorly documented and that pipeline markers were incorrectly located. These 
discrepancies created significant confusion among those dealing with accidents (COWI, 
2011, p. 29). The legal proceedings of the case are still ongoing and the investigation 
reports are still not available more than ten years after the incident.  
Despite the occurrence of catastrophic accidents, there has been a claim that major 
incidents in pipeline industries happen rarely (see COWI, 2011, p. 6; Desai, 2016, p. 
636): albeit with consequences that can be technically, economically, socially, and 
politically catastrophic when they do occur. Claims of this type, which have been 
addressed by pipeline regulatory institutions and pipeline industries in Australia, 
constitute a focus of this thesis’s investigations.  
1.2.2 The research setting in Australia 
Internationally, Australia is the world’s ninth largest energy producer (Geoscience 
Australia & BREE, 2014). According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
(2016, p. 53), Australia is becoming the world’s second largest exporter of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG). Domestically, gas is the third largest energy resource after coal and 
uranium (Geoscience Australia & BREE, 2014, p. 3). The conventional gas resources 
are sufficient for 51 years at the current production levels (ibid). In addition, Australia 
has significant quantities of unconventional gas resources including coal seam gas 
(CSG), tight gas and shale gas (ibid). The roles of the Australian energy industry 
nationally and internationally indicate that pipelines are currently a crucial part of the 
energy industry for delivering and transporting products. And, this will likely continue 
unchanged into the future.  
Pipeline institutions claim that the country’s energy pipeline industry has a good safety 
record based on a rate of pipeline failure that is below that of the US and Europe (Tuft 
& Bonar, 2009; Tuft & Cunha, 2013). This comparatively good safety record, it is 
claimed, reflects the effectiveness of the national Australian pipeline standard (AS2885) 
(see for example: Fletcher, Venton, Kimber, Haddow, & Bilston, 2003; Kimber, 2003).  
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However, a review of the literature reveals discords in the proclaimed good safety 
record and regulations. These will be addressed in the following sections.  
1.2.2.1 Discords surrounding Australia’s safety record 
Although Australian pipeline institutions claim a good safety record relative to the US 
and Europe, the reasons for this are not yet clear. There is, however, one obvious 
technical reason: Australian pipelines are relatively young compared to others. Hence, 
the negligible rate of corrosion failures (Tuft & Cunha, 2013).  
A review of the accident literature in Australia reveals evidence that although Australian 
energy pipelines have never reported a major accident causing fatalities or injuries to 
workers and the general public, major and minor incidents have been reported in 
association with pipeline industries and petroleum industries. Examples of major 
pipeline incidents include: (a) a pipeline explosion at Varanus Island in Western 
Australia in 2008, resulting in significant economic loss; and (b) a pipeline explosion in 
South Australia in 2015, resulting in gas-supply disruption to approximately 10,000 
homes and businesses. The empirical evidence indicates that risk from pipelines and 
petroleum industries, where pipelines are a key infrastructure carrying and delivering 
petroleum products, is diverse and has a high potential to cause accidents. 
Some of the issues presented here are based on an analysis of the pipeline rupture and 
gas plant explosion at the complex Varanus Island hub in 2008. Operated by the Apache 
Corporation (Bills & Agostini, 2009, p. XVi), the plant was located off the North West 
coast of Western Australia. Four pipelines were ruptured and a subsequent explosion 
occurred at a gas processing plant. The incident resulted in the shutdown of all 
production facilities and connected platforms including gas export to the mainland 
(Bills & Agostini, 2009, p. 127). The accident was caused by severe external corrosion 
of a pipeline which then could not withstand the operating pressure (Bills & Agostini, 
2009). The cause of accident went unnoticed and unreported before the incident 
happened, even though it had been documented. The pipeline had been inspected and 
audited more than 50 times by reputedly top international consultants and regulators 
(Bills & Agostini, 2009, p. 127). 
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Although there were no deaths reported and no injuries to workers or the general public, 
the pipeline failure had an adverse impact on the Western Australia economy of 
approximately AUD$2.6 billion (Bills & Agostini, 2009, p. 6). In addition, over 
560,000 residential and small businesses were affected due to the significant disruption 
to gas and electricity supplies (ibid). The Apache Company had to pay approximately 
AUD$60 million to repair the pipeline and the plant repaired (ibid). Furthermore, the 
company and its joint venture partners had to deal with both financial loss and the loss 
of the facility, which was no longer fully operative after the incident for about a year 
(ibid). 
There were also minor recorded incidents involving pipelines, documented and 
collected by the Australian Pipeline and Gas Association from members of its Pipeline 
Operators Group (POG) dating back to 1965 (Tuft & Cunha, 2013, p. 3). There were 
three types of incidents documented: loss of containment events (average one event 
each year, and zero to three events per annum in recent years); minor pipeline damage 
(130 items in total in the database); and ‘near miss’ incidents by unauthorised third 
party excavation activity on the pipeline easement (460 items in total in the database) 
(ibid).  
1.2.2.2 Discords surrounding pipeline regulations 
A review of evidence from the Australian pipeline literature indicates the complexity of 
pipeline regulatory structures in Australia that oversee a massive Australian pipeline 
system stretching more than 33,000 kilometres across Australia (see Figure 1.3). 
Among them, the majority are gas pipelines (comprising 83%). The remaining pipelines 
(17%) carry diverse fluids including oil, LPG, and ethane (Tuft & Cunha, 2013, p. 4). 
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Figure 1.3: Location of Australia’s gas pipelines and gas resources (Geoscience Australia & BREE, 
2014, p. 82).  
Australian pipelines are regulated by a complex legislative structure involving 14 
regulatory institutions and 46 pieces of legislation across the Australian Commonwealth, 
states and territories (McDermott & Hayes, 2014, pp. 61-67). The complexity of 
Australia’s pipeline regulatory system in Australia contradicts pipeline institutions’ 
claims regarding the ‘superior’ harmonisation of the national Australian Pipeline 
Standard (AS2885) by pipeline institutions (see for example: Fletcher et al., 2003; 
Kimber, 2003), described in the following paragraph.  
The complexity of legislation and jurisdictions were reflected in the Varanus Island 
incident which involved three Western Australia government agencies: the Department 
of Mines and Petroleum (DMP) (formerly the Department of Industry and Resources 
(DOIR)); the Department of Consumer and Employment Protection (DOCEP); and the 
National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority (NOPSA) (now the National Offshore 
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Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA)). The 
complex interactions involving the agencies above were associated with regulatory 
muddle and confusion involving regulatory roles and responsibilities pertinent to safety 
knowledge and resources at the time of the incident. As Bills & Agostini (2009) noted 
while investigating the Varanus incident: 
This regulatory muddle complicates our examination of who should have 
known what and who should have done what in relation to ensuring 
appropriate safety measures are applied to Varanus Island and the 12 inch 
SGL 2 . We have already discussed the information available to Apache 
regarding the 12 inch SGL and we consider that Apache had information 
available to it which would have allowed it to foresee an incident like that 
which occurred on 3 June 2008. The involvement of the three government 
agencies – DOIR, DOCEP and NOPSA – in regulation of the pipeline 
requires consideration of what these agencies may have known, what they 
should have known, and what they could or should have shared regarding 
the 12 inch SGL in order to enable them to also foresee the risk posed by the 
pipelines on the Varanus Island shore crossing (p. 87). 
Evidence of historical gas transmission pipeline ruptures gleaned from pipeline accident 
cases in Australia and internationally emphasises the long and slow incubation periods 
of pipeline accidents, confirming the invisibility of pipeline risks. These events indicate 
that potential catastrophic accidents could happen at any time, and give rise to the 
following question: how can regulators be assured of the effectiveness of their 
regulatory knowledge and practices when dealing with the invisibility of pipeline risks? 
The regulatory systems that rely on the technical-physical nature of industries, industrial 
management and regulatory functions can be fallible to invisible pipeline risks. This is 
yet another discord peculiar to regulatory systems and how they regulate unseen 
pipeline risks. The scenario around the conflict of regulatory knowledge regulating 
invisible risk can be termed a ‘paradox of regulation’ (Haines, 2011).  
The appearance of two black boxes: (a) the black box of discourses pertinent to 
criticisms of regulatory roles, institutions, and apparatuses; and (b) the black box of 
invisibility of pipeline risks, together with discords of safety record and the complexity 
                                                 
2 The 12 inch SGL (12 inch Sales Gas Line) is the name of the pipeline that ruptured on Varanus Island 
(Bills & Agostini, 2009) 
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of pipeline regulations in dealing with the invisibility of pipeline risks (see Section 1.2), 
has led me to review the contemporary theories with their assumptions and limitations 
vis-à-vis regulating hazardous industries.  
1.3 Thesis structure 
This thesis aims to understand and improve the process of risk regulation and, by 
extension, to improve regulatory practices and effectiveness (or regulatory outcomes). 
The findings that emerge are employed to improve such processes. They facilitate a re-
framing towards asking the question: how we can improve regulatory practices 
concerned with technological risk from energy industries? The new performance 
process illuminates alternative concepts, approaches and practices that can be 
considered for employment to improve risk regulation, reduce technological risk and 
prevent catastrophic accidents. 
This thesis comprises three main parts and is divided into nine chapters.  
Part I (Chapters 1-3) explores the thesis context and setting. Chapter 1 (this chapter) 
outlines the research problems and questions.  
Chapter 2 seeks insight into how research can be operationalised to comprehend and 
analyse how power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation is performed through and 
around regulators. It reviews and explores relevant theories, traces their ontological 
stance, and analyses their limitations: in the process providing an alternative approach 
to tackle the research questions. As earlier sketched, this thesis employs a critical-
empirical approach, inspired by the ANT theory in association with a concept of 
Foucauldian power-knowledge. I have drawn upon the above theoretical approach to 
ground my examination of what entities and who have influenced power-knowledge 
relationships throughout the processes of risk regulation. The philosophical stance of 
this thesis approach, together with the main features of this approach (i.e., ontological 
equality, semiotics of materiality, and a concept of power-knowledge) and their 
limitations are reviewed, discussed and analysed.  
Chapter 3 will describe: (a) the philosophy behind methodological concepts (i.e., a 
semiotics of materiality, Actor Network Theory and discourse analysis of power-
knowledge); (b) methodological techniques (i.e., semi-structured interviews, 
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documentation analysis); (c) sampling justification and a symmetrical approach of ANT 
in practice; and (d) processes of data analysis (i.e., coding categorisation, research 
themes). In addition, Chapter 3 will also provide insights into the use of the reflexivity 
concept together with how research questions are operationalised in empirical practice, 
and an analysis of limitations. 
Employing a theoretical-methodological approach, I trace relational assemblages of 
those non-human and human actors that interact with regulators and pipelines to 
perform power-knowledge relationships. Research themes and assemblages implicated 
in power-knowledge relationships were revealed through the process of investigating 
these relationships. The research themes and assemblages were drawn from interviews 
and documents. For this purposes of my investigation, I conducted formal and informal 
interviews. My formal participants included both regulators and associates, and non-
regulators. Regulators and associates included technical regulators across states and ex-
regulators. Non-regulators included pipeline industry staff employed in different 
divisions, external auditors, pipeline industry lobbyist groups, pipeline consultants, 
members of Australian pipeline standard committees, unions, regulatory experts, 
planning panels, field managers and staff from pipeline companies and their contractors 
as well as members of the public.  
Part II of this thesis circumscribes the discussion issues. There are four relational 
assemblages, emerging from empirical investigation, both inside, in between, and 
outside of organisations: they are laid out in four discussion chapters (Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 7). The four relational assemblages include: regulators and multiple 
assemblages across Australian States (discussed in Chapter 4); regulatory apparatuses 
(discussed in Chapter 5); the technical-regulatory specification which is measurement 
length (discussed in Chapter 6); and neoliberal rationalities, discourses about 
government (i.e., deregulation and energy privatisation), and neoliberal techniques 
(discussed in Chapter 7). 
Chapter 4 discusses and analyses the first assemblage: how power-knowledge 
relationships are performed and shaped by regulators and multiple assemblages that 
interact with regulators. This chapter contains two sections. Section 1 discusses the 
findings surrounding the current ontological stance of pipeline regulators in regulating 
pipeline risks. An analysis of the ontology of pipeline regulators is employed to 
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challenge existing theory vis-à-vis regulatory capture. The second part of Chapter 4 
discusses the findings surrounding multiple assemblages that shape regulatory practices 
across Australian states. This section reorganises the data regarding multiple 
assemblages into seven geographical states. Each state has different assemblages, 
indicating a multiplicity of regulatory practices across states. In addition, this section 
will question: what is multiplicity and what challenges follow from around the 
multiplicity of regulatory practices? 
Chapter 5 discusses and analyses the second assemblage associated with three emerging 
regulatory apparatuses: safety plans; risk-based regulation; and social-regulatory 
controls (i.e., tripartite engagement or union engagement, and workforce engagement). 
This chapter discusses how regulatory knowledge and practices related to these 
regulatory apparatuses have been made, understood, implemented and communicated 
among actors. In addition, Chapter 5 traces and re-traces gaps in the knowledge and 
practices pertinent to these apparatuses. 
In Chapter 6, the focus is upon discussing and analysing a third assemblage, specifically, 
a technical-regulatory specification under the Australian pipeline standard AS2885 – 
called measurement length. This chapter argues that the technical dimension is enacted 
as part of a negotiating process in performing power-knowledge relationships. It 
examines how the enactment of measurement length has influenced risk accountability, 
risk communication and risk knowledge among actors.  
In the process of exploring measurement length, one emerging conflict and a newly 
emergent group of actors became manifest. Examination of the emerging conflict 
revealed the research themes that involve an incoherence of knowledge and practices in 
the process of risk regulation including risk communication, risk assessment, and risk 
accountability. The group of newly emergent actors is distinctive: I have named these 
actors – ‘interactors’. Who are interactors, why and to what they are crucial, and how 
are they different from other actors embedded within the existing literature? These 
questions are discussed and analysed in Section 6.2.2. The interactors will be employed 
to re-frame an alternative approach to improving regulatory practices and effectiveness 
(see Chapter 8).  
Chapter 7, the last discussion chapter, explores and analyses knowledge and practices in 
relation to risk regulation as shaped by neoliberal rationalities, discourses about 
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government (i.e., deregulation and energy privatisation), as well as neoliberal 
techniques embedded within deregulation and energy privatisation. As a result of 
following these relations, the research themes representative of certain material impacts 
on knowledge and practices involved in regulatory processes become apparent. The 
findings indicate that these impacts went largely unacknowledged by the majority of 
participants as well as by contemporary theorists. The impacts were described by a 
regulatory expert participant in this thesis as ‘going to be a whole new thing in terms of 
risk’. So, what are these new types of risk and how do they create adverse impacts on 
actors? These questions will be analysed in the last section of Chapter 7. 
Part III (Chapter 8 and 9) discusses the research implications, conclusions and the future. 
It contains two chapters. The aim is ultimately to improve regulatory outcomes. Chapter 
9 concludes with a discussion of reflexivity and what may be needed for the future? 
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Chapter 2 
Theories of risk regulation, ANT, and power  
This chapter explores theoretical perspectives with potential to provide insight into the 
nature of industrial risks, the causes of major accidents and the effectiveness of 
regulation. In so doing, this chapter critically engages with existing literature on the 
regulation of industrial risk and the causes of accidents with an aim to develop a 
conceptual and analytical framework that will serve as a foundation for investigating the 
research questions that guide this thesis. It explores Actor-Network Theory as a way to 
extend risk regulation literatures through the re-examination of their ontological 
assumptions.  
2.1 Regulating technological risks: exploring existing theories 
Understanding the regulation of technological risks involves theories relevant to three 
broad and inter-related concepts: risk, safety and regulation. Hopkins and Hale (2002) 
stress that: ‘[s]afety regulation is about the regulation of risk’ (p. 3). However, this 
chapter does not attempt to analyse all of the theories concerned with risk and safety; 
rather, its focus is more upon those theories that are associated specifically with experts, 
technologies, regulatory approaches, and power relations. Three groups of key theories 
are reviewed: theories of regulation; theories of organisational safety; and theories of 
risk. These are summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Three broader groups of theories that deal with hazardous industries and risk. 
Groups of theories Theories 
Regulation  Risk-based regulation (Black, 2010) 
 Responsive regulation (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992) 
Organisational safety Swiss cheese model (Reason, 1997) 
 High reliability organisation (La Porte, 1996)  
Risk Risk society (Beck, 1992b) 
 Lay-expert understanding of science (Wynne, 1996) 
 Governmentality (Zinn, 2008b) 
 Inclusive risk governance (Renn, 2008c) 
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This section will begin by reviewing how risk is dealt with in regulatory approaches and 
theories.  
2.1.1 Risk in regulatory approaches and theories  
This section reviews two theories and the setting of their premises. The two theories are: 
(a) risk-based regulation; and (b) responsive regulation. These theories are primarily 
employed in regulating technological risk that is generated by hazardous industries.  
2.1.1.1 Risk-based frameworks 
(a) Risk-based frameworks: an overview  
Contemporary regulatory practice in hazardous industries is predominantly based on 
risk-based regulation (also known as goal-setting regulation, outcome-oriented, 
performance-based legislation or self-regulation). The risk-based framework has been 
described ‘as a necessary attribute of “better regulation”’ (Black, 2010, p. 186), and is 
widely used by regulators in many countries for managing their resources and 
reputations (Black & Baldwin, 2010; Rothstein, Irving, Walden, & Yearsley, 2006b). 
Included among the above are regulators3 in Australia. 
Risk-based regulation is based on the premise that beneficial outcomes are best 
achieved by allocating resources according to where risks are highest rather than 
according to fixed rules (Black & Baldwin, 2010, p. 184). The degree of risk posed to 
society is taken into account in order to prioritise regulatory resources and to set proper 
levels of controls (Rothstein et al., 2006b, p. 1057). This framework can use in 
combination with a range of approaches to risk management including voluntary 
agreements, trading schemes, environmental management systems, taxes, etc., in 
addition to more traditional regulatory instruments such as authorisation, checking and 
enforcement (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001).  
Risk-based frameworks incorporate a range of strategies and activities ranging from 
objective and standard setting to compliance assessment and enforcement (Rothstein et 
                                                 
3 The primary types of regulators involved in this thesis are technical regulators (or pipeline regulators) 
who regulate technological-hazardous risk from industries and who implement technical-safety 
regulations. 
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al., 2006b, p. 1057). According to (Black & Baldwin, 2010, pp. 184-185), necessary 
steps include:   
• Risk identification. Regulators and risk managers have to identify what types of 
risks they wish to control.  
• Risk tolerance. Determination of what types of risks they are prepared to tolerate 
and to what level.  
• Risk assessment. Risks are assessed with consideration for adverse events, 
especially the probabilities about how often such events may occur.  
• Risk scoring or risk ranking. Regulators assign scores and/or rank the degree of 
risk to industrial firms and industrial activities with regard to outcomes of risk 
assessments.  
• Monitoring and enforcement. Organisational strategies, inspections and, in 
particular, enforcement resources allocated to optimise risk management.  
The risk-based approach is thus used by regulators to determine which industrial 
activities deserve the most regulatory attention and whether the measures firms propose 
to take are sufficient (Black, 2010, p. 187). An example of a risk-based framework is 
presented in Figure 2.1 below:  
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Figure 2.1: A diagram of a risk-based framework (NSW Department of Premier and Cabinet, 2014, p. 
5). 
Figure 2.1 shows how the practice of a risk-based approach is generated from fixed, 
established and necessary elements in a closed framework. While on the one hand, it 
sets steps that are easy to follow and implement, on the other, the framework excludes 
factors outside of its criteria such as social-political factors that intervene at the level of 
risk acceptability. Discourses and relationships that influence regulatory practice are 
overlooked in risk-based regulatory models.  
Nonetheless, risk-based approaches have a number of advantages. For example, they 
provide a better platform for regulators, compared to the conventional prescriptive 
approach which is rule-based and inflexible. The risk-based approach can accommodate 
the degree of risk and allow negotiation of knowledge and regulatory practices with 
industries. In addition, risk-based approaches provide firms subject to regulation with 
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flexibility. Each can find its own approach to optimising the cost of mitigating risks 
(Coglianese, Nash, & Olmstead, 2003, p. 711).  
Risk-based approaches are efficient in as much as they maximise the benefits of 
regulation while minimising the burden of specific interventions on industries 
(Hampton, 2005). Risk-based approaches have been promoted as effective rational 
decision-making instruments for managing risks in relation to resource allocations 
(Rothstein, Huber, & Gaskell, 2006a, p. 97).  
(b) Risk-based approaches in the Australian pipeline context 
Risk-based approaches that regulate technological risks associated with pipeline 
industries in Australia are embedded in safety plans: a regulatory requirement under the 
Australian standard for pipelines (AS2885) and pipeline regulations across Australian 
states and territories. The broader scope of the risk-based approach is encompassed in 
safety plans. In the context of Australian pipelines, a safety plan is called a Pipeline 
Management System4 (PMS) or, in some jurisdictions, a safety case. So, what is a safety 
case? According to Hopkins (2012b): 
A safety case is a case - an argument made to the regulator. Companies must 
demonstrate to the regulator the processes they have gone through to 
identify hazards, the methodology they have used to assess risks and the 
reasoning that has led them to choose one control rather than another. 
Finally the regulator must accept (or reject) the case (pp.4-5). 
Generally, regulators have specified a safety policy goal and require facilitators to 
ensure worker and public safety (Hopkins & Hale, 2002, p. 4). 
Pipeline licensees are required to submit safety plans to regulators prior to obtaining 
pipeline licenses to ensure the safe operation of the pipelines. In addition, they have to 
submit safety plans to regulators before commissioning and operating the pipelines 
(Standards Australia, 2012b). In the next step, pipeline licensees have to undertake a 
Safety Management Process or Safety Management Study (SMS) (Standards Australia, 
2012a, p. 16), identifying and assessing risk to the pipeline system and applying 
                                                 
4 Formerly known as a Safety and Operating Plan (SAOP). 
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controls to them (ibid). Risk assessment must be undertaken using the AS2885.1 risk 
matrix (Standards Australia, 2012a, pp. 187-190) (Figure 2.2).  
Pipeline licensees have to ensure that residual risk is reduced to an acceptable level; that 
is, ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) (ibid, p. 8). Safety plans are an on-going 
part of SMS and pipeline licensees are required to revise safety plans every five years or 
when any changes to threat levels occur (ibid, p. 23). Both SMSs and risk matrices are 
examples of regulatory devices (or apparatuses). The regulatory apparatuses are 
problem-solving tools that regulators develop and design to control risks. This thesis 
will investigate what apparatuses are employed and how they are employed by 
regulators in pipeline industry contexts.  
 
Figure 2.2: AS2885.1 Risk matrix (Nilsson, 2011, p. 11). 
Although the process of SMS between a PMS and a safety case sounds similar, the 
components of PMSs are different from safety case documents. A PMS document 
contains five necessary elements (see Figure 2.3) including: management; planning; 
implementation; measurement and evaluation; and consultation, communication and 
reporting. A safety case document is composed of: (a) a facility description; (b) a formal 
safety assessment (FSA); and (c) a safety management system (see Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.3: A diagram showing the broad scoping of the risk-based approach encompassing a 
Pipeline Management System (PMS) (Standards Australia, 2012b, p. 90). 
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Figure 2.4: A diagram showing the broad scoping of the risk-based approach encompassing a 
safety case (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011b, p. 13). 
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The major difference between a PMS and a safety case involves the regulatory 
requirements. The safety case regime is designed to have requirements as equal to, or 
exceeding, the requirements of AS2885 (Standards Australia, 2012b, p. 95). In other 
words, the safety case regime appears to have more stringent requirements than a PMS. 
Whereas the core focus of the safety case regime is upon identifying hazards contingent 
to a major accident event (MAE)5 (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011b, pp. 2, 
9), a PMS does not emphasise MAEs. More importantly, the safety case regime requires 
industries to involve workers in the process of developing, revising, and implementing 
the safety case document (ibid, p. 8). 
The reasons for such differences between a PMS and safety case are associated with the 
background of the enactment process. The PMS regime was enacted for use with the 
Australian pipeline industries wherein pipeline catastrophes have never occurred. The 
enactment of the safety case regime and its core facet of workforce involvement were 
triggered by the Piper Alpha disaster that occurred in 1988 (Miller, 1991, pp. 183-184). 
A massive explosion on the oil platform not only killed 167 out of 226 workers on 
board, but caused substantial financial losses to the UK industry and government 
(National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority, 2015).  
Investigation of the Piper Alpha incident showed that failures of risk management and 
risk communication contributed to the disaster (Miller, 1991, p. 181). The Cullen report 
stressed that workers had not been informed about the layout of the platform and had 
not been given adequate emergency procedures training (ibid). Such failures led to 
emphasis on workforce involvement (or workforce participation or workforce 
engagement) as a key element of producing and improving safety cases (Hart, 2002, pp. 
486-487). This key element was underscored by the successful Norwegian case which 
resulted in unionised workforces assisting and strengthening the effectiveness of 
Norwegian regulatory regimes (Miller, 1991, p. 184).  
The safety case regime has been widely applied in many countries, with the major 
exception of North America. A safety case approach is employed in Australia for 
offshore oil and gas facilities (National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental 
                                                 
5 A major accident event (MAE) is defined as ‘an event connected with a pipeline operation, including a 
natural event, having the potential to cause multiple fatalities of persons engaged in the operation or other 
protected persons’ (Standards Australia, 2012b, p. 95). 
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Management Authority, 2015) and for onshore hazardous process plants (or major 
hazard facilities (MHFs) in all states and territories (Safe Work Australia, 2012). For 
pipelines, safety cases are required in two Australian states: Victoria and Western 
Australia. In the state of Victoria, the safety case regime was employed among 
petroleum onshore and offshore industries following incidents at Longford6. 
In summary, risk-based approaches are embedded in Australian pipeline regulations 
including the national, harmonised Australian pipeline standard AS2885 and other 
pipeline regulations across Australian states and territories. While risk-based approaches 
have various advantages, in effect they are limited to the assessment of technological 
risks which are perceived as tangible. Risk-based methods rely on necessary and fixed 
elements in an assessment process to imagine and predict what risks exist. What is 
unimagined remains disassociated and unacknowledged, in particular relationships of 
power-knowledge related to risk regulation and regulatory practices shaped by 
regulatory institutions and pipeline industries. In addition, regulators may encounter 
other difficulties when assessing invisible risks, in particular, difficulties due to limited 
resources together with complex regulatory problems (Black & Baldwin, 2010, p. 182).  
2.1.1.2 Responsive regulation 
(a) Responsive regulation: an overview  
Responsive regulation theory emphasises the recursive relationships that obtain between 
regulatory practices and the responses and needs of the firms they regulate (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1992). It provides tools for regulators to interact with businesses in order to 
improve regulatory design and enforcement.  
Responsive regulation theorists argue that regulatory strategies can be organised 
according to principles embedded in the idea of ‘regulatory pyramids’ (ibid, p. 38-39). 
The latter have two components: the support pyramid and the sanction pyramid (Figure 
                                                 
6 The ‘Longford incident’ refers to an explosion that occurred at one of Esso Australia’s gas plants (in 
September 1998) in Longford in the state of Victoria (Dawson, 1999). Two workers were killed and the 
state’s gas supply was severely affected to Victorian industries and residential households (Hopkins, 
2001). The accidents were variously caused by: the failure of safety management system audits, the 
failure of Esso’s incident report system, the failure of the alarm system, and inadequate oversight by 
senior staff (ibid). As a result of the Longford accident, the Longford Royal Commission required that 
Esso’s Longford facility and all major hazard facilities in the State of Victoria have to conform to a safety 
case regime (Dawson, 1999, p. 141). 
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2.5). The logic of a regulatory pyramid anticipates more cooperative strategies (e.g., 
education, persuasion) employed at the base of the pyramid. Punitive approaches (e.g., 
notices, prosecution, cancelling licenses) are used only when cooperative strategies fail 
or when more powerful incentives (e.g., subsidies, prizes) are considered inappropriate 
or ineffective (Braithwaite, 2011, p. 482). The strategies of staying at the bottom are 
related to cost and the rationales of firms taking self-regulation. It is generally 
considered to be least expensive for all stakeholders to stay at the bottom of the 
regulatory pyramid and more expensive to escalate to the top. Therefore, firms are 
incentivised to avoid carrying costs of non-compliance and to adopt a cooperative 
stance (Ivec & Braithwaite, 2015, p. 7).  
 
Informal communication 
of suspected or detected  
non-compliances 
 
Monitoring compliance 
(field and desktop 
inspections) 
  License cancellation 
 
Security forfeiture 
 
Prosecution or  
administrative penalty  
 
Revert licensee to ‘high 
surveillance’ operator 
Public recognition of 
outstanding performance 
 
Education 
 
Activity direction or 
prohibition  
 
Notice of non-compliance 
 
Self-regulation  
 
Self-regulation 
 
 
Figure 2.5: A model regulatory pyramid for regulating pipeline risks.  
Note: examples of supports and sanctions are drawn from the following reference: Energy Resources Division (2012). 
The premises for effective responsive regulation include democratic deliberation and 
transparency (Ivec & Braithwaite, 2015, p. 6). The ideal at the base of the pyramid is 
respect for dialogue, not only with firms that are not complying with regulatory 
requirements, but also with broader publics (ibid). This is where the ideal of tripartism 
(or the empowerment theory of tripartism) enters the realm of responsive regulation 
theory (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 81). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) developed the 
ideal of tripartism by co-opting other social actors into the regulatory process, called 
third party actors (e.g., communities, labour unions, and non-governmental actors), into 
Escalating 
supports 
Escalating 
sanctions 
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the regulatory process. The theorists suggest that the regulatory process must include 
third parties to prevent regulatory capture, their aim being to remedy an inequality of 
power (ibid). Regulatory capture occurs when regulators fail to enforce the law against 
powerful business offenders (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992). When regulators have been 
captured by regulated organisations, their responsibilities become distorted. Conflicts of 
interest occur because regulators serve their own interests rather than the public interest 
(Baldwin, Scott, & Hood, 1998, p. 10). Examples of regulatory capture include an 
absence of toughness and being sympathetic towards firms coping with compliance 
difficulties (Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 61). Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) suggest 
that in order to break regulatory capture and improve regulatory enforcement, tripartism 
should apply at any of the enforcement pyramid levels. 
Although the theory of responsive regulation highlights the potential benefits of 
incorporating less powerful parties into regulation, it is important to acknowledge that 
such involvement raises questions of its own. For example, how can regulators 
encourage third parties to be effectively involved when regulators face their own 
constraints (e.g., limited resources, unclear regulatory objectives, limited legal power 
and limited knowledge in coping with rare events)? How can regulators overcome these 
constraints? Furthermore, although third parties can participate and add their voices to 
the regulatory process, they generally have different sets of knowledge from those of 
other parties. So, how do regulators reconcile these differences? These questions are 
associated with power-knowledge relationships that appear to be positioned outside the 
frame of regulatory pyramids. In other words, the strategies associated with responsive 
regulation theory do not deal explicitly with how to ensure effective deliberation vis-à-
vis power-knowledge relationships. 
(b) Responsive regulation in the Australian pipeline context 
The theory of responsive regulation has been employed by pipeline regulators to 
regulate pipeline risks in Australia (see for example: Department of Natural Resources 
and Mines, 2011; Energy Resources Division, 2012; Energy Safe Victoria, 2014). 
Despite its practical use, the literature is limited to general indications about employing 
responsive regulation in line with government documents. The literature does not 
explain the constraints in relation to power-knowledge and pipeline regulators. For this 
reason, during my fieldwork I explored the question of what has worked well and what 
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has not worked well with respect to the responsive regulatory approach (see Chapter 4). 
In addition, I sought to identify and explore the assemblages that have shaped 
knowledge and practices associated with use of the responsive regulatory approach. 
In the next section, I will examine the philosophical stances behind regulatory theories 
and trace some of the history of the development of a pipeline standard. 
2.1.1.3 The philosophical stances of regulatory theories used within the 
Australian pipeline contexts 
Regulatory theories have roots (or theoretical ontologies) that tend to be concordant 
with the criteria of realism (see for example: Hasle, Limborg, & Nielsen, 2014; Nourse 
& Shaffer, 2009). According to Law (2004), the term “realism” is defined as: 
an approach to the philosophy of science that argues that empirical and 
experimental investigation is unintelligible in the absence of an external 
world, and human capacity to intervene in that world and monitor the results 
of their actions (Law, 2004, p. 163).  
In accordance with the above definition, regulatory theories delineate (albeit in more 
pragmatic ways) how regulators using technical-regulatory tools (or devices or 
strategies) can objectively regulate technological risks. Techniques and technical-
regulatory strategies including risk assessment and technical risk analysis have been 
developed to manage industrial risk and uncertainty. The philosophical stance of 
realism embedded in AS2885 is apparent here:  
The philosophy under which Committee ME-038 has operated has been to 
use a first principles approach to the development of technical requirements. 
The Committee aims to first understand the laws of nature so that it can set 
down effective laws of man. Consistent with the style requirements of a 
Standard the rules are, wherever possible, accompanied by explanatory 
material in order to help the user understand the principles and intent of the 
Standard (Standards Australia, 2008, p. 20).  
The ontology of AS2885 largely contains the premises of realism, joined here with an 
element of positivism: ‘[t]he Committee aims to first understand the laws of nature so 
that it can set down effective laws of man’. What is positivism? According to Law 
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(2004), positivism argues to the effect that: ‘scientific truths are rigorous sets of logical 
relations or laws that describe the relations between (rigorous) empirical descriptions’ 
(p. 15). Positivism tends to support fixed and inflexible regimes when applied in 
practice – technocratic regimes assuming scientific authority.  
The following question arises: have regulators employed the realist approach to deal 
with complex regulatory problems in the Australian pipeline case? This section tracks 
some of the history of AS2885 development. It asks who has been involved, how, and 
what perspectives do pipeline experts bring to bear in managing risks? The questions I 
raise are consistent with the notion of regulation as put forth by Black (2002). Black has 
inferred that regulations should be understood as composed of core elements. The 
elements that are relevant to this thesis include: (a) the complexity of the regulatory 
context; and (b) the challenges pertinent to the fragmentation of knowledge and the 
exercise of power and control. These questions are examined through the field research 
of this thesis.   
The process of performing pipeline risk and safety knowledge in Australia commenced 
after an oil and gas discovery in 1960 (Kimber, 2010, p. 1). The first long distance 
pipeline (Roma to Brisbane) was completed in 1969. Knowledge about how to build 
pipelines and manage risks was imported from the USA via consultants as a 
consequence of the worldwide recognition given to USA technology and standards at 
that time (Kimber, 2003, p. 1). The USA was the first country to develop high pressure 
pipelines for petroleum products and by extension to produce an industry-wide pipeline 
standard. The majority of pipelines in the 1960s were designed and built under the 
supervision of USA companies including Bechtel, Williams Brothers and Fluor. 
Shortly after, Australia (and many other countries) developed their own standards. The 
Australian standard was developed in the early 1970s by Australian pipeline engineers. 
Drawing upon their overseas experience and knowledge, they constructed new, long 
distance but relatively small diameter and high pressure pipelines. Their development of 
the Australian Standard was strengthened by multilateral science and engineering 
research and with the cooperation of North American and European pipeline researchers.  
The first Australian Standard (AS2885) was established in 1987. AS2885 was revised in 
1997, 2007, and 2012, and has continued to be periodically revised up until the present. 
It is an engineering standard, and as such, technical aspects remain its key focus. In 
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1996, the pipeline industry set up research programs to produce technical knowledge 
that applied directly to the standard specifications. Modifications were made with the 
aim of developing innovative technology. The goal were to reduce costs and improve 
safety in relation to construction, welding methods, and other associated problems 
confronting operators in their daily management of the completed pipelines (Kimber, 
Haddow, & Chipperfield, 2003, pp. 1-3).  
Although the standard was drawn-up by the pipeline industry, regulators have been 
actively involved in the ME-038 Committee7 in developing and revising the regulatory 
specifications and sharing knowledge and expertise. ME-038 makes representations to 
the Australian Standards Committee, which is comprised of industry representatives 
(two thirds) and of state regulators (one third). Critically, this standard has the same 
force of legislation as AS2885; which has been adopted by the legislative and regulatory 
frameworks across states subject to an agreement from the Council of Australian 
Governments (CoAG) to harmonise these diverse pipeline legislations (Standards 
Australia, 2008, p. 12). 
Pipeline legislation and regulations in Australia are diverse across the Australian 
Commonwealth and the Australian States and Territories. They involve 14 regulatory 
institutions and 46 frameworks of legislation and regulation (McDermott & Hayes, 
2014, pp. 61-67). But, how do regulators deal with these regulatory complexities in 
managing pipelines with long distances of up to and more than 33,000 kilometres across 
Australia?  
The AS2885 Standard claims to be ‘the single and sufficient technical standard’ 
(Standards Australia, 2008, p. 9) for hydrocarbon pipelines (AS2885.0 Section 1.3). In 
addition, according to AS2885.0 part 1.3, ‘the Standard exists for: (i) the safety of the 
general public and pipeline personnel; (ii) the protection of the environment; and (iii) 
security of supply’ (Standards Australia, 2008, p. 8). Nevertheless, influential industry 
sources claim that the standard components and specifications have been revised over 
time, the purpose being to reduce costs and optimise safety (Kimber et al., 2003, p. 2). 
This raises an important issue about the role of the standard and its framing. How has 
the balance between cost and safety been determined, and in particular, how are non-
technical questions taken into account when developing that balance? The technical 
                                                 
7 This is the name given to the formally constituted committee that manages the standard and its revision. 
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factors specific to those aspects amenable to analysis using a realist or positivist 
approach are only one part. In order to govern risk, the integration of technical experts, 
consideration of regulatory requirements and reflection upon the values of different 
social actors are required (Renn & Schweizer, 2009). The underlying concern is that if 
technical aspects adopting a realist or positivist approach are prioritised over other 
aspects, then how can the industries be certain that they are considering the right issues, 
not only for themselves, but for others also?  
The premises of the technical-regulatory approach, subject to mediation by regulatory 
theorists, form a characteristic discourse which carries the following features. 
According to regulators, risk can be both theoretically and practically controlled (Haines, 
2011; Hood et al., 2001; Kirwan, Hale, & Hopkins, 2002). The linkage of theory and 
practice in this way indicates realism. The reasoning behind this discourse is based on 
premises that accompany a perception of modernity – whereby humans create and 
develop technical mastery over threats from technology (Haines, 2011, p. 3; Leiss, 
1972). Regulators perceive the modernist project as involving the development of 
processes and styles of enforcement and compliance in order to minimise risk (ibid). 
Modernism has heavily informed regulatory rationalisation and systematisation (Meyer, 
2000).  
In accordance with technical-regulatory realist perspectives, regulations are 
acknowledged as vital instruments or problem-solving tools developed and designed to 
reduce harm or control risks (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012b, p. 83; Gunningham, 
Grabosky, & Sinclair, 1998; Gunningham & Johnstone, 1999; Haines, 2011, p. 10; 
Hopkins & Hale, 2002; Sparrow, 2011). Regulatory tools and strategies range from 
conventional forms of regulation (command and control or compliance-based 
approaches) to those which are more flexible. The latter involve not only governments, 
but other actors including commercial interests and non-government organisations, 
communities, unions or even a combination of these. Alternative regulatory approaches 
include self-regulation, ‘responsive regulation’, ‘smart regulation’, ‘risk-based 
regulation’, ‘principles-based approaches’ and ‘co-regulation’.  
While on the one hand, regulations are structured and can be implemented to mitigate 
pipeline risks, on the other, they are a paradox (Haines, 2011), for as Rothstein and 
colleagues suggest, regulations face epistemic challenges from science (2006b, p. 1061). 
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Technological risks are difficult to assess and manage (ibid). For example, regulated 
firms have faced difficulties measuring, evaluating and verifying their actual 
performance, although models are available to them for making predictions (Coglianese 
et al., 2003, p. 715). However, the said predictions may not be accurately related to 
actual performance; and additionally, they cannot easily be evaluated or verified, as is 
the case with rare and high-consequence events (e.g., pipeline explosions) (ibid). Not 
only can the factors involved in rare events be numerous and complex: they can lead to 
high levels of uncertainty (ibid). This is illustrated by how operators make their 
judgements vis-à-vis what is an acceptable threshold (ibid). In this process, many causes 
of uncertainty have been unrecognised or ignored (ibid). In addition, risk-acceptance 
criteria are unlikely to be open to public scrutiny (Melchers, 2001). In short, as 
invaluable as the contributions of the regulatory tools are, regulatory instrumentations 
are limited in coping with the complexity and uncertainty of technological risks.  
This thesis evaluates the theoretical ontology of the literature that addresses regulations 
used within Australian pipeline contexts, and finds that social-political issues are often 
disassociated from the realist realm, leading to potential problems in research 
exploration and analysis. For example, risk-based approaches give less attention to 
engaging the concept of citizen deliberation and worker participation when compared to 
responsive regulation. The risk-based approach is more focused on resource allocations 
related to the degree of risk and the decisions made by regulatory institutions.  
More importantly, regulatory practices constantly interact with the sorts of issues more 
traditionally viewed as the domain of social science. For example, regulators have faced 
difficulties when interpreting the acceptability of risk driven by political interventions 
(Black & Baldwin, 2010, p. 184). In addition, regulators are primarily involved with 
bureaucratic rational decision-making procedures; for this reason, they may not consider 
all of the aspects addressed by the stakeholders when weighing costs against benefits 
(Rothstein et al., 2006b, p. 1057). The big question is: how do regulators deal with this 
mixture of technical and social issues? As far as the extant literature is concerned, 
research exploration and analysis may be limited by uncritical assumptions. So, what 
regulations should researchers start with? What limitations of the technical-regulatory 
realist realm affect research design?  
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In the next section, attention will turn to how risks are regulated by other contemporary 
theories of regulation within organisations, in between and beyond.  
2.1.2 Risk within organisations, in between and beyond  
Technical-regulatory experts practise technical risk analysis in a manner that largely 
excludes social-political interactions from their analyses. These technical-regulatory 
realist approaches to regulating risk have been the subject of criticism, in particular by 
scholars from the social sciences. The social science cohort argues that risks cannot be 
understood as straightforward ‘objective’ of ‘technical’ phenomena. Risks, they claim, 
are filtered by human values and experiences, experts, and interventions, from political-
institutional structures within, in between and outside of organisations (Dietz, Frey, & 
Rosa, 2002). Risks are constructed, in important ways, through social-political actors 
and processes. According to Law (2004), constructivism is ‘the claim that scientific 
statements or truths are constructed in a way that to a large degree (in some versions 
totally) reflects the social circumstances of their production’ (pp. 157-158).  
Risk scholars have observed and developed the notion of how risk is constructed in 
several ways, not only in relation to technical factors but also through organisational 
factors, human factors, technologies, experts, the values and experience of laypeople 
and through power relations. This section will review how knowledge about risks is 
constructed through different viewpoints including: organisational factors and human 
factors (Section 2.1.2.1); social-political issues at macro and micro studies (Section 
2.1.2.2); and power relations (Section 2.1.2.3). The overall approach aims to recognise 
that each viewpoint is framed or constructed by different theories. Each theory has its 
own assumptions and limitations. In addition, I explore the possibility of employing 
these theories to examine, explain and ameliorate problems associated with the existing 
power-knowledge relationships that shape the regulatory outcomes. 
2.1.2.1 Organisational theories 
The construction of risk in relation to organisational and human factors is influenced by 
theories about organisational safety. Theories on organisational safety set assumptions 
that indicate the performance of safety-instrumental systems in managing industrial 
safety is influenced by culture, organisational factors and human factors in addition to 
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technical factors in a wider socio-technical system. These theories have advantages for 
analysing the causes of accidents, and for proposing prevention strategies to prevent 
accidents: they include the Swiss Cheese Model theory and the High Reliability 
Organisation (HRO) theories.  
(a) Swiss Cheese Model theory 
The Swiss cheese model provides an analysis of accident causation with the aim of 
preventing catastrophes. The model uses the concept of an ‘accident trajectory’ (Reason, 
1997, p. 9) which explains how accidents can happen as a result of interconnections 
among unsafe acts, caused by organisational factors such as decisions made by senior 
managers. Active failures and latent conditions are technical terms to describe 
contributors to human-caused accidents. Active failures that cause accidents are human 
decisions and actions which have direct impacts on the safety of the system (Reason, 
1997, p. 10). Latent conditions are indirect impacts causing accidents by humans (e.g., 
poor design, undetected manufacturing defects, and unworkable procedures), which 
may be hidden for many years until they penetrate and destroy the systems (ibid).  
Reason claims that technological risks are controlled by constructing a series of 
‘defences in depth’ (Reason, 1997, p. 7) involving multiple layers of protection (ibid). 
Defensive functions that prevent accidents are composed of hard and soft defences 
(ibid). Hard defences are technical devices (e.g., engineered safety features, alarms, and 
protective equipment) and soft defences are a combination of paper and people (e.g., 
legislation, rules and procedures, training, and administrative controls) (ibid). Reason 
further suggests that one defence lies behind the others, bracing against the possible 
breakdown of the one in the front (ibid). For example, if the procedural guidance system 
fails to protect potential victims from hazards, alarms will alert operators to 
technological risks in a bid to maintain the safety of the system (ibid).  
The model suggests the reality that defences are imperfect; each layer has holes, 
emulating the metaphor associated with the holes in Swiss cheese. The system becomes 
affected if a potential accident can enter the holes in the first defence. Should this occur, 
this potential accident will enter the second defence, and if the holes in all of the 
defences line-up in succession, the defences will collapse (Reason, 1997, p. 12).  
40 
Regulatory practitioners and scholars employ the Swiss Cheese Model to analyse 
accident cases. The pipeline failure at San Bruno and the Enbridge cases were subjected 
to this analysis (Hayes & Hopkins, 2014a). Regarding San Bruno, the maintenance 
work was not properly controlled. The resultant increase in operating pressure caused 
the existing weld defects to fail, by extension causing pipeline rupture. In the Enbridge 
case, the accident occurred due to a poor decision making process. The assigned leader 
of the team deferred its formal decision-makers to the operator on duty or to her/his 
subordinate. The latter was presumed to have expertise but the reality was unarguably 
different.  
The original model has been criticised in terms of its structure and application. Luxhøj 
and Kauffeld (2003) note that the model provides insufficient details of the 
interrelationships among the causal factors, making it difficult to use in practice. 
Furthermore, the model does not provide guidelines for further in-depth investigation 
and analysis, in particular of the structure of the holes (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2012). 
So, how can the connection between latent conditions and accidents be identified before 
an accident occurs (Young, Shorrock, Faulkner, & Braithwaite, 2004)? What 
knowledge have regulators used in their current practices to identify latent conditions 
such as undetected manufacturing defects and unworkable procedures? Further, how 
can regulators regulate such conditions? More importantly, Besnard and Hollnagel 
(2014, p. 17) argue that the premise of improving safety by increasing the layers of 
protection can be considered as a myth because: (a) psychologically, people adjust their 
risk exposure according to the perceived level of protection; and (b) technically, adding 
layers of protection results in an increase in technical complexity thus making 
understanding of the system more difficult.  
(b) High Reliability Organisation (HRO) theories 
The literature on High Reliability Organisations is a leading guide to the explication of 
preventive strategies employed to ensure industrial safety. HRO research explores the 
conditions of large-scale and hazardous operating organisations that have excellent 
safety records and have conducted highly reliable operations over long periods of time 
(La Porte, 1996; Roberts, 1989). An understanding of how HROs operate is crucial if 
organisations are to avoid catastrophic accidents (ibid). Research suggests that the 
conditions needed to sustain HROs are variously related to internal processes and 
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external relationships of organisations (La Porte, 1996). The former include: HROs 
presenting a strong mission and goals; HROs having extraordinary technical 
competence; HROs having high operational performance accompanied by stringent 
quality assurance measures in maintenance; HROs considering flexibility to ensure 
safety and protect performance resilience; HROs having predominantly hierarchical 
patterns of authority; decision-making by HROs within authority patterns that tend to be 
decentralised to the level where action needs to be taken; and decisions being executed 
with little chance for review (La Porte, 1996). The importance of ‘safety culture’8 in 
HRO elements (Weick, 1987), referring to norms, shared perceptions, and having 
fraternal workways and informal traditions within operating groups (Roberts, 1990) is 
worthy of note. The organisations’ external relationships involve cooperation with 
external interest groups, with the aim of increasing and fostering public trust (La Porte, 
1996).  
HRO scholars suggest that organisations can become highly reliable and capable of 
preventing accidents by changing human and organisational factors. HRO theory 
addresses the extent to which social as well as technical dimensions are involved in 
regulating safety. A somewhat similar approach is taken by Resilience Engineering 
theory (RET) which focuses on the functions of industrial systems involving safety and 
efficiency. RET argues that to become resilient systems must be able to respond 
effectively to expected and unexpected situations, to monitor changes that happen in the 
environment and the system, to learn from experience, and to anticipate threats, 
potential changes, and constraints (see for example: Hollnagel, 2014; Hollnagel & 
Fujita, 2013). HRO and Resilience Engineering theory draw on complexity theory and 
the socio-technical systems approach to safety, highlighting the importance of 
unpacking the organisational characteristics of firms that operate hazardous facilities: in 
effect, also drawing attention to the ontology of risk.  
HRO theorists additionally apply concepts of mindfulness to help organisations achieve 
high reliability in more effective ways (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999). The 
process of organisational mindfulness comprises the following five processes: (i) 
preoccupation with failure; (ii) reluctance to simplify interpretations; (iii) sensitivity to 
                                                 
8 A safety culture is part of an organisational culture (Hopkins, 2006). The concept of safety 
culture is that every organisation has its own culture (or a series of sub-cultures) and that culture 
has an impact on safety (ibid). HRO scholars examine the elements of cultures in HROs that can 
contribute to reliable operations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). 
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operations; (iv) commitment to resilience; and (v) underspecified structuring (Weick et 
al., 1999). HRO theorists suggest that these five processes mitigate the blind spots that 
allow failures to accumulate and ultimately result in catastrophic outcomes (Weick et al., 
1999). In addition, the concepts and processes of mindfulness have been advocated as 
essential for improving the safety of organisations (Hopkins, 2005).  
While the HRO concept has proven valuable for improving industrial safety, it gives 
rise to a number of questionable premises. First, the criteria for classification of HROs 
are vague (Clarke & Short Jr, 1993). Second, the concepts of reliability and safety are 
different and neither concept can replace the other (Leveson, Dulac, Marais, & Carroll, 
2009). Leveson et al. (2009) argue that the system can be reliable but unsafe, or safe but 
unreliable. Notwithstanding, HRO theorists treat these concepts as equivalents (Leveson 
et al., 2009). HRO studies indicate the absence of low frequency events as evidence of 
high reliability (Clarke & Short Jr, 1993). In practice, HRO operations may be difficult 
to maintain because of constraints including economic resources and declines in 
consensus vis-à-vis the value of organisations (La Porte, 1996). Here it is important to 
consider the following question: what are the organisational factors that regulators use 
to identify HRO operations? Specifically, to investigate: how regulators respond to 
active failures and latent conditions; and how can these responses be improved in order 
to maintain HROs and prevent future accidents? 
(c) Limitations  
In practice, the theories of organisational safety that are employed by regulators and 
practitioners (see for example: Bills & Agostini, 2009; Lekka, 2011; Royal Commission 
on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, 2012) evidence the fact that regulators seek 
solutions to rectify malfunctions associated with the ‘social’ sides of organisations. 
However, although regulators may know what organisational and human factors could 
be proposed and made effective for enhancing safety practices, the factors often prove 
difficult – even impossible – to regulate (Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal 
Mine Tragedy, 2012, p. 147).  
The major deficit of these theories is that their assumptions are based on plant-based 
safety (or organisation-based safety). Theorists focus on the management of risk by 
developing and using particular instrumental techniques and strategies. Uncritically, by 
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following these tools, other factors in the management of technological hazards are 
ignored; particularly social and political issues. Politics and power relations within 
organisations and regulatory processes can be overlooked. Or, these theories face 
difficulties in explaining, managing, and ameliorating problems associated with the 
power-knowledge relationships that shape regulatory knowledge and practices.  
The social and political aspects of regulations figure already in the literature. For 
example, Rasmussen (1997) proposed a framework to analyse the causes of accidents 
occurring in a complex socio-technical system. Rasmussen linked the regulatory 
environment with social and political aspects of organisation and management 
processes, including human errors that influence accidents. Likewise, this thesis 
considers social and political aspects of regulations as they are related to the causes of 
accidents. It explores how accidents influence regulatory knowledge and practice in the 
Australian pipeline context. Further, it examines other assemblages apart from accidents 
that may influence regulatory practice? In addition, it investigates how regulators can 
overcome difficulties that are related to social issues and politics when dealing with 
industrial actors or managing hazardous industries.  
The social and political also figured in Jasanoff (1998) who problematized the research 
on risk perception undertaken by psychometric researchers. That body of research was 
based on a dichotomy between ‘actual’ risk as measured by experts and ‘perceived’ risk 
as experienced by laypeople. The psychometric model contended that risk perception of 
laypeople can be distorted by a number of factors (e.g. faulty memory, inability to think 
probabilistically and strong prior beliefs). Jasanoff argued that the psychometric 
approach failed to conceptualise the nature of risk in relation to reality and power in risk 
perception. Taking this starting point, Jasanoff explored political dimensions in risk 
perception by using an approach involving social studies of science and risk together 
with a quantitative risk assessment. The study asserted that risk perception is embedded 
within three common models, namely: the realist, the constructivist and the discursive; 
where each model has influenced decision making and risk-related research processes. 
To that end, the study called attention to the need for greater sophistication in methods 
of studying expert risk perception.  
Similar to Jasanoff’s study, this thesis explores political dimensions in regulatory 
practice, querying the nature of risk and its relation with power. It further proposes that 
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ANT, together with a critique based on Foucauldian power-knowledge, can help with 
such difficulties (see Section 2.1.2.3 and 2.2).  
In the following sections, other theories that shape how risk is constructed in relation to  
social-political issues beyond organisations will be reviewed. These theories are 
relatively disengaged from regulatory theories and practices.  
2.1.2.2 Risk and socio-political issues at the macro and micro scales 
(a) Risk and socio-political issues at the macro scale: the theory of Risk 
Society 
Beck (1992b) contended that modernity, through the application and unintended 
consequences of technology and science, introduced risks to society that led to what he 
termed ‘risk society’ – a society in which social organisation is increasingly shaped in 
response to the distribution of hazards. The complexity of these hazards exceeds the 
capacity of individuals and collectives to understand and so they are managed through 
regulatory institutions and industrial experts. But these institutions are scrutinised and 
challenged by the competing knowledge and expertise of the public, non-governmental 
organisations and industry (Lockie & Measham, 2012; Renn, 2008c, p. 29). The 
instrumental rationality of improving individual living conditions through technical-
scientific progress has lost its authority. Individuals in modern societies strive to protect 
their own ontological security in the face of technological risks: those risks imposed by 
risk producers on members of society without asking for consent (Renn, 2008c, p. 29). 
The concept of risk society has been criticised as an overgeneralisation because, in 
accordance with the rationality of modernity and its institutional settings, the risk 
society thesis treats risks as universal and unmanageable (Wynne, 1996, p. 44). In effect, 
the risk society thesis does not offer any solutions to cope with technological risk apart 
from emphasising the role of trust in the sub-politics of civil society actors (Renn, 
2008c, p. 29). Furthermore, it fails to provide a process of in-depth analysis of the 
deficits of technical approaches at the micro-sociological study scale (Lockie & 
Measham, 2012, p. 6). 
Such criticisms aside, the risk society thesis does provide a number of concepts that can 
be used to explore how risk is influenced by social and political processes. For example, 
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Beck (1999) proposed a concept of the ‘relations of definition’ (pp. 149-150) to explore 
risk associated with the social and political relations of law, regulations and institutions. 
Beck (1999) stressed that: 
risk society’s relations of definition include the specific rules, institutions 
and capacities that structure the identification and assessment of risk in a 
specific cultural context. They are the legal, epistemological and cultural 
power matrix in which risk politics is conducted (Beck, 1999, p. 149).  
Beck further organised the relations of definition into four clusters of questions where 
they could be employed to investigate the issues of risk related to social and political 
processes within legal institutions. The questions are: 
1. Who is to define and determine the harmfulness of products, the danger 
and risk? Where does the responsibility – with those who generate the risks, 
those who benefit from them, those who are potentially affected by them or 
with public agencies?  
2. What kind of knowledge or non-knowledge about the causes, dimensions, 
actors, and so on, is involved? To whom have evidence and ‘proof’ to be 
submitted?  
3. What is to count as sufficient proof in a world where knowledge about 
environmental risks is necessarily contested and probabilistic?  
4. Who is to decide on compensation for the afflicted, and what constitute 
appropriate forms of future damage limitation control and regulation? (Beck, 
1999, pp. 149-150). 
Despite the relevance of these questions when considering how the ‘relation of 
definitions’ operates, Beck’s questions and focus is on who makes risk, the causes and 
evidence of proof. Beck has taken the regulatory institutions that attempt to control risk 
for granted without contemplating and exploring the substantial empirical evidence 
associated with these following questions:  
• How is risk identified, accessed and communicated, who has been engaged in 
the process of risk regulation and at what level? Have they been involved at the 
decision making levels, and if they have what issues relevant to decision-making 
have arisen?  
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• What regulatory apparatuses are used by regulatory institutions and how have 
they been developed and implemented among actors not only regulators but also 
various types of actors within regulated companies (e.g. CEO of companies, 
business managers, engineers and technicians) as well as other stakeholders (e.g. 
affected parties, planning authorities, unions, the public)? 
These empirical questions and arguments need to be explored from other perspectives. 
An example of such a perspective is provided through this thesis (using ANT).  
(b) Risk and socio-political issues at the micro scale: the theory of lay-
expert understanding of science  
An analysis of the construction of risk at micro scales is proposed by the theory of lay-
expert understanding of science. The assumption of this theory is that lay people 
experience impacts from science and technologies and employ their local knowledge-
experience to monitor and mitigate the said risks (Wynne, 1996). A well-known 
example drawn from risk research involves the case of sheep farmers in the hilly Lake 
District of Cumbria in northern England. In 1986, the Lake District was impacted by the 
fall-out of nuclear particles from Chernobyl (Wynne, 1996), which resulted in pastures 
and flocks being contaminated (Wynne, 1992, p. 288). The lay understanding of science 
is central to Wynne’s focus. The formal-technical experts and institutions dismissed the 
locally-experienced consequences of nuclear fall-out from Chernobyl (Wynne, 1992; 
Wynne, 1996). Furthermore, although local knowledge was used as evidence, the 
technocratic experts ignored it in their studies of sheep farms (Wynne, 1992, pp. 296-
297). In this case, knowledge about risk was constructed by cultural and moral 
considerations rather than simply by competing technical facts between lay people and 
experts (Wynne, 1996). The Cumbrian case offers an analytical account of the 
construction of knowledge at the micro level, as a premise of further analysis. Who was 
involved in the interpretation of risk knowledge and how people should respond to such 
knowledge became important features for analytical outcomes (Lockie & Measham, 
2012, p. 6; Wynne, 1996).  
Despite the valued contribution of the theory of lay-expert understandings of science, 
the associated social construction of risk is built upon a model of conflict between lay 
people and experts. The influence of regulatory and industrial actors and institutions 
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that shape knowledge and practices in relation to regulatory outcomes is dismissed. The 
next section will discuss how risk is constructed and influenced by power relations. 
2.1.2.3 Risk and power relations 
The issue of power relations is the key focus of many social scientists, particularly of 
those are interested in power and the construction of risk. Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality has become influential in conceptualising the construction of risk 
associated with power relations (see Zinn, 2008a, pp. 191-192).  
The concept of governmentality, which is drawn from the Foucauldian discursive 
concept of power (Zinn, 2008a, p. 192), re-theorises classical power structures that have 
been presented in a legitimated-hierarchical form and applied by governments to control 
the public. It also relates to discursive practices where power as knowledge (power-
knowledge) is dispersed throughout society and generated by institutions, as well as by 
subjectivities that are part of discursive practices (ibid). 
In such an understanding, the concept of government is reframed. It is not simply a 
political institution but, ‘the conduct of conduct: a form of activity aiming to shape, 
guide or affect the conduct of some person or persons’ (Gordon, 1991, p. 2). Foucault’s 
forms of power and knowledge are interrelated to inform his concept of power-
knowledge. He emphasised that ‘power is not something that is acquired, seized or 
shared, something one holds on to or allows to slip away’ (Foucault, 1978, p. 94). 
Rather, power is relational and associated with strategies, technologies, and programs 
embedded in practices, techniques and procedures which have been managed by states 
that shape the lives of those upon whom power is exercised (Foucault, 1980). Foucault 
further contended that:  
The exercise of power itself creates and causes to emerge new objects of 
knowledge and accumulates new bodies of information ... the exercise of 
power perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, knowledge constantly 
induces effects of power ... It is not possible for power to be exercised 
without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power 
(Foucault, 1980, p. 52). 
48 
The Foucauldian concept of power is important here for the following reasons. First, it 
focuses on the interrelationship between power and knowledge, especially with 
reference to the ability to do things. Second, it focuses on the fluidity of power where 
power is not held by one centre but is relational and exercised through various elements 
of apparatus (e.g. strategies, technologies, institutions, regulations, law and philosophy) 
which are linked to and supported by particular types of knowledge (Foucault, 1980, pp. 
194-196). Third, it takes Foucault’s insight that power is productive as well as 
repressive. Power here is not only a negative, coercive or repressive force. When its 
function is repression, people are forced to take actions against their will. Power rather 
is a necessary and productive force. Governmentality emphasises the productive aspect 
of power where power is a productive effect operating through the entire social body, 
inducing knowledge and producing discourses (ibid, p. 119).  
Risk knowledge from the viewpoint of governmentality theory is shaped through 
technologies of government (or governmental technologies) (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 
175) and the calculative practices of governments and societal institutions with 
individuals as part of these practices. The governmentality concept focuses on strategic 
power manoeuvres that governments and other institutional actors employ to regulate 
risks which indirectly shape individuals’ conduct. This way, by avoiding a direct chain 
of responsibility, authorities can displace their responsibility for technological risk 
which may cause adverse impacts on citizens (Renn, 2008c, p. 36). Furthermore, it 
allows regulatory authorities to constantly perpetuate their interest-driven activities and 
maintain their powerful influence. Such practices are built into neoliberal institutions 
(Zinn, 2008a, pp. 191, 198-199), as part of current government.  
More importantly, governmentality has been little used to study the processes of risk 
regulation in relation to power-knowledge relationships pertinent to regulators and 
regulated firms. In addition, governmentality scholars have faced difficulties when 
attempting to provide substantive and constructive advice on how to better regulate 
risks in the face of neoliberalism. For example, when regulating risk, it is necessary to 
involve natural-technical knowledge and apparatus. The constructivist group of theorists 
have tended to critique the technical practices used by institutions and governments 
rather than articulating how technical knowledge and practices can be used to handle 
technological risk. Instead, this thesis extends the concept of governmentality by 
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cooperating with ANT to explore power-knowledge relationships and ontological issues 
related to risk and power pertinent with elite-expert institutions.  
In the next section, the influence of the theory on inclusive risk governance about how 
risk ‘should be regulated’ will be introduced and analysed.  
2.1.3 Inclusive risk governance: how risk ‘should be regulated’  
What has become apparent after reviewing theories that deal with risk is that the 
definitions of risk offered by the theoretical perspectives reviewed in this chapter reflect 
the varied ontological orientations of those perspectives. Strict realists, for example, 
define risk as:  
the combination of the likelihood of an adverse event (hazard, harm) 
occurring, and of the potential magnitude of the damage caused (itself 
combining number of people affected, and severity of the damage for each) 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2014, p. 27).  
Risk from this perspective reflects the view that risks and their manifestations are real 
and observable events which can be objectively identified, measured and controlled. 
Such realist notions of risk are used among regulatory practitioners to organise the 
activities of inspectors and to decide how resources should be allocated, according to 
the level of risk assessed (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
2014, p. 27).  
Constructivists, on the other hand, define risk as socially constructed; shaped through 
varied processes including social interpretation and negotiation, history, politics, and 
culture associated with values, experiences, and interests (Renn, 2008c; Zinn, 2008b). 
In this view, risks and their manifestations are ‘social artefacts’ fabricated by social 
groups or institutions (Renn, 2008c, p. 24). 
Many authors, of course, argue that risk is both real and constructed. Renn thus defines 
risk as ‘an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with regard to something 
that humans value (definition originally in Kates et al, 1985, p21[9]). Such consequences 
                                                 
9 The reference cited in Renn (2008c) is Kates, R. W., Hohenemser, C. and Kasperson, J. (1985) Perilous Progress: 
Managing the Hazards of Technology, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.  
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can be positive or negative, depending upon the values that people associate with them’ 
(Renn, 2008c, p. 373). Renn also notes that specific risks are characterized by differing 
degrees of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity. In practice, social conflict is 
mundane in hazardous industries. It occurs where there is insufficient technical-
scientific knowledge together with differences in social values about the potential 
impacts of sources of risk, the more so if these consequences are complex, uncertain or 
ambiguous (Renn, 2008c). Risks may be complex and difficult to identify: the 
relationships between cause and effect may be obscure (Renn, 2008a, p. 52) – testing 
the limits of scientific knowledge (Renn, 2008c, p. 179). And, risks may be ambiguous 
in the sense that different actors tend to interpret and value risks differently (ibid). In 
order to deal with these three components of risk characteristics, a procedure that 
transcends conventional risk management routines is required (Renn, 2008c).  
Risk theorists recognise that each theory has its own advantages and limitations, 
underpinned by its theoretical propositions. Risk theorists offer some solutions to 
overcoming these difficulties. A possible solution is to integrate the risk concepts of 
different multidisciplinary socio-technical perspectives together with deliberative 
approaches for cooperating and communicating with different stakeholders in an open 
way (see for example: Lockie & Measham, 2012; Renn, 2008b; Renn, 2008c; Taylor-
Gooby & Zinn, 2006; Wynne, 2002). The deliberative concept emerged from 
Habermasian discourse theory (Habermas, 1984; 1987) which advocates deliberative 
systems of public participation for legitimation and sustainability in political decision-
making (Renn, 2008c, p. 297). The deliberative concept emphasises the importance of 
‘equality’ among participants (Renn, 2008c, p. 285). To this end, a veridical approach 
from participants is required in order to develop mutual understanding and learning 
(ibid). A well-known example is the risk governance approach (Renn, 2008c). 
The notion of inclusive risk governance is offered to ‘engage’ different groups of 
stakeholders in governing risk together on the same platform and, in so doing, to bridge 
realism and constructivism (Renn, 2008c, p. 3). The notion of inclusive risk governance 
aims to improve the traditional procedures of risk analysis and risk management (Renn, 
2008b, p. 196). It offers a comprehensive means of integrating risk identification, risk 
assessment, risk management, and risk communication (ibid). In addition, it provides a 
tool or framework to improve governance structures and processes by involving 
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previously absent parties and shifting the political focus from government to 
governance. As Renn (2008b, p. 196) suggests: 
“governance” implies, analyzing and managing risk cannot be confined to 
private companies and regulatory agencies. It rather involves the four central 
actors in modern plural societies: governments, economic players, scientists 
and civil society. 
The risk governance concept aims: (a) to contextualise the complexity of risk-related 
decision-making when involving multiple actors; (b) to construct a new form of 
coordination by replacing the term ‘government’ with ‘governance’; and (c) to provide a 
platform for possible reconciliation of stakeholders who have different aims, goals and 
perspectives (Renn, 2014, p. 10).  
The risk governance approach is used as a platform to achieve good governance for 
‘robust regulation’ in the quest to prevent major accidents and improve safety 
performance among hazardous-technological industries (Lindøe et al., 2014, pp. 7-8). In 
addition, there are indications that the use of participatory scenarios that engage 
multiple stakeholders has proven a powerful tool to resolve social conflict and assess 
future consequences, as well as to change conditions in order to prevent future 
accidents. These changes may be overlooked if traditional risk assessment is undertaken 
(Kok, Biggs, & Zurek, 2007). To achieve robust regulation, regulators and risk 
managers must manage the challenges associated with risk characteristics: complexity, 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Renn, 2008c, p. 187).  
When risks are well known by actors, the process of risk assessment and risk evaluation 
can be simple. Regulators and risk managers can apply cost-benefit analysis to make 
risk acceptable or tolerable together with using technical standards, safety manuals and 
routine monitors (Renn, 2014, p. 20).  
However, (a) when risk is complex, (b) risk is difficult to identify, but (c) uncertainty 
and ambiguity of risk is low: the process of risk assessment and risk evaluation should 
be left to experts. In these cases, sceintists or researchers can deliberately work with 
regulators and risk managers to obtain good outcomes. Examples occur in HRO 
industries (e.g. oil platforms and petrochemical plants). The experts, regulators and risk 
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managers can design and develop models and measures with the potential to prevent 
accidents (Renn, 2014, pp. 20-21).  
Under another scenario, when risk is highly uncertain but of low ambiguity: affected 
stakeholders can participate in the process of risk assessment and evaluation. In 
addition, it is important to apply precuation-based risk management (Renn, 2014, p. 21).  
When risk is highly ambiguous: it is better if affected stakeholders, the public and civil 
society participate in assessing and evaluating risk. Further, they can contribute to the 
development of a collective understanding of risk and design procedures for making 
decisions on risk acceptability and tolerability (Renn, 2014, p. 21). The types of actors 
to participate in the process of risk governance must be selected in accordance with their 
level of knowledge about risk (or understanding of risk characteristics (see more details 
in Figure 2.6).  
    
Figure 2.6: Relationship between stakeholder participation and risk categories in risk governance 
(Renn, 2014, p. 21) 
The risk governance approach provides useful insights into when, how and why 
regulators should involve other stakeholders in risk assessment and management. It 
acknowledges both the importance, and the limitations of, technical or realist 
approaches to risk assessment. Some questions, however, remain unanswered. What are 
the criteria that regulators use to choose participatory groups? Are these criteria valid? 
What role can these groups play in mitigating technological risks and at what levels can 
they participate? In addition, the operationalisation of the concept of ‘risk governance’ 
in practice implies difficulties understanding causation. More particularly, when 
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accidents have not yet occurred, as in the Australian pipeline case, stakeholders may not 
perceive the urgent need for regulators to develop a risk governance platform. 
Furthermore, bringing groups with opposing perspectives onto one platform could 
prevent the possibility of reasonable outcomes. The latter may not eventuate if opposing 
groups keep arguing about what may not be compromised in negotiation – by extension 
creating more gaps among these groups.  
This thesis extends the scope of the risk governance approach by investigating the 
power relationships between regulators and pipeline industries and how their 
relationships shape regulatory practices and knowledge about public safety. In addition, 
it explores notions of risk that may fall outside the conventional criteria and scopes of 
the risk governance framework. The question to be examined is how regulators deal 
with this new type of risk?  
In the next section, I will summarise the limitations of contemporary theories as 
addressed in Section 2.1 and propose an alternative approach (see Section 2.2) for 
tackling the two main research questions: (1) how is power-knowledge in relation to 
risk regulation performed by and around regulators in the case study of pipeline 
industries in Australia; and (2) how can the process of power-knowledge in relation to 
risk regulation be improved? 
2.1.4 Limitations of contemporary theories 
It is apparent that each theory on risk, organisational safety and regulation has its own 
assumptions and limitations. The uncritical use of such assumptions can lead to design 
inflexibility which constrains the boundaries of research exploration and analysis. 
Although one may argue that constructivism seems to be more flexible that realism, the 
process of constructivist analysis is dominated by a particular pattern of research 
practice. As Law contends: ‘[c]onstruction usually implies that objects start without 
fixed identities but that these converge and so gradually become stabilised as singular in 
the course of practice, negotiation and/or controversy’ (Law, 2004, p. 158). The 
employment of constructivism could result in the reproduction of similar analyses and 
narratives. This is evident in most approaches to the theorisation of risk regulation and 
organisational safety employed within the Australian pipeline contexts. They pay little 
attention to power-knowledge relationships as indicated by the discourses about risk 
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that circulate around major accidents when they occur. The limitation of these 
approaches is that discourses and assemblages implicated in politics and power relations 
can be overlooked.  
In addition, each theory takes a different approach in dealing with risk and may ignore 
ontological assumptions, in particular, the nature of risk and the nature of power as they 
relate to empirical grounds and regulatory processes. For example, the theories of 
responsive regulation and of risk society are involved with the social and political 
processes in understanding and managing risk, theories of risk governance set premises 
related to the ontology of risk, and theories of governmentality set premises pertinent to 
the ontology of power.  
Finally, through the evaluation process of reviewing existing theories, I found that 
theoretical suppositions have a tendency to construct analysis through a series of 
dichotomies, such as realism vs. constructivism, the macro vs. micro level of studies, 
expert vs. lay people, dominance vs. powerlessness, and classical versus discursive 
concepts of studying power relations. This series of dichotomies are indicative of dualist 
assumptions and may indicate that the regulatory knowledge pertinent to regulating 
technological risk, enacted based on these contemporary theories, is likely to be 
incomplete, dissociated and fragmented.  
In addition, existing theories of technological risk regulation are framed around either 
human entities (e.g., regulatory experts, lay people, the public, unions, human factors, 
and organisational factors) or the non-human entities (e.g., pipelines, risk assessment 
tools, technical-regulatory pipeline standards) involved in performing knowledge and 
practices in relation to risk, safety and regulation. The question of how realities (power, 
knowledge and practices) are co-performed by both non-human and human entities, by 
contrast, has been relatively under-explored. 
In light of the limitations of existing theories, this thesis argues that instead of following 
assumptions that are uncritically situated within existing theories in tackling research 
questions, a better option would be to take a critical-empirical approach to viewing what 
is incomplete, unacknowledged or disassociated on empirical grounds. Such absences or 
disassociations that emerged from empirical findings in this research are used to 
challenge existing theories. This thesis’s purpose is to understand and explore the 
ontology of risk and ontology of power in risk regulation. To this end, I have employed 
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a theory of governmentality associated with the concept of Foucauldian power-
knowledge in cooperating with ANT to tackle the research questions, explained in the 
following.  
2.2 What approach does this thesis take? 
To reiterate, in this thesis, a critical-empirical approach is employed to reframe and re-
evaluate theoretical ontologies. The assumptions of existing theories are put aside to 
allow the empirical evidence that emerges from field research free reign to inform. This 
approach is influenced by Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the concept of 
Foucauldian power-knowledge. The following section will review ANT, and explain 
why it is important to this research. Starting with its background and philosophy, the 
key features will be investigated as well as limitations. 
2.2.1 ANT background and philosophy 
2.2.1.1 An overview 
ANT, which has its roots in Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies, argues that 
‘knowledge is a social product’ (Law, 1992, p. 381). Knowledge cannot be true and 
accepted only through the operation of the scientific method (ibid). Instead, Law 
explains that knowledge is the effect of a network of heterogeneous materials (Law, 
1992, p. 381). ANT aims to characterise and understand networks of heterogeneous 
assemblages and to investigate how knowledge has been produced through a system. 
Knowledge is ‘performed’ as a set of associations. It is, therefore, the effect of a 'doing' 
from diverse assemblages including people, technologies, textual and symbolic forms 
assembled within a social context (Latour, 1986; Law & Callon, 1992). The term 
‘assemblage’, which is taken from the English translation of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Mille Plateaux (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988), refers to ‘a process of bundling, of 
assembling, or better of recursive self-assembling in which the elements put together are 
not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list but are constructed at least in 
part as they are entangled together’ (Law, 2004, p. 42). 
ANT has evolved from STS over a disagreement about theoretical prepositions. The 
STS theorists’ strong programme alters the way to explore realities by changing the 
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mode of research examination from ‘natural’ science to ‘social’ science (Collins & 
Yearley, 1992, p. 302). The ‘strong’ STS approach attempts to argue that the science 
status quo takes a scientific and technical approach that is based on their own interests 
and benefits. The alternative is to develop a reflective-critical analysis of science actors, 
institutions and applications, as part of shaping and performing societal knowledge. The 
traditional opposition between nature and society still remains with the utilisation of the 
strong STS approach. Callon, an ANT theorist, argues against those adopting the strong 
SST approach: 
They acknowledge the existence of a plurality of descriptions of Nature 
without establishing any priorities and hierarchies between these 
descriptions. However, and this is where the paradox is revealed, within 
their proposed analyses, these social scientists act as if this agnosticism 
towards natural science and technology are not applicable towards society as 
well (Callon, 1986, p. 197).  
ANT has increased its distance from STS by combining the traditional opposites 
assumed by STS. These include nature and society (or between the philosophy of 
natural sciences (usually realism)) and the social sciences (usually constructivism), 
macro- and micro-analysis, agency and structure, objectivity and subjectivity, 
positivism and interpretativism. ANT aims to renew analysis and explanation of the 
process of performing knowledge (Callon, 2001, p. 62) by: (a) tracing back how those 
opposites are assembled in a network of knowledge, and (b) analysing what and how 
material conditions have influenced the performance of knowledge over time.  
2.2.1.2 ANT ontology 
The terminology of performativity, performing and performance (or enactment) and 
‘perform’ in a verb form, employed throughout this thesis, is grounded in the 
ontological stance of ANT: the ontology emphasises a relational approach. Law argues 
that: ‘[w]e are no longer dealing with construction, social or otherwise: there is no 
stable prime mover, social or individual, to construct anything’ (Law, 2009, p. 151). 
What has been seen ‘is an effect rather than a cause. We are dealing with enactment or 
performance. In this heterogeneous world everything plays its part, relationally’ (ibid).  
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In as much as it is framed and analysed as a relational approach, the performativity 
concept is employed in a similar way to other concepts used throughout this thesis 
including power-knowledge, power-knowledge practices, discourse and the 
performativity of power-knowledge relationships. These terms are core theoretical 
concepts. They are used in a relational way consistent with the ANT approach: a 
relational approach (see more details in Section 2.2.2.3).  
Viewed broadly, ANT is a poststructural approach. Law (2009) states that ANT can be 
‘understood as an empirical version of poststructuralism’ (Law, 2009, p. 145). It 
emphasises insight into otherness (or the others) and absence. Law (2004) asserts that 
this version of poststructuralism challenges a flaw in the classical metaphysics of 
presence, which attempts to bring everything to presence in the form of a transparent 
representation (pp. 162-163). Classical metaphysics presents particular enacted versions 
of reality which set limits on what is able to be known or created (ibid). Post-
structuralism argues that presence demands absence and that the two are constructed 
and come into being together (ibid). The poststructuralist paradigm challenges such 
limits and attempts to reveal the otherness, incompleteness, absence, or things that have 
been repressed but are necessary to presence. For example, social and political issues 
overlooked by conventional regulatory processes may be revealed through open 
investigation.  
2.2.1.3 Sociology of translation (or sociology of association) 
ANT is acknowledged as a sociology of translation, and as a sociology of association in 
which the notion of translation stresses ‘the continuity of displacements and 
transformations’ (Callon, 1986, p. 223) of conditions (e.g., goals, interests, human 
beings, devices, and pipelines). ANT theorists emphasise that no entities are situated in 
isolation in making and representing realities. Knowledge is performed though networks 
of nature and the social and that changes through time. Callon and Law (1995) state that:  
There isn’t a reality on the one hand, and a re-presentation of that reality on 
the other. Rather, there are chains of translation. Chains of translation of 
varying lengths, and varying kinds. Chains which link things to texts, texts 
to things, and things to people. And so on (p. 501).  
The next section will outline the key features of ANT which are employed in this thesis. 
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2.2.2 Key features of ANT 
ANT has three important features: ontological equality (Section 2.2.2.1); semiotic 
materiality (Section 2.2.2.2); and the study of the effects of power-knowledge processes 
(Section 2.2.2.3).  
2.2.2.1 Ontological equality 
The ANT approach dissolves a priori distinctions between opposite theoretical 
propositions: for example, nature and society. ANT emphasises an important role for 
‘non-human’ as equal to the role of human actors in order to bring nature and society 
into being, and to represent realities. Both human and non-human actors play equal 
roles in performing knowledge as part of the process of their interconnected 
relationships.  
Traditionally, the ontology of non-human entities has been overlooked in social 
research and theories. ANT theorists offer ‘a radical constructivist semiotic approach’10 
(Ashmore, Wooffitt, & Harding, 1994, p. 735) where it is necessary to treat non-human 
and human entities equally for the purpose of the analytical process (ibid). ANT 
theorists argue that ‘agency cannot be dissociated from the relationship with actors’ 
(Callon, 1991, p. 134). Non-human entities (or non-human actors or actants) are equally 
able to act upon or negotiate or do things to human entities (or human actors or actants) 
in the heterogeneous networks, associations and relations (a network of human and non-
human actors or an assemblage of them). Actant refers to ‘anything that acts’ and actor 
refers to ‘what is made the source of action’ (Latour, 1992, p. 256). The terms actant 
and actor are defined from a semiotics perspective which is not limited to humans; the 
act in principle is treated symmetrically (ibid) (see further discussion of how an ANT 
symmetric approach has been undertaken in practice in the methodology chapter: 
Chapter 3, Section 3.2.2).  
ANT theorists argue that rather than debating whether non-humans are equal to humans 
or whether non-humans have agency, it is better to pay close attention to empirical 
practices (called ‘empirical metaphysics’) when exploring the agency status of non-
human entities (Latour, 2005, p. 51). Callon and Law (1995) further suggest that ‘[a]ll 
                                                 
10 Material semiotics is explained in Section 2.2.2.2. 
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we can do is make stories which suggest that if you don’t make such assumptions, then 
revealing things may happen, theoretically and empirically’11 (p. 483). In light of this, 
what are the assemblages that have influenced the power-knowledge relationships that 
shape knowledge and practices in the processes of risk regulation? Some examples 
include: pipelines, the effects of chemical compositions of gases, risk assessment 
methods, pipeline regulations, industrial and government policies, and organisational 
structures, along with other emerging entities from field research. Do they have to be 
investigated or unveiled? How do the assemblages, which are all relational, come to be?  
The process of revealing the relationships involving the assemblages above relies on 
empirical findings that may possibly support the evaluation of many other narratives 
which have yet to be explored. In the main, this thesis has focussed on and revealed 
discourses and assemblages implicated in the power-knowledge relationships that shape 
knowledge and practices in relation to regulatory outcomes: those outcomes which 
appear to have been overlooked in the existing literature. How the relationships 
involving assemblages are revealed will be discussed in the following section. 
2.2.2.2 Material-semiotic relationality: treating all actants as network 
effects 
ANT offers an approach that treats all actants (humans and non-humans that perform in 
assemblages) within the social and natural worlds as network effects produced and 
reproduced through webs of heterogeneous relations. Law states that ‘nothing has 
reality or form outside the enactment of those relations’ (Law, 2009, p. 141). This 
approach can be described as a ‘semiotics of materiality’, ‘relational materiality’ (Law, 
1999, p. 4) or ‘material semiotics’ (Law, 2009). The semiotics of materiality approach 
attempts to develop insight into the relationality of assemblages, by examining the ways 
in which materials are produced and shaped in relation to other actors. This applies to 
all materials, not only to those that are linguistic (ibid). Thus, realities can only be 
understood as sets of relations, allowing the construction of human and non-humans, 
nature and society, centres and peripheries, insides and outsides, and so forth (Murdoch, 
1995, p. 743). This approach is used throughout this thesis. 
                                                 
11 This issue will be expanded upon in the methodology chapter (Chapter 3) by utilising the concepts of 
method assemblage. 
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Knowledge about risk regulation is materially constructed not only through technical-
regulatory processes, but also together with social, economic and political processes. 
For example, risk should be socialised in order to practically calculate and manage it 
(Lockie & Measham, 2012, p. 6). The calculation of physical harm from risk-sources is 
crucial to producing the best estimation by experts from the natural and technical 
sciences. But, in order to gain best management practices for risk, an exploration of how 
relevant actors take action and respond to hazardous risks is necessary (Renn & Klinke, 
2012, pp. 65-66).  
In this thesis, ANT takes a semiotics of materiality approach as a theoretical-
methodological foundation 12 to explore heterogeneous relationships between human 
actors (e.g., regulators, operators, Australian Pipeline Associations, labour unions et al.) 
and non-human actors (pipelines, gas, petroleum industries, industrial risk et al.) in 
performing power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation and regulatory practices. 
This approach addresses the issue of heterogeneity and considers how different 
elements and different perspectives are combined in the creation of a socio-technical 
network (Star, 1991, p. 26). 
2.2.2.3 Power-knowledge effects 
Finally, ANT is employed to study the effects of power-knowledge processes (or 
power-knowledge practices). ANT re-conceives the concept of power as an 
performative effect or a relational consequence between humans and non-humans alike 
performing as assemblages rather than as properties enacted by individuals, collective 
groups or institutions, or as a cause of their actions (Latour, 1986, p. 264). 
The term ‘power-knowledge’ which I use in this thesis is taken from the Foucauldian 
concept of power-knowledge, as explained in Section 2.1.2.3. The forms and 
mechanisms of power and knowledge in both ANT and Foucault are similar as they 
both re-theorise the concept of power and knowledge as interwoven with relational 
effects (Matthewman, 2010, pp. 3-4). Knowledge is influenced, interpreted and 
displaced by power relations and competing discourses generated though heterogeneous 
relationships. 
                                                 
12 This issue will be extended in the methodology chapter. 
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ANT emphasises the implications for both non-human and human actors in these 
relational effects. In addition, it offers principles for studying power and politics that 
take an agnostic approach: generalising symmetry and freedom from association or 
abandoning hypotheses with a definite boundary between natural and social events 
(Callon, 1986, p. 200). Researchers in this tradition attempt to impartially observe 
scientific, technical and technological arguments without judging them (ibid). Second, 
the ideal of generalising symmetry means that researchers engage with both sides of an 
argument from the social and natural sciences, and seek to analyse them equally (ibid). 
Last, researchers must not impose pre-established assumptions; rather, they investigate 
issues by following actors and analysing topics for their discussion in order to explain 
and build their argument (Callon, 1986, pp. 200-201). 
Analysts do not directly criticise powerful entities (e.g. states, CEOs, industries) when 
employing ANT and Foucauldian approaches to study ‘power-knowledge’. They seek to 
avoid being indirectly tied into the same repertoire that is being required to enunciate 
the same social explanation (Latour, 2005, p. 260). Critical concepts assist researchers 
in re-compositing and expanding the contents of power and politics by revealing how 
these actors have power without speaking politically (ibid) or unveiling how the power 
of powerful groups comes to be. As one ANT theorist stated: ‘‘be sober with power’, 
that is, abstain as much as possible from using the notion of power in case it backfires 
and hits your explanations instead of the target you are aiming for. There should be no 
powerful explanation without checks and balances’ (Latour, 2005, pp. 260-261).  
These key features form the methodological framework of this thesis (see Chapter 3). 
The overall theoretical-methodological thesis framework is presented in Figure 2.7.  
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Figure 2.7: The overall theoretical-methodological framework.  
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2.2.3 ANT Limitations 
As previously suggested, ANT emphasises how non-human actants play their parts in 
producing knowledge. Ontological equality is emphasised to balance both the natural 
and the social, or to balance both views with the views of those who take a natural-
technical approach or a social science approach.  
The theoretical and methodological repositioning associated with ontological equality 
leads numerous authors to claim ANT neglects those issues of power, inequality and 
injustice which occupy the base of traditional sociology (Murdoch, 1995, p. 748). It is 
true that ANT does not propose a macro-social theory of capitalist or patriarchal 
inequality or the skepticism towards ideas such as corporate responsibility and industrial 
safety macro-social theory is often used to support (see the discussion in Lockie, 2004a; 
Star, 1991). However, it is important to remember that ANT conceives power and 
inequality as network effects which researchers ought, in fact, explore through the 
processes of translation, mobilisation and interessement that produce and reproduce 
actor-networks (Callon, 1986; Latour, 2005; Law, 1992). In other words, ANT requires 
researchers to explore both the productive role of power relations in network assembly 
and the repressive role of inequality, coercion, sanctions etc. through which some 
actants are enrolled or excluded. The emphasis here on process is highly relevant to a 
research field in which a diversity of actors including regulators, external auditors, 
CEOs, engineers, workers, and the general public are all involved in relations of power 
– the understanding of which is fundamental to this thesis.  
The ontological focus of ANT does place it at one step removed, however, from direct 
engagement with risk regulation. To address this limitation the thesis adopts two 
approaches. The first is to co-opt a concept of deliberation (see Section 2.1.3). A basic 
understanding of the importance of both workers’ and the public’s roles in deliberative 
democracy is crucial in order to take further steps towards examining empirical work 
that may yield answers to questions such as whether workers, their representatives 
(unions) and the public, have previously been involved in the regulatory processes and, 
if so, how; what roles workers, their representatives (unions) and the public play in the 
regulatory process; and how these respective roles produce risk and knowledge. The 
second approach employs discourse analysis and ANT material semiotics to reveal 
inconsistencies in field practices by analysing the following processes: (a) how safety 
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practices in relation to safety regulations are enacted in pipeline industries; and (b) how 
safety rules are set to mitigate pipeline risks towards the workers and the public. 
Unveiling these processes could offer solutions towards articulating with existing 
discourses that aim to improve regulatory effectiveness and practices.  
Conclusion 
Through a review and evaluation of theories on regulation, the causes of accidents and 
risk, this chapter argues that regulatory knowledge built from these theories is likely to 
be incomplete, disassociated and fragmented. This thesis proposes to utilise ANT 
together with Foucault’s concept of governmentality as an overarching perspective to 
tackle ontological issues associated with risk and power in regulation. ANT extends its 
ontology beyond governmentality in order to dissolve the nature and society boundary. 
It also provides an analytical approach (the semiotics of materiality) to examine both the 
material character of risks and the construction of risks associated with regulation. ANT 
further helps with retaining an openness to recursive relationships involving the dualist 
character of risk through discourses, theories, power, knowledges and practices. How 
ANT is undertaken in practice will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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Chapter 3 
Methodology: power-knowledge and risk regulation  
This chapter describes and discusses the process of developing and operationalising 
research questions in relation to ANT. It begins with an analysis of the process of 
research inquiry: what it is; and how it is related to ANT?  
This research inquiry contains the following basic interconnected elements: an 
epistemology-ontology, a theoretical perspective (or philosophical stance), a 
methodology and methods. An overview of the process of research inquiry articulated 
using the model of Crotty (1998) is presented in Figure 3.1.  
 
Figure 3.1: The research inquiry process, articulated using the model of Crotty (1998, p. 4). 
3.1 Philosophical stance and reflexivity 
This thesis adopts the view that theoretical perspectives (or philosophical stances) are 
informed by epistemological-ontological views (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). An epistemology 
refers to a theory of knowledge. Crotty (1998) contends that an epistemology ‘is a way 
of understanding and explaining how we know what we know’ (p. 3). Ontology is the 
study of being and existence: it includes the study of assumptions about the nature of 
what exists (Blaikie, 2007, p. 13). Ontology addresses what the form and nature of 
reality is and what can be known about reality (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). From this point, 
ontological issues and epistemological issues are likely to arise together and these issues 
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inform theoretical perspectives (ibid). By way of explanation, Crotty (1998, p. 10) states 
that ‘each theoretical perspective embodies a certain way of understanding what is 
(ontology) as well as a certain way of understanding what it means to know 
(epistemology)’. For example, according to objectivist epistemology realities exist 
outside the mind (ibid). Proponents of constructivism, however, argue that the 
ontological status of realities cannot be divorced from the meaning-making activities 
with which we make sense of them (Crotty, 1998, p. 10). At its most extreme, this might 
suggest reality exists only in the consciousness of beings but, for the majority of 
constructivists, reality is conceived as an outcome of interaction between and among 
human and non-human entities (Crotty, 1998, p. 43).  
The philosophical stance of this thesis is based on ANT and the Foucauldian approach, 
adopting the view that realities are not fixed as they are enacted in a heterogeneity of process. Realities (or power, knowledge and practices) are performed in diverse and 
heterogeneous ways. Or, power, knowledge and practices are relational effects, a 
consequence of interaction between human and non-human actors. Realities are 
multiple, not singular.   
The philosophical stance informs methodology and method. Methodology, the strategy 
or plan of research action, design or process, is used to guide inquiry (Crotty, 1998, p. 
3). The various methods include techniques or procedures to collect and analyse data in 
relation to the theoretical considerations, problems and the questions of the research. 
The methodology of this thesis is ‘method assemblage’, using the material semiotics of 
ANT combined with discourse analysis. How this methodological framework is 
operationalised will be discussed in the next section. The methods used to collect data 
involved interviews and documentary sources. A mixture of sampling techniques were 
used for data collection including theoretical sampling, purposeful sampling, snowball 
sampling, and opportunistic sampling. This thesis used the principle of a grounded 
theory together with the symmetrical approach of ANT to select samplings. The 
sampling justification will be discussed in Section 3.2.2. The findings from interviews 
and documents were inductively coded into research themes and the coding techniques 
were guided through grounded theory (discussed in Section 3.4.3).  
Throughout the methodological process, this thesis follows a concept of reflexivity. 
Reflexivity has various foci, including: (a) a researcher’s awareness of their own 
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relationships with others in field research together with a consideration of how these 
relationships effect the research process including data analysis and further outcomes 
(Ashmore, 2015; Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Cunliffe, 2003; Geertz, 1988); (b) the 
potential influence of theoretical orientations and methodological approaches on 
research outcomes (Wilson, Ruch, Lymbery, & Cooper, 2008); and (c) consideration of 
the role of reflexivity in social processes as proposed by theories of ‘reflexive 
modernity’ (Beck, 1992b).  
Reflexive awareness of the researcher’s position in the field is ‘a practical 
methodological concern’ through sampling, data collection, analysis and 
communication (Passoth & Rowland, 2013, p. 465). Reflexive awareness is employed 
when cross-checking the relational assemblages in which various groups of interest are 
immersed against novel assemblages and recommendations. Reflexivity is employed 
when determining when sufficient data have been collected. Reflexivity is fundamental 
to ethical practice in research involving humans.  
3.2 Operationalisation of the methodological framework  
3.2.1 Method assemblage 
This thesis relies on empirical evidence that emerges from field research in order to gain 
insight into understanding and improving the process of risk regulation that is 
performed to prevent pipeline accidents. The goal of revealing the process of power-
knowledge performativity in the research situation is part of the larger objective to help 
perform anew how regulators can effectively deal with pipeline risks both practically 
and theoretically.  
How is the process of performing power-knowledge practices in relation to risk 
regulation revealed? This thesis uses ‘method assemblage’ as a methodology strategy to 
investigate, craft, and enact in order to make absences manifest (Law, 2004, p. 161). 
Method assemblage is performative or generative: it crafts the relations of entities (ibid). 
The material semiotics concept is a key element of method assemblage (see Chapter 2, 
Section 2.2.2.2), which I employ together with discourse analysis. This thesis argues 
that the application of ‘semiotics of materiality’ to the methodological strategy of 
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discourse analysis is an important advance. But, what is discourse analysis and how 
does discourse analysis work with ANT material semiotics?  
Discourse analysis is the analysis of discourse: so what is discourse? The concept of 
discourse used in this research was developed in the wake of Foucault’s methodology of 
social science (Law, 2004, p. 159). From a sociological standpoint, discourse includes 
more than talk or written text (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). It also refers to ideology and a social 
product (ibid). More importantly, discourse following the concept of Foucault ‘refers to 
a long-standing systems of ideas’ (Tracy & Mirivel, 2009, p. 154). The analysis of 
discourse is the analysis of broad patterns of meaning, representing ways of thinking 
about the social world (Tracy & Mirivel, 2009, p. 155).  
Law summarises the Foucauldian concept of discourse as ‘a set of relations of 
heterogeneous materiality … recursively produc[ing] objects, subjects, knowledges, 
powers and distributions of power’ (Law, 2004, p. 159). Adopting this approach, this 
thesis examines the ways in which power-knowledge relationships are embedded within 
discourses that circulate through and around elite-expert institutions. Discourse, it is 
assumed, is indelibly linked to power, knowledge, and the material outcomes of 
regulatory practice. 
It is important to note that ANT and discourse analysis are consistent with the broad 
concept of power-knowledge as a relational effect in sociological theory. However, 
ANT extends its focus to non-human actors. The concept of ontological equality is 
employed here. Non-human actors play roles in social networks broadly equal, albeit 
different, to the roles of human actors (Callon & Law, 1995). Furthermore, this 
perspective can be built through both theory and method into notions of discourse 
analysis. Theoretically speaking, ANT attempts to dissolve dichotomies: for example, 
the roles of structure and agency that have putatively constituted the world; the concepts 
of the social and the natural that some believe act independently in reality (Law & 
Hassard, 1999; Lockie, 2002). ANT offers a resolution involving the dissolving of 
dualisms which can be described as the ‘semiotics of materiality’ or ‘relational 
materiality’ (Law, 1999, p. 4). The semiotics of materiality approach attempts to gain 
insight into the relationality of entities by conceptualising all materials or concepts 
produced and shaped in relation with other entities in social networks (ibid).  
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The application of a ‘semiotics of materiality’ with the methodological strategy of 
discourse analysis is an important advance for the following reasons. Power-knowledge 
effects that better mitigate risk from hazardous industries are unlikely to develop only 
through discourse and/or discursive relations but rather through the interactions among 
people, discourses and non-human entities. The ‘semiotics of materiality’ approach will 
contribute to the development of a process of research inquiry that designs 
methodological techniques, builds up research themes, interview themes, interview 
questions and data analysis.  
In addition, it is important to acknowledge that ANT and discourse analysis, which are 
situated within a poststructural approach (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.2), are used to 
investigate the process of performing power-knowledge among conventional regulatory 
processes. Employing a discourse analysis approach can help to reveal how power-
knowledge is produced as a network effect or, to put this differently, as outcome of 
negotiations among entities.  
Taking these insights from ANT and discourse analysis, it is evident that consideration 
of the thesis’s key research questions (see below) requires consideration of how a 
heterogeneous range of entities, including non-human entities, influence power and 
knowledge. In asking how power-knowledge is performed in relation to risk regulation 
we need to take the questions of what is involved in these performances just as seriously 
as we take the question of who. The process is put forward to investigate key research 
questions: (a) how is power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation performed by and 
around regulators in the case study of pipeline industries in Australia?; and (b) how can 
the process of power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation be improved? 
An important question is: what non-human and human actors interact to generate 
power-knowledge effects that shape the processes of risk regulation? Empirical data 
emerges from both inside, in between and outside of organisations. Given this 
abundance of choice, the question is: where to start? On the basis of its research 
rationale and questions, this thesis emphasises ontological equality: the idea that human 
actors are equal to non-human actors as a source in performing power-knowledge 
effects. To this end, this thesis begins by equally investigating both human and non-
human actors in forming assemblages. Primary human and non-human actors are 
regulators and pipelines respectively. They were my first entry points. Empirical 
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evidence was investigated through interviews and documentary sources (summarised in 
the following Section 3.2.1.1 and 3.2.1.2). 
Some commentators raise the question of how non-humans can exercise agency (see for 
example: Khong, 2003, pp. 702-703; Riis, 2008, p. 295). I acknowledge that my 
research focuses, for the most part, on understanding the actors who attempt to speak on 
behalf of actants (human and non-human) that make up the assemblages I am 
investigating. Humans use a variety of devices and techniques to understand non-human 
actants ranging from technical instruments that measure physical parameters to 
conventions for recording data to concepts that inform regulatory practices. Those 
humans face the same problem that I do – namely, knowing when non-humans have 
been enrolled successfully and knowing when failure to enrol them is likely to lead to 
catastrophic failure. As a social researcher I explore how it is that the regulators and 
other people in my sample try to access non-humans, and whether there is evidence of 
failure to do so as indicated by accidents, near misses, disagreement among 
interviewees, understanding of regulatory documents among interviewees, accident 
reports, databases, and pipeline maps. In so doing, the principle of symmetry has been 
put into action. How this principle has been enacted in practice is explained in Section 
3.2.2.  
3.2.1.1 Interview groups 
My first entry point was regulators. I started by interviewing a few regulators with 
assistance from my research team13. My formal participants can be divided into two 
groups: (a) regulators and their associates from Australia and New Zealand; and (b) 
non-regulators. There were 64 formal and 14 informal interviews. The different 
interviewee types and their details are detailed in Table 3.1. 
                                                 
13 My research has been funded by the Energy Pipelines Cooperative Research Centre (EPCRC). The 
EPCRC is mainly supported by a combination of the Australian Commonwealth under the Cooperative 
Research Centre (CRC) Programme and the Australian pipeline industry, and partly supported by the 
Australian university participants in the EPCRC program (Energy Pipelines Cooperative Research Centre 
(EPCRC), 2015a). The EPCRC program was established in 2010 to provide research and education to 
benefit the energy pipelines industry in Australia (ibid). The key institutions that lead and support the 
EPCRC programme are the CRC Programme and a pipeline industry partnership: the Australian Pipelines 
and Gas Association Research and Standards Committee (APGA-RSC) (ibid). My EPCRC research team 
is composed of not only my academic supervisors from universities but also of industrial advisors. The 
industrial advisors are those who have practical knowledge and experience of pipeline regulations and 
pipeline industries. 
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Table 3.1: Interviewees and their details. 
Types of interviewees Details Numbers of 
interviewees 
Regulators and associates Regulators regulating pipelines 
and petroleum industries across 
Australian states and New 
Zealand. 
26 
Non-Regulators Pipeline industry staff from 
different divisions including: - technical compliance 
personnel from both high gas 
transmission pipelines and 
distribution pipelines - pipeline construction project 
teams - operation and maintenance 
divisions  - business divisions - health safety and environment 
divisions  
Pipeline consultants, lobbyist 
groups, unions, planning panels, 
regulatory experts and the public. 
52 
Total  78 
3.2.1.2 Documentation sources 
Apart from conducting interviews, this thesis also investigated documents, both written 
and non-written. The analysis of documents is not only useful for producing findings: it 
can also be important for cross-checking empirical data obtained from interviews and 
other sources. Documents are used as the basis of criticism and for later development of 
the research argument (Finnegan, 2006, p. 138). Documents were sourced through 
theoretical sampling and purposeful sampling (discussed in Section 3.2.2).  
Examples of documents included: (a) public inquiries, Royal Commission reports and 
transcriptions of meetings about previous offshore and onshore petroleum accidents in 
Australia; (b) regulations and legislative frameworks of pipeline industries, onshore and 
offshore petroleum industries; (c) the Australian pipeline standards (AS2885); (d) 
regulatory documents including a PMS and a safety case; (e) official and unofficial 
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reports of government, states, firms and trade unions; (f) pipeline maps; and (g) graphic, 
pictorial, audio and video.  
3.2.2 Sampling justification and the symmetrical approach of ANT  
Various sampling techniques were employed to identify potential interviewees: 
purposeful or selective sampling, theoretical sampling, snowball sampling and 
opportunistic sampling. These sampling procedures are related to each other. Purposeful 
and theoretical sampling techniques were used at different levels. The method of 
grounded theory (Glaser, 1978; Glaser & Strauss, 1967) has a contribution to play here. 
According to Glaser (1978, p. 37), purposeful sampling refers to: 
the calculated decision to sample a specific locale according to a 
preconceived but reasonable initial set of dimensions (such as time, space, 
identity or power) which are worked out in advance for a study.  
Glaser (1978, p. 36) defines theoretical sampling as: 
the process of data collection for generating theory whereby the analyst 
jointly collects, codes, and analyses his data and decides which data to 
collect next and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it 
emerges. 
The data collection process is guided by the emerging theory. Thus, ‘[t]he analyst who 
uses theoretical sampling cannot know in advance precisely what to sample for and 
where it will lead him’ (Glaser, 1978, p. 37).  
Purposeful sampling and theoretical sampling were employed in the field in a manner 
consistent with the symmetrical approach of ANT: selecting who (humans) and what 
(non-humans). The sampling process is a reflexive approach to selecting participants 
(the definition of ‘reflexive’ is explained in Section 3.1). Purposeful sampling, 
involving who and what to sample, was enacted from preliminary literature reviews of 
related literature about the research questions. Theoretical sampling of who and what to 
sample was enacted by interacting with the empirical ground. I started interviewing 
regulator participants (my purposeful samples) so as to understand how they performed 
their knowledge in regulating risk. My research aimed to open the black-box of 
regulatory discourses pertinent to regulatory responsibility, roles and devices.  
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The process of theoretical sampling occurred as follows. The narratives and research 
themes that emerged from interviews allowed me to see gaps in knowledge: thus who 
and what were selected for interviews so as to explore gaps in knowledge that emerged. 
Who and what were unknown before I started investigating. After interviewing 
regulators began, some insight into how they performed their knowledge became 
apparent, for example, regulators of some states employed external auditors’ reports and 
inspections from pipeline companies to support their inspection analysis. Once this was 
observed, I investigated further by identifying the external auditors and interviewing 
them. The external auditors (who) and auditing documents (what) were unknown before 
my research investigation.  
Another example is that after interviewing regulators the issues of measurement length 
and who are involved with such issues were raised. I therefore investigated the risk 
knowledge about measurement length and selected more participants associated with 
this issue. For example, I interviewed a participant who was dealing with planning and 
investigated what was happening: what were the problems they faced with 
‘measurement length’ and planning processes associated with pipeline encroachment? I 
also interviewed a pipeline operator who had field experience in dealing with third party 
encroachment.  
After the theme related to measurement length emerged, the what (non-human actants) 
and documents were investigated. They included: the Australian Pipeline Standard 
(AS2885), industrial documentation regarding measurement length, planning documents 
and reports, maps of the areas that had problems with pipeline danger and measurement 
length. This gap in risk knowledge about pipeline danger was gradually fulfilled or 
saturated. This is how I selected who and what from my theoretical sampling. The 
planning participants (who) and measurement length (what) were unknown before my 
research investigation. They were selected from the empirical ground to fulfil the gap in 
knowledge. This is how emerging themes drawn from empirical findings became 
saturated.  
Additional interviewees were selected through a snowball process. This occurs when an 
interviewee, who has been chosen through purposeful sampling, helps the researcher to 
identify other interviewees through his or her networks (Warren, 2002, p. 87). For my 
purposes, I interviewed regulators and used snowball sampling which involved asking 
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regulators to suggest other interviewees. Selecting a sample of interviewees is 
sometimes opportunistic when advantage is taken of unexpected situations (Creswell, 
2013, p. 158). For instance, the interview responses of opportunistically-chosen 
interviewees were considered relevant to the second key research question: how can the 
process of power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation be improved?  
Despite their general importance, the aforementioned sampling models do not fully 
explain the research method I used. I had to develop my own strategies articulated with 
ANT methodological strategies to gain access to my interviewees and to manage issues 
of trust and confidentiality – issues that were themselves embedded in the network of 
power relations pertinent to elite-expert institutions that this thesis aimed to explore. 
These issues are outlined in Section 3.3. 
3.3 Difficulties with power-knowledge assemblages 
There were difficulties encountered during the process of data collection that were 
related to the effects of power-knowledge within elite-expert institutions. I started my 
data collection process by tracing the relationships of regulators with others. The 
process led me to become part of the power-knowledge assemblages in which regulators 
were embedded. This process was interactive; it both shaped me, and was shaped by me, 
to enable accessibility (and inaccessibility) with my interviewees. The issues were 
associated with trust and confidentiality of access to participants, and reflected on the 
confidentiality of the power-knowledge network in pipeline industries (discussed in the 
following section).  
3.3.1 Trust and confidentiality 
Data collection took 11 months from December 2013 to October 2014. It took more 
time than I had expected due to the following reasons. I could not use snowball 
sampling to interview regulators outside of the state where I started the process as it 
would have infringed with confidentiality requirements. I wanted to keep my 
interviewees’ names as anonymous as possible. In cases where my interviewees 
mentioned other regulators’ names during my interview session I did ask for the latter 
name and contact details. I located them independently and during contact with them I 
did not mention who provided their names and contact details unless my interviewees 
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directly contacted them for me. Such cases, however, were relatively rare. Where I had 
difficulty gaining access to interviewees, I approached potential interviewees at the 
national rather than at the state level. I searched for interviewees’ names in the 
regulatory websites of every state. Nevertheless, I still struggled as regulators’ names 
were usually not included on regulatory websites. Only a few were found.  
I initially struggled to get access to interview regulator-interviewees, except in a few 
cases, despite having the name of my potential regulator-interviewee – either discovered 
myself or provided by my research team. This difficulty can be analysed in two ways. 
First, it involved the matter of trust between my professional participants and me – a 
stranger researcher. I subsequently developed strategies to establish trust with my 
potential interviewees. I asked the AS2885 committee’s (ME-038) permission to attend 
their annual meeting in early 2014. I had heard about the meeting from one of my 
interviewees. I asked if I could attend the AS2885 board meeting and provided the 
committee with information about my research. The information I provided included: 
my research background, research aims, my role in the ME-038 meeting, my research 
methods and my participant involvement. I wanted to introduce myself to potential 
interviewees, in particular, to regulators who were attending from other states. More 
importantly, I informed potential interviewees about my intentions with the committee 
in these words: ‘I will be at the ME-038 meeting as an observer for the purposes of 
getting background on the standards and their modification process’. I stated that 
nothing from the meeting would be reported directly in my research. More importantly, 
I wanted to seize this opportunity to recruit more participants. In addition, I affirmed the 
involvement of participants was on a voluntary basis. During the meeting I had a chance 
to introduce myself personally to my potential interviewees and I then provided them 
with my information sheet.  
The process of employing a strategy and presenting myself at the meeting, on one hand, 
helped me a great deal in establishing trust with regulators, as well as other members of 
the committees who work for pipeline companies and consultant companies. The 
personal meetings ensured easier access and interviews were conducted at a later date 
with less difficulty. In addition, attending the meeting assisted me in developing my 
understanding of pipeline risks, safety and regulation.  
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On the other hand, confidentiality constraints in accessing participants reflect power-
knowledge relationships. Had I not known about the AS2885 board meeting in early 
2014, I may have had limited access to regulators and industry’ interviewees. Being 
through this process, I have come to terms with what is a power-knowledge effect in the 
process of risk regulation. Information pertaining to pipeline risks is not openly 
disclosed.  
The relationships that obtain between human entities and non-human entities involved 
in performing power-knowledge practices through elite-expert institutions were 
gradually traced and revealed. For example, by attending the meeting, I ascertained that 
the members of ME-038 were composed of only two main bodies: pipeline industries 
and regulatory institutions. Members of these two institutions held roles at the higher 
levels of their organisations or at least in managerial roles. The committee did not 
include any ‘third’ or independent parties such as unions, workers or the public. In 
essence, the tripartite and risk governance concepts were either disassociated from or 
unacknowledged by the prevailing discourse of the Australian pipeline case (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.2 and Section 2.1.3 consecutively). These disassociated 
relationships will be further analysed in the following section in terms of actor-networks.  
3.3.2 Difficulties in accessing interviewees  
I explored the relational assemblages (or a web of heterogeneity or an actor-web, or an 
actor-network) of actors, both human and non-human, involved in the pipeline 
regulatory process. My initial human entities and my initial non-human entities were 
regulators and pipelines. The pipeline standard (AS2885) subsequently became a non-
human entity. From this beginning, I was able to gain access to specific groups of 
participants: regulators and industries who were the members of AS2885. The 
advantage of gaining entry to this group was that I had a chance to interview regulators 
in various Australian states and participants from private sectors who are usually 
difficult to access. However, once I had enrolled myself in the network of regulators, I 
struggled to gain access to those who were not part of that network. They included the 
workforce entities, unions, public, and planning panels. The workforce entities are 
specifically those who work ‘on the ground’ in pipeline safety operation and 
maintenance. In this section, I will further discuss the complexity, association and 
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disassociation of relational assemblages by reference to the difficulties in accessing 
workforces for interviews. 
The web of relations among actors involved in regulating pipeline risks forms a 
complex of relational assemblages. For example, the human actors are those I 
interviewed as detailed in Table 3.1. The emergent findings from a web of relations 
slowly emerged and were subsequently gathered into research themes14. In parallel, 
more time than expected was exercised in following these human actors and making 
contact with them for interviews. My strategy of investigating relationships among 
actors involved following controversial issues and triangulating and cross-checking the 
data obtained from different parties. Following controversial issues is part of the 
methodological practice of the process of data collection and analysis. The process, as 
inspired by the ANT approach, is to trace how controversial issues are enacted by who 
and what entities (Latour, 2005, p. 23). For example, when I understood that workforce 
entities and the public were not part of the AS2885 board, I asked questions about the 
safety practices of workforces in relation to safety practices developed through AS2885 
and the safety documentation submitted to regulators. I wanted to find out about the 
relationships between safety documentation and safety practices at the coalface. What 
risk is there, and what safety knowledge do workforces utilise to cope with pipeline 
risks? In addition, I wanted to know about how (and if) the public engaged in the 
processes of risk regulation in preventing pipeline risks. What knowledge does the 
public have about pipeline risks? The findings that emerged could assist me in gaining a 
better understanding and improving of the process of risk regulation. I then started to 
ask questions about pipeline risks in relation to workforces and public knowledge with 
regulators and industry staff whom I interviewed. 
I tried to gain access to interview workforces by using snowball sampling. First, I asked 
for the contact details of workforces from industrial staff, my industrial advisors from 
the EPCRC, regulators, as well as the AS2885 committee members so that I could 
arrange to interview them. However, I failed to get the contact details of workforce 
entities in the first instance: the industrial staff told me that they would get back to me 
about interviewing their workers. After not hearing anything from the staff for three 
months, I contacted them again and persisted in attempts to gain access to their 
workforces regarding safety operations and maintenance. I finally acquired the contact 
                                                 
14 The research themes that were gathered from emergent findings will be explained more in Section 3.4.3. 
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details of the field managers but not of the technicians and patrol staff. I subsequently 
interviewed the field managers in an attempt to use snowball sampling. My aim was to 
get access to the workers through the field managers. I asked a field manger if I could 
interview the company’s workers but was unsuccessful in the first instance. The reason 
provided was that the workers were working under pressure with limited availability of 
time. The managers insisted that the workers did not have enough time to be 
interviewed. In their words, the workers were not paid to do both the operation and 
maintenance and be involved with my research. Notwithstanding, I persisted in trying to 
interview some workers.  
When I asked for the contact details of workforce members from the industry staff, my 
industrial advisors, and the AS2885 committee members I interviewed, their response 
invariably came in the form of a question: why did I want to interview the workers? 
This question gave rise to concern vis-à-vis the workers’ role and the risk knowledge 
that workers employ in their work.  
I developed my own strategies to approach workforce members in two ways, in both 
cases using different entry points to gain access to the workforces. First, I went to 
interview the union staff members, who are outside of the regulator-industry pipeline 
network. My aim was to access workers who were union members and I was eventually 
successful. But, in the process of attempting to interview union members, I first had to 
spend some time learning how to access unions as the unions’ systems and categories in 
Australia were new to me. The different union organisations in Australia include the 
following: the Australian Workers’ Union (AWU), Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU), Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union (AMWU), and Construction 
Forestry Mining Energy Union (CFMEU). I commenced by telephoning union 
organisations directly; but this proved unsuccessful. Then, I visited some union offices 
at the state level. A receptionist working for a union organisation provided me with an 
email address of a union staff member. I contacted that person and she provided me 
with contact details of union members who she thought were close to my research. I 
was successful in the end after realising that union systems in Australia were scattered. 
There is no pipeline union as such. Pipeline workers were part of different union 
organisations. I tried to use snowball sampling from union participants to gain access to 
interview pipeline workers but was unsuccessful. This experience suggested the 
relevance of Foucault’s governmentality concept. Ideally, the union philosophy should 
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support workers against risk. Nevertheless, institutional systems including unions, 
workers, industries, regulators and the public are all part of a process of 
governmentality and are part of the discursiveness of governmentality practices (Miller 
& Rose, 1990, p. 4), which in this case prevented access to participation. Power-
knowledge is dispersed everywhere in society and indirectly controlled through various 
‘conduct of conduct’ forms of governmentality. This seems to be a norm (Miller & Rose, 
1990).  
So, I developed a second strategy to approach workers. While I was waiting to gain 
access to the workers I worked to establish trust with my regulators and industrial 
participants. I sought permission to attend key regulator-industry meetings so that I 
could get to know more people and understand how their organisations were structured. 
By doing this, I continually built trust with industry participants. In addition, I came to 
understand more about the structure of industry organisations, which in turn allowed me 
to access potential participants who had strong links to workers’ workplaces. These key 
participants worked in the Division of Occupational Health and Safety and had empathy 
for workers’ contributions. I have named these types of actors as ‘interactors’ (see 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.2), and Chapter 8 (Section 8.3.2.1)). 
After approximately four months I gained access to workers. After interviewing them I 
felt ‘saturated’ (Strauss & Corbin, 1998) as the data relevant to safety practices 
associated with the process of risk regulation in the Australian pipeline case had been 
triangulated or cross-checked. I had reached the point where I felt satisfied that I had 
collected enough data to support analysis of my research questions. 
3.4 Data analysis processes and strategies 
The data analysis process commenced once I started collecting my data. I made journal 
notes, observed, and analysed what was happening in my field research. The process of 
performing power-knowledge practices was analysed through relevant documentation 
and interview transcripts, transcribed both by myself and transcription experts. I traced 
the relationships of regulators interacting with other human actors, as well as non-
human actors, in performing power-knowledge practices implicated in the processes of 
risk regulation. The methodology framework of ANT material semiotics combined with 
discourse analysis proved beneficial in providing concepts for revealing the 
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relationships of actors. But, the strategies involved in how to do it or how to collect and 
analyse data relevant to issues of power-knowledge relationships were, to say the least, 
challenging. 
3.4.1 Operationalising key research questions 
I collected my data beginning with open-ended questions where I put theoretical 
assumptions about risk, safety and regulation aside as much as possible. My interview 
questions had been operationalised from my key research questions (see Table 3.2), and 
were gathered under the interview themes. The strategy of re-configuring key research 
questions into interview questions involved cause-effect relations and the 
transformation of relations. I began with questions: ‘how’, ‘what’, ‘who’ rather than 
‘why’ as the how, what and who questions allowed me to search further with in-depth 
investigation and analysis compared to the why questions.  
Table 3.2: The operationalisation from ‘modified key research questions’ to ‘interview questions’ 
and interview themes. 
My modified key research questions. The operationalisation of my interview 
questions. 
How has power-knowledge in relation to 
risk regulation been shaped and performed 
by what entities and by whom? 
 
  
Interview theme: regulatory challenges 
What is the most important issue or 
challenge that regulators encounter these 
days? 
Are there other issues you would like to 
mention as well? 
How has this issue had an impact on 
safety? 
How has this issue had an impact on what 
you do?  
How well is your agency/department 
equipped with regulatory frameworks and 
compliance processes? 
 Interview theme: regulatory trends 
What about regulatory approaches? Have 
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you seen any major changes in approaches 
to regulation? If you have, what are they? 
What has worked well and how? What has 
not worked and why?  
In your opinion, what are the main reasons 
behind the changes? Who has been 
involved with the changes? What are their 
roles? Who are the key actors among them, 
who create changes and how? 
What has worked well and what has not 
and how can they be improved? 
Opportunities for improvement. 
What do you think could be changed to 
improve the knowledge you used and your 
knowledge-capacity and actions? For 
example, what could be changed in dealing 
with uncertain situations?  
What about regulators themselves? Where 
do you see opportunities to improve what 
you and other regulators do?  
What about regulation? What do you think 
could be done to improve regulations?  
Where do you see opportunities to improve 
the effectiveness of regulations?  
The opening interview question was: ‘what is the most important issue or challenge that 
regulators encounter these days?’ Although the question was open-ended, to a certain 
degree it was limited to issues in relation to ‘power-knowledge’ practices engaged in by 
regulators. After asking my opening interview question, I followed up with either 
specific questions or with operational questions (Kvale, 1996, pp. 133-134). The 
interview questions that were common across all groups of interviewees are presented in 
the Appendix.  
During the first stage of data collection from December 2013 to April 2014, I 
interviewed 15 regulators, who were predominantly pipeline regulators (or technical 
regulators). I also interviewed some who regulate petroleum industries in order to 
compare practices; but, a comparative study was not the main aim. I wanted to 
understand the background to regulatory practices from petroleum industries compared 
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to pipeline industries in light of the changes in the regulatory practices and regulations 
as a consequence of the Longford Incident in Victoria (Victoria State Government, 
2004).  
After my initial 15 interviews (of regulators) were conducted, I shifted to interview 
pipeline company staff and other actors including unions and lobbyist industry groups 
with the intention of cross-checking data. I subsequently returned to interview 
regulators again. In the meantime, some among the 15 initial interviews I conducted 
asked for second interviews to follow up certain issues and for data triangulation. Some 
responded to the follow-up questions via email. I employed the same follow-up 
strategies with other groups of interviewees as well. 
The most important issues associated with regulation comprise complex assemblages of 
technical, social, economic and political themes. Having let the research unfold, and 
letting the data emerge with no assumptions, it took time to follow the web of relations; 
that is, who had been involved and how and influenced by what entities. Nevertheless, I 
had to choose what entities to follow. In the next section, the process of data analysis 
will be explained. I will discuss the entities I chose to follow, and what were the reasons 
for selecting them and not others.  
3.4.2 Four emerging relational assemblages 
I explored the non-humans that interact with humans in constituting assemblages by 
tracing their relationships involved in the processes of risk regulation. To achieve this, I 
employed the strategic methods associated with a semiotics of materiality combined 
with discourse analysis in, between and outside of pipeline and regulatory institutions. 
In addition, grounded theory is employed to draw out emerging themes.  
How did I make my decisions to follow which assemblages? I chose to follow and 
analyse assemblages that were involved in contradictory and controversial issues 
wherein multiple, complex and relational assemblages were involved. The contradictory 
and controversial issues were represented in the process of negotiation and re-
negotiation among entities.  
There are four distinct relational sets of assemblages that emerged in relation to these 
contradictory and controversial issues, including: (a) regulators and multiple 
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assemblages across Australian States; (b) three regulatory apparatuses involved in the 
safety-regulatory apparatus including safety plans, risk-based regulation, and social-
regulatory controls; (c) the technical-regulatory specification of measurement length; 
and (d) neoliberal rationalities, discourses about government (i.e. deregulation and 
energy privatisation), as well as neoliberal techniques embedded within deregulation 
and energy privatisation. The four relational assemblages are laid out in the thesis’s four 
discussion chapters (Chapters 4-7).  
Through the process of following these relational assemblages, aspects (or research 
themes) that have a material impact on regulatory outcomes were gradually revealed. 
The aspects representing discourses involved knowledge and practices in the process of 
risk regulation; the knowledge and practices that are shaped through power-knowledge 
relationships involving elite-expert institutions. Such discourses are unacknowledged in 
the existing literature. The discourses were subsequently analysed empirically and 
theoretically with the larger aim of performing new power-knowledge practices in the 
existing process of risk regulation.  
Formally, material semiotics ANT combined with discourse analysis describes the 
method used in this thesis, but, in practice, the analysis was complex and messy. As 
Law (2004, p. 2) stresses:  
what happens when social science tries to describe things that are complex, 
diffuse and messy. The answer, I will argue, is that it tends to make a mess 
of it. This is because simple clear descriptions don’t work if what they are 
describing is not itself very coherent. The very attempt to be clear simply 
increases the mess. 
Although Law argues that the ANT approach has attempted ‘to imagine what it might 
be to remake social science in ways better equipped to deal with mess, confusion and 
relative disorder’ (ibid), how ANT is done in practice is still complex and messy.  
So, how did I deal with such complexity and messiness? There were several ways to 
ANT in my analysis. I regularly took notes in my journal books, whiteboard, my Ipad, 
my notebook and office computer. I also used the NVivo textual database and analysis 
software to help me to code my interview transcripts and draw interview themes. 
Despite its powerful features, the process of my coding and analysis was more complex 
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than NVivo could facilitate. My primary means of analysing the complex and messy 
data was by using sequential mind mapping (see Figure 3.2). In addition, I printed out 
coding information from NVivo. I then crafted the linkages of interaction between those 
who and what that emerged from the findings. I also crafted the transitions of these 
interactions and their effects as they emerged from findings. These linkages were 
gradually drafted, and drawn into the research themes and narratives of each chapter.  
 
Figure 3.2 Example of sequential mind mapping of the complex and messy data. 
3.4.3 Emerging research themes  
The second key research question involves the improvement of regulatory practices and 
effectiveness: how can the process of power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation be 
improved? The question was modified and operationalised to enable effective 
interviewing. The research themes about the improvement of regulatory practices and 
effectiveness that were raised by interviewees were gathered and critically analysed in 
an attempt to improve the process of risk regulation.  
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I took a grounded theory approach to coding. I employed an inductive logic (Charmaz, 
2011) to develop explanatory concepts through data analysis. Interviews were coded by 
using the concepts of opening coding, axial coding and theoretical coding. Opening 
coding involved an interpretative process that helped me conceptualise data into 
categories or subcategories (Corbin & Strauss, 1990). Axial coding was employed to 
help me develop relationships between coding categories and subcategories (Charmaz, 
2011). Theoretical coding was employed to provide an analysis of new relations which 
helped me analyse the thematic concepts at the abstract level. One of the key theoretical 
codes is ‘incoherence of knowledge and practices’. The concept of incoherence (or 
disassociation or in a verb form as disassociated or incoherent) emerged inductively 
from the research. It refers to a number of ways in actors’ understanding and 
performance of safety knowledge, risk regulation etc. were characterised by absences, 
incompleteness, fragmentation and/or the marginalisation of potentially important 
actants.  
Examples of coding are presented in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Examples of coding 
Types of coding Examples of coding 
Chapter 4  
Opening coding  
Categories Technical regulatory specifications 
Subcategories AS2885 
 Risk metrix 
Categories Pipelines being physically safe 
Subcategories Catastrophic accidents  
 Using technical controls 
Axial coding Relationships among pipeline regulators and 
pipeline industries, and pipeline regulations 
that shape regulatory knowledge, power and 
practice 
Theoretical coding Five constituents of pipeline regulators’ 
ontological-epistemological logic: a new 
form of regulatory capture 
Chapter 4   
Opening coding  
Categories Regulatory practices in Australian states 
Subcategories Accidents and their impacts 
 Resources 
 The salary system 
 Industrial policy and activities 
86 
 Organisational structures within regulatory 
departments 
 Styles of auditing process 
 The approval processes of a safety plan 
 Disclosure of information about industrial 
pipeline performance presented as an annual 
report over the website of regulatory 
departments 
 Changes in technical specifications in 
AS2885 
 Deregulation 
 Energy privatisation. 
Axial coding Relationships among pipeline regulators and 
pipeline industries across Australian states  
Theoretical coding Multiplicity (or incoherence) of regulatory 
practices 
Chapter 5   
Opening coding  
Categories Developing, understanding and 
implementing safety plans  
Subcategories Safety plan 
 Field safety practices 
 Process safety 
 Personal safety 
 Workforce engagement 
 Union engagement 
Categories Developing, understanding and 
implementing risk-based regulation 
Subcategories Risk-based regulation  
Axial coding Relationships among pipeline regulators, 
pipeline industries, pipeline workforce 
groups and unions that shape regulatory 
knowledge, power and practice 
Theoretical coding Incoherence of knowledge and practices 
between safety plans and operational 
activities 
 Incoherence in understanding and 
implementing risk-based regulation 
 Incoherence of risk assessment practice 
 Ambiguity of regulator accountability 
towards workforces 
Chapter 6  
Opening coding  
Categories The enactment of Measurement Length 
Subcategories Definition 
 Urban encroachment 
 Third parties 
 External interference 
 Location class 
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 Physical-technical controls 
 Procedural controls 
Categories Changes in technical-political assemblages 
Subcategories Public notification 
 Pipeline maps 
 Safety Management Study (SMS) 
 Dial Before You Dig program 
 Location class 
Categories Changes in economic-political assemblages 
Subcategories Cost 
 Who pays? 
Categories Changes in social-political assemblages 
Subcategories Planning authorities 
 Independent planning panels 
 Underground companies 
 Developers  
 Builders 
 Contractors and sub-contractors 
Axial coding Relationships between measurement length 
and others that shape knowledge and 
practice associated with public safety 
Theoretical coding Distortion of risk accountability and risk 
assessment 
 Muddling practice of risk communication 
 Uncommon knowledge about pipeline risk 
 Incoherence of knowledge and practice 
related to pipeline risk and public safety 
Chapter 7  
Opening coding  
Categories Neoliberalism concepts 
Subcategories Deregulation 
 Energy privatisation 
Categories Neoliberal techniques 
Subcategories Contractual arrangement 
 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
 Red tape reduction 
 External auditors 
 Building blocks 
Axial coding Relationships between deregulation, energy 
privatisation and other assemblages that 
shape knowledge and practice in the process 
of risk regulation 
Theoretical coding Stewardship complexity 
 Precarious conduct of conduct or 
uncertainty of governing at a distance 
 Incoherence of knowledge and practice 
shaped through neoliberalism 
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The process and methodological practices of this thesis are presented in Figure 3.3. This 
process can be applied to explore, undertake and analyse research in risk regulation.   
 
 
Figure 3.3: The process and practice of the methodological framework used in this thesis.   
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Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to explore and explain how two key research questions were 
operationalised and tackled. More importantly, it has attempted to reflect on the 
concepts of ANT: dissolution of dichotomy, material semiotics and ontological equality, 
which are articulated with reflexivity. The ANT concepts and reflexivity have been 
shaped through the process of this research inquiry: the philosophical stances, 
methodological framework (material semiotics ANT combined with discourse analysis), 
and the process of data collection and data analysis. Within the rationales of this 
application of methodology, the webs of relational assemblages were revealed. 
Following these assemblages, research themes embodying power-knowledge 
relationships that shaped knowledge and practices in relation to regulatory outcomes 
were made visible. Such themes were critically analysed with an aim to revise the 
existing process of risk regulation so as to improve regulatory outcomes. This chapter 
highlights that this application of methodology not only illuminates alternative 
processes in research inquiry, research exploration and analysis; but can be extended, 
developed and made relevant to ethical practices in undertaking research on risk 
regulation.  
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Chapter 4 
Regulator ontological stances and the multiplicity of  
regulatory practices 
Existing scholarship on risk is largely moulded by either realist or constructivist 
ontological orientations. The primary ontological approach in dealing with 
technological risk shaped by regulatory theories is argued to be realism, where 
technical-regulatory tools and strategies are used in relatively pragmatic ways to 
objectively regulate technological risks (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.3). The realist 
approach, however, has been criticised by constructivists arguing that risks are socially 
constructed through values, experiences, and expert institutions associated with power 
relations (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2). 
This chapter argues that this dichotomy of ontological stances has placed limits on the 
exploration and explanation of ontological diversity in the empirical world, resulting in 
a constrained set of regulatory solutions to regulating risk. Consequently, this chapter 
explores the question of how realities (knowledge and practices) out-there are 
composed, by whom and by what entities within the context of the Australian pipeline 
industry?  
Using a semiotics of materiality, this chapter follows technical regulators (the entry 
points) and non-human actors that interact with them in performing regulatory practices. 
Herein, regulatory practices are defined as a performative effect generated from the 
power-knowledge relationships of multiple assemblages. The first section (4.1) 
evaluates the discourse that involves the current ontological stances of regulators. The 
findings indicate that pipeline regulators have a certain kind of logic: a way of thinking 
and doing safety practices which I describe as an ontological-epistemological logic 
comprised of, in this case, five constituent assumptions. The questions of what logics 
are and how such logics have influenced regulatory practices, will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 4.1.1. A performativity of the logic of pipeline regulators is employed 
to challenge the existing discourse underlined within theories of regulatory capture 
(discussed in Section 4.1.2).  
The second section (4.2) analyses the findings relevant to the question of how 
regulatory practices are performed across Australian States. The findings about 
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emergent multiple assemblages that interact with regulators across Australian states are 
mapped out. The terms multiplicity and coherence (discussed in Section 4.2.2) are used 
in this analysis, challenging the ontological-epistemological logic of pipeline regulators 
and the adoption of a harmonised Australian pipeline standard (AS2885) (discussed in 
Section 4.2.3). The outline of this chapter is presented in Figure 4.1.   
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Figure 4.1: Chapter 4 outline. 
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4.1 Ontological stance and the regulation of pipeline risks 
The main argument of this thesis is that realities (regulatory practices) are relational and 
not fixed. A fixed categorisation of the existing theories on risk, organisational safety 
and regulation, either realist or constructivist, tends to contain one singular narrative 
which may overlook or fail to fully comprehend complex power-knowledge 
relationships involved in regulation. This chapter, therefore, attempts to investigate how 
regulatory practices in relation to the ontological stance of regulators are composed, by 
whom, and by what. It examines and evaluates the current stance of pipeline regulators, 
and the roots or origins of their thinking and doing in regulatory practice. To my 
knowledge, this has not previously been examined in contemporary pipeline research. 
My investigation and evaluation are based on empirical findings in an effort to widen 
and contextualise the understanding of current practices among technical regulators. 
The empirical findings are employed to challenge the ontology of realist and 
constructivist theories so as to assist contemporary scholars to go beyond mainstream 
thinking and consider different ways of improving the process of risk regulation. 
Debates over the ontology and epistemology of risk have been problematized using 
straightforward technical calculations of probability (see for example: Althaus, 2005; 
Aven & Renn, 2009; Macgill & Siu, 2004; Merkelsen, 2011; Rosa, 1998; Solberg & 
Njå, 2012). They have drawn attention to debating and progressing the definition of risk 
together with advancing new ways for practicing risk analysis in a holistic manner. 
These debates have several implications for risk regulation including: an articulation of 
the concept of political risk calculation (Althaus, 2005); a utilisation of asemantic 
analysis to redefine risk (Merkelsen, 2011); a reconceptualization of risk in relation to 
the concepts of time, states of affairs and events (Solberg & Njå, 2012); and an 
employment of the definition of risk at various scales (macro, meso, micro) together 
with a recognition of the notion of risk as containing both physical and social aspects 
(Macgill & Siu, 2004). Drawing on these insights, this chapter will tackle the 
problematic character of the dualist concept of risk in the sciences. In addition, the 
chapter will explore how risk regulation is framed through hybrid realms.  
An analysis of emergent themes was conducted which disclosed that the current 
ontological stance of pipeline regulators is neither simply realist nor dominated by 
constructivist perspectives. Instead, the stance of pipeline regulators is composed of a 
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combination of realism and constructivism. The stance contains a realist element in the 
sense that pipeline regulators have a tendency to understand and regulate risk 
objectively by employing technical-regulatory tools that lie in pipeline regulations and 
AS2885. Nevertheless, the way in which risks are regulated is shaped, interpreted and in 
a sense, constructed by two interconnected bodies: regulators and the pipeline 
industries. Both parties are the same groups that originally enacted the technical-
regulatory specifications posited within AS2885. The outcome is that risk regulation is 
controlled and constructed by these interconnected parties. The lesson to be drawn here 
is that the ontological stance of pipeline regulators is partly created through a 
constructivist approach. 
The findings of this study have informed my notion of the ontological stance of 
regulators: a stance that leads regulators to think and act in certain ways, referred to as 
their ontological-epistemological logic. The logic is deeply embedded in taken-for-
granted assumptions about the nature of pipeline risks and the practice of pipeline 
regulation. The logic itself is comprised of five inter-related constituents. 
4.1.1 Five constituents of the pipeline regulators’ ontological-
epistemological logic 
4.1.1.1 The first constituent: the technical-regulatory specifications of 
pipeline regulations are constituted by two interdependent groups of 
experts 
The first constituent, indicating how regulatory practices influence power-knowledge in 
regulating pipeline risks, articulates with the technical-regulatory approaches employed 
in pipeline regulations. Such approaches are shaped through historical processes, from 
gas discovery until the establishment of pipelines and their implementation. An analysis 
of historical processes since gas discovery indicates that pipeline regulatory knowledge 
and practices have been influenced by pipeline regulations that were developed after the 
inception of pipelines (part of this issue is discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.3). 
Date indicate that the pipeline regulations were created by specific experts within two 
larger interdependent groups of experts: pipeline industries and pipeline regulators. 
Although one may argue the general point that such experts are located in elite-expert 
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institutions, experts work in different divisions and at different levels within and outside 
of different kinds of organisations. Experts contributing to pipeline regulation include: 
(a) professionals working on technical safety assurance, regulatory enforcement and 
compliance; (b) professionals working in safety assurance in the field; (c) professionals 
working in organisational management; (d) professionals working on industrial and 
business policy; (e) professionals working on work, health and safety issues; (f) CEOs 
of companies; (g) executive directors working in state government bodies; and (h) 
ministers of state parliaments. Among them, professionals are positioned at different 
levels within organisations: senior professionals who have manager roles, young 
professionals who work under the seniors. In summary, different professionals sit within 
two broader bodies: industry and government. They are connected together, working 
within relational assemblages in performing power-knowledge relationships that have 
shaped regulatory logic and practices in regulating pipeline risks.  
The industry body played a key role in discovering gas. Gas was discovered in 1900 in 
Australia and the process of petroleum exploration was expanded in the 1950s (Kimber, 
1984, p. 1). The majority of petroleum resources were gas, and a natural gas industry 
was developed (ibid, p. 2). Gas discovery brought a pipeline industry into being with 
strong support from Australian governments. Kimber (2009) states:  
None of these gas finds was able to be commercialised without the strong 
support of governments – either directly, with significant amounts of 
government ownership or supply underwriting, or indirectly through 
facilitation of land access and support for major gas consumers (p. 1). 
Without government support, the industry would not have been able to commercialise 
the gas and pipeline industry. The interdependence of the two bodies influenced how 
pipelines were established, commercialised, and managed, and how pipeline risks are 
regulated. As I state in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.1.3), both bodies played their important 
roles in developing, establishing and revising the Australian pipeline standard AS2885.  
These two broader bodies have dominated the technical-social approaches employed in 
pipeline regulations. They chose and made decisions about what technical-pipeline 
specifications are, and who should be involved in the process of regulating pipeline 
risks. This longstanding historical relationship between industry and government 
continues to influence regulatory practices today. 
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4.1.1.2 The second constituent: pipelines are physically safe and pipeline 
risks are regulated with technical-physical controls 
The second constituent is that pipelines are generally perceived as physically safe by 
both pipeline regulators and pipeline industries at all levels including senior manager 
levels and technicians at the ground level. Their viewpoints were supported with 
technical-scientific evidence and records of pipeline accidents in Australia. For 
example, pipeline regulators and pipeline industry professionals claimed that pipeline 
ruptures are very rare events, and that the Australian pipeline industry has operated at 
high standards with an excellent safety record. In addition, there have been no 
catastrophic pipeline accidents in Australia, involving the safety of people. One 
participant, a pipeline manager on the operation and maintenance side, contended that 
‘[W]e don’t consider [that] pipelines are major hazardous facilities’ and ‘it is confusing’ 
to consider them as major hazardous facilities. Such consideration is influenced by 
technical rationalities, reiterating the way pipelines are technically-physically operated 
and controlled. 
The degree to which pipelines are physically safe is dependent upon the invisibility of 
pipelines. Some participants, both regulator and industrial participants, indicated that 
pipelines are acknowledged among the pipeline industry body as fitting in to ‘the 
silence of supply’ and they are ‘out of sight, out of mind’. An industrial participant 
highlighted the meaning of these terms: 
Pipelines are out of sight out of mind, they are silent. ... They deliver a vast 
quantity of energy, quietly, nobody knows about it, unless something goes 
wrong, and we don’t want something to go wrong.  
The participant further commented that the pipeline industry likes to keep pipelines this 
way, out of sight and out of mind so that pipelines remain unopposed by the public. 
Such perspectives influence how pipelines are regulated and managed. Technical 
knowledge has become central to regulating pipelines by pipeline regulators and the 
Australian pipeline industry that focuses on technical knowledge in accordance with 
cost. For example, the Australian pipeline industry developed the Australian pipeline 
research program in 1996 to support and develop pipeline technology in a response to a 
complex set of rules created to design, construct and operate pipelines with an aim to 
reduce costs and improve the safety of pipeline technical conditions (Kimber, 2001, p. 
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1). The Research and Standards Committee (RSC) was established in 1996 and has 
worked closely with the pipeline committees of pipeline Australian standard AS2885 to 
ensure that the results from pipeline research are applied directly and quickly to AS2885 
(Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2015). There are four research programs, 
that aim for: (a) more efficient use of materials for energy pipelines; (b) the extension of 
the safe operating life of new and existing energy pipelines; (c) advanced design and 
construction of energy pipelines; and (d) public safety and security of supply of energy 
pipelines (Energy Pipelines Cooperative Research Centre (EPCRC), 2015b).  
Pipeline regulators and the Australian pipeline industry are concerned about the 
technical and physical controls that regulate pipeline risks. The industry requires the 
adoption of AS2885 to protect external interference from third party damage in order to 
maintain public safety. The physical protection of pipelines includes: (a) using 
sufficient wall thickness to resist pipeline penetration; (b) using sign posts and other 
markers as physical warning messages; (c) frequently patrolling of pipelines; (d) using 
the mechanical-physical method of pipeline inspection; and (e) using a safety 
management study during the design period and reviews every five years to identify 
threats including changes in the pipeline environment and, in particular, urban 
development. 
The second form of logic together with the influence of technical-scientific evidence 
about presenting a good safety record has the potential to lead to a complacency about 
the management and regulation of technological-hazardous risks (see for example: 
Carroll, Rudolph, & Hatakenaka, 2002; Hopkins, 2001; Hopkins, 2007a). The issues of 
becoming complacent are addressed in the following questions: (a) are the technical and 
physical measures adequate; and (b) how do regulators regulate and evaluate such 
complacency? 
4.1.1.3 The third constituent: regulators use specific sets of regulatory 
theories and strategies 
Regulator participants indicated that most pipeline regulators acknowledge and employ 
particular regulatory theories in their strategies. Regulators primarily employ 
enforcement-based regulatory pyramids. The strategy of employing social mechanisms 
(i.e., tripartite and inclusive risk governance approaches (see Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.2 
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and 2.1.3 consecutively) that assist regulators in increasing regulatory effectiveness is 
not part of pipeline regulatory practice (analysed further in Chapter 5). Engagement 
with third parties (e.g. the public and trade unions) in the process of regulating pipeline 
risks has also been partially excluded. 
Enforcement pyramids are useful in many ways. Regulatory participants contended that 
the regulatory guidance concerning compliance and enforcement pyramids is easy to 
follow and not complicated. Nevertheless, regulators utilise highly negotiation-based 
strategies and only proceed with prosecution as a last resort. I did ask the question: 
‘have you ever prosecuted any company’? A participant regulator stated:  
No never had to. I don’t want to be prosecuting companies. It means I'm 
failing as a regulator too. No. It's true. When you start prosecuting you've 
failed as such, as I have, and people forget that. It’s not my job ... I am not 
responsible for their compliance but I am responsible to make sure that I feel 
comfortable with what their performance is, and when they are not, I need to 
hit them over the head, but fortunately I haven’t had to prosecute anybody. 
Although the enforcement pyramid procedures suggest that prosecution should be the 
last resort, it needs to happen when necessary (Braithwaite, 2011, p. 504). Nevertheless, 
when considering reasons for prosecution including the process of shutting down a 
facility, regulatory participants highlighted the involvement of politics outside and 
within regulatory organisations. The political reasons are beyond the scopes and 
procedures of regulators’ enforcement actions; regulators are unlikely to intervene in 
pipeline operations as the consequences of prosecuting companies by shutting down a 
pipeline facility will affect energy supplies to industry and domestic sources. Regulators 
cannot directly decide to shut down pipeline facilities although they may predict that an 
accident will happen. In addition, the decision process leading to prosecution involves 
executive directors or a head of regulatory department within regulatory agencies as 
well as ministers positioned within states. Based on the degree of influence and 
intervention, regulators tend to take action by choosing the lower levels of the 
enforcement pyramid instead of prosecuting the company. A regulator participant 
emphasised that:  
We need to do some intelligent thing, you need to do this. We actually told 
them many times they need to do it but they just ignored it. We predicted but 
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we could not … it was not within our regulatory powers to stop operations. 
It's politically unacceptable. We can't do it. It's shutting down the whole 
economy of [the state], physically impossible.  
Pipeline regulators’ activities revealed certain patterns in doing and practicing in 
relation to guidelines attached to the enforcement pyramids. The findings indicated that 
regulators would rather use compromising strategies instead of punishment strategies. 
The reasons also involve their work roles: regulators work as public servants under the 
Australian government. Regulators have been brought in to regulate pipeline risks after 
the decision regarding the establishing of pipelines was already made by the Australian 
government in response to demand by the pipeline industry. Regulators’ roles are to 
provide information and recommendations to the government authority who makes the 
decision. Regulators acknowledged that they cannot guarantee accidents involving the 
public will not happen. One participant regulator contended: ‘I don’t give community 
guarantee [sic] that nothing will go wrong, I just gave the community guarantee that I 
am watching their back as best as I could’. 
It could be argued that regulators lack power. This, however, ignores the relational 
character of power-knowledge, and the discourses, enforcement actions, regulatory roles 
and responsibilities through which power-knowledge in relation to the regulation of 
pipeline risks is performed. The relational effects of the third constituent of regulators’ 
ontological-epistemological logic result in the next constituent. 
4.1.1.4 The fourth constituent: regulators inevitably rely on the knowledge 
and activities of industry  
The three previous constituents of ontological-epistemological logic have led to and 
been associated with the fourth: regulators have relied on industrial knowledge and 
industrial activities in managing pipeline risks. A regulator participant stated:  
Well I’m not saying that − nothing’s really wrong. As long as industry does 
the right thing there’s no problem, because all the industries out there, doing 
things, and we audit and inspect a sample of all that. That’s fine. Now if 
something goes wrong and we need to do a lot more things then we’re going 
to need a lot more bodies. … It’s all good until something goes wrong, 
something goes wrong people start pointing fingers and saying “who?” and 
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“what?” Did the company do something wrong by not managing their 
pipeline properly, or was it the government that was wrong by not making 
sure the company did the right thing? So if something goes wrong, there’ll 
be fingers pointed, yes. 
Regulators rely on industrial expertise to ensure the safety of pipelines. Regulators tend 
not to consider how the knowledge of pipeline risks is understood throughout regulatory 
processes as long as industry can show them how pipeline industries are going to deal 
with pipeline risks (discussed further in Chapter 5). Regulators are unlikely to check 
whether pipeline risks are validly assessed by industries throughout regulatory 
processes. This form of logic is a relational effect of the three previous constituents and 
all of them are related to the next constituent.  
4.1.1.5 The fifth constituent: establishing good relationships with 
industries 
As a consequence of the previous constituents of ontological-epistemological logic, 
regulatory knowledge and approaches are circumscribed through industrial bodies and 
the establishment of relationships with industries that are important to them. Regulators 
emphasised what they saw as the importance of establishing good relationships with 
industries for the following reasons:  
Because what happens is a lot of this comes about regulatory engagement 
with the stakeholder. If the regulator doesn’t have meetings with the 
stakeholders regularly telling them that these are what they expect, this is 
what is required to be done, this is what licensee’s obligations are and you 
keep telling them again and again and again at the highest level, at the CEO 
level, things will never change because it will just go on the way it’s always 
gone on.  
The statement above emphasises that an engagement with industries is the way to 
communicate the required regulatory obligations and actions with the goal of better 
regulatory outcomes.  
The following quote from one regulator highlighted another reason:  
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We don’t definitely audit as much as we should. Again, that pushes more 
weight on the relationship we have with the gas entities and that’s why we 
try extremely hard to maintain the relationship as a ‘no surprise 
relationship’. If you don’t have the time to audit then hopefully you got that 
relationship where they tell you that they’ve got a problem before it actually 
happens.  
The implication here is that regulators have limited resources to undertake field audits. 
In order to negotiate safety knowledge and practices, a strategy of establishing good 
relationships with industries is crucial. With this strategy, informal dialogue and trust 
between two parties can occur and this is the way accidents can be prevented. Trusting 
each other is fundamental, in particular, when a problem happens. Both parties can work 
and solve problems together before the possibility of an accident arises. Regulators 
indicated that they ‘need to be on top of everything’, and they have to engage with 
industries in order to know what industry is doing. In addition, this strategy enables 
regulators to access technical information and enhance their technical skills. The 
process of establishing a relationship between the two parties is the basis of the 
negotiation of their power-knowledge in relation to the process of risk regulation; these 
relationships have shaped regulatory practices or regulatory outcomes.  
The findings of this chapter are consistent with the existing regulatory literature, in 
particular: regulators’ dependence on industry to access information and other resources 
necessary to enact regulatory practices; regulators’ reliance on industrial expertise to 
ensure safety; regulators’ need to create and maintain good relationships with industries; 
and regulators’ reluctance to use punishments (Friedrichs, 2007; Hawkins, 1983; 1984; 
Kringen, 2014; Wiig & Tharaldsen, 2012). This chapter has extended the analysis of 
existing literature to power-knowledge relationships that shape ontological practices as 
a new form of regulatory capture.  
4.1.2 Ontological-epistemological logic: a form of regulatory capture 
The constituent assumptions of regulators’ logic indicate that regulators are closely 
connected to industry, and reliant on industry knowledge and activities to carry out their 
regulatory work. The closeness of this relationship, however, has a detraction. The 
notion of regulatory capture has been raised by regulatory theorists when two parties, in 
this case, regulators and industry, share a cooperative relationship and where their 
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regulatory actions are not transparent to others outside of their network (Ayres & 
Braithwaite, 1991; Levine & Forrence, 1990; Makkai & Braithwaite, 1992).  
Regulatory capture has been analysed in various situations. First, regulators become 
captured when they fail to enforce the law against powerful business offenders (Makkai 
& Braithwaite, 1992). This occurs for three main reasons. First, regulators who once 
worked for industry are loyal to industries rather than to the goals of regulatory 
institutions (ibid, p. 67). Second, regulators sympathise with industries in correlation 
with time; the longer regulators are involved with industries, the more likely they can be 
captured (ibid). Last, regulators can become weak because they aim for future careers in 
the industries they regulate (ibid).  
There are further explanations of regulatory capture. Baldwin et al. (1998) contend that 
regulators are distorted by their responsibilities, and have conflicts of interest whereby 
they serve their interests rather than the public interest (pp. 9-10). Furthermore, Bó 
(2006) theorises that regulators can be captured through state interventions at policy 
levels including the setting of taxes and regulations and the restructuring of regulated 
monopolies that allows regulated corporations to manipulate and control regulatory 
institutions (p. 203).  
I argue that these theories on regulatory capture are framed with a classical theorisation 
of power relations in which power is assigned to dominant states or industries. A more 
relational theorisation of power suggests more attention should be paid to the 
relationships between regulators and industry without assuming these to be negative or 
unproductive. The ontological-epistemological logic explored in this chapter helps to 
expose the ways in which such relationships are understood and ordered in the 
Australian pipeline industry. 
I have employed the findings that emerged around ontological-epistemological logic to 
re-theorise and interpret how regulators are captured. I argue that pipeline regulators 
have not only been captured in the ways analysed and theorised by the extant theories. 
Rather, regulators have been subtly captured through their own logic and practices in 
regulating industry. More importantly, regulators themselves do not realise this new 
type of regulatory capture in which they are immersed. Regulator participants 
acknowledged the conventional forms, based on the contemporary literature. They 
insisted that they have not been captured by industry. They asserted that they were 
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aware of the issue and have developed organisational criteria and rules to avoid 
regulatory capture.  
4.2. Multiplicity of regulatory practices 
This section continues to explore regulatory practices shaped through power relations 
pertinent to elite-expert institutions. The findings demonstrate that the knowledge and 
practices of regulators are influenced by multiple assemblages – collections of human 
and non-human entities – that interact with regulators across Australian states. These 
findings are employed to challenge existing theories in relation to regulatory practices.  
The existing literature shows that regulators in many countries including Australian 
pipeline regulators increasingly use and develop risk-based strategies to allocate their 
resources (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.1). Despite their salience, regulatory 
scholars acknowledge that risk-based regulatory regimes have faced difficulties in 
analysing the complex problems and dynamics of regulatory practices concerning risk-
related issues (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2012a, p. 283; Black & Baldwin, 2010, p. 
181). Uncritical application of risk-based frameworks may, therefore, promote an 
equally uncritical application of other regulatory standards and practices. Black and 
Baldwin (2010) evaluate the issue as follows:  
In a risk-based regime, the inherent danger is that of "model myopia" — that 
regulatory officials become committed to an historically captured set of risk 
indicators and assessment criteria. Such commitment inhibits the regulator 
from responding to an unpredicted future. If the safest thing to do is to 
follow the risk framework, the way of least resistance is not to respond to 
any circumstances or events that are not anticipated by that framework. The 
irony is that risk-based frameworks are in danger of becoming 
institutionalized in a way that negates their capacity to deal with the very 
predictive challenges that they are intended to meet. … a further aspect of 
this danger of institutionalization is that regulators may become committed 
to a risk model that is technically or intellectually deficient in a manner that 
prevents adaptation to developing threats (Black & Baldwin, 2010, pp. 205-
206). 
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As an antidote, Black and Baldwin (2010) propose a ‘really responsive risk-based 
regulation’ model (ibid), arguing that regulators should be required to regulate risk in a 
responsive way to five elements including: (a) regulated firms’ behaviour, attitudes and 
cultures; (b) regulations’ institutional environments; (c) interactions of regulatory 
controls; (d) regulatory performance; and (e) change. The response to the last element, 
change, suggests that regulators should be adaptive to the changes that may impact 
regulation including shifts in objectives and emergent risks. What are ‘changes’ and 
how can they be explored?  
Despite the comparative flexibility of a ‘really responsive risk-based regulation’ model, 
I am concerned that these scholars do not adequately explain how to monitor and 
comprehend relevant ‘changes’. This thesis develops a theoretical-methodological 
approach to explore such changes. The method of assemblage (material semiotics of 
ANT combined with discourse analysis, presented in Figure 3.3) is used to investigate 
assemblages interacting with regulators that have influenced regulatory practices. The 
investigation is based on the analysis of grounded empirical findings. The findings open 
more opportunities to analyse and challenge the existing risk-based regulations, as well 
as providing a more flexible-analytical framework for dealing with complex risk issues. 
4.2.1 Overarching multiple assemblages at different geographical levels  
Multiple assemblages were evident in the performance of regulatory practices, several 
of which are not documented in extant regulatory theories. Specifically, assemblages 
included: (a) accidents and their impacts; (b) resources; (c) the salary system; (d) 
industrial policy and activities; (e) organisational structures within regulatory 
departments; (f) styles of auditing process; (g) the approval processes of a safety plan; 
(h) disclosure of information about industrial pipeline performance presented as an 
annual report over the website of regulatory departments; (i) changes in technical 
specifications in AS2885; (j) deregulation; and (k) energy privatisation. The 
assemblages were located within, between and beyond the boundary of organisations.  
The assemblages are organised in four geographical levels in Table 4.1. Despite being 
enrolled in different geographical levels, each assemblage was mobilised, dynamic and 
interrelated.  
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Table 4.1: Assemblages at different geographical levels. 
  Assemblages Levels 
    
International  National State Local 
Council 
1 Accidents and their impacts x   x   
2 Resources   x x   
3 Salary systems     x   
4 Industrial policy and industrial 
activities 
    x   
5 Organisational structures within 
regulatory departments 
    x   
6 Styles of auditing process     x   
7 Approval processes of a safety plan     x   
8 Disclosure of information about 
industrial pipeline performances 
presented as an annual report on the 
website of regulatory departments 
    x   
9 Changes in technical-regulatory 
specifications in AS2885 
  x     
10 Deregulation  x x x 
11 Energy privatisation x x x x 
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to the assemblages at different geographical levels.  
4.2.2 Multiplicity: differences among regulatory practices across 
Australian states 
The data drawn from the interviews were reorganised and grouped into seven states and 
territories variously labelled State A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. Although each assemblage 
was enrolled at different levels, they were dynamic and related to each other. Each state 
or territory had multiple and different assemblages as presented in Table 4.2. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that this chapter is of a qualitative nature and no 
attempt is made to draw out statistical differences between states. The purpose here is to 
demonstrate variability and to explore the range of ways in which regulatory practices 
are and might be enacted. Each state has been influenced by different assemblages 
which emerged from interviews and documentation. Some states have not been 
discussed because their regulatory performance has not been shaped by those particular 
assemblages. For example, in Section 4.2.2.6, only three states (State A, E and F) 
employed external auditors in their regulatory process (Table 4.2 and 4.7). The 
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influences of different assemblages associated with each state were analysed to indicate 
the different or multiple power-knowledge practices of states across Australia. 
This section aims to present the multiplicity of regulatory practices across Australian 
states (discussed in the following paragraphs), challenging the existing regulatory 
literature and the existing regulatory practices (discussed throughout this chapter).   
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Table 4.2: The multiplicity of overall assemblages in each state.  
Assemblages State 
  
 
A B C D E F G 
1 Accidents and their impacts               
1.1     Accidents at the international level  x x x x x x x 
1.2     Accidents at the state level    x     x     
2 Resources x x x x x x x 
3 Salary system               
3.1     Paid directly by state governments       x   x   
3.2     Cost recovery levies: charging 
licensees’ fees from licensees (pipeline 
companies)   
x x x   x   x 
4 Industrial policy and industrial 
activities               
4.1    Crude oil production and reserve    x     x     
4.2    Refinery x x     x   x 
4.3    Production of conventional natural 
gas   x x   x   x 
4.4    Coal Seam Gas x           x 
4.5    Shale Gas x   x   x   x 
4.6    Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)         x   x 
4.7    Mining x x x x x   x 
4.8    Pipeline industry x x x x x x x 
5 Organisational structure x x x x x     
6 Style of auditing process               
6.1    Field audits x x x x x x x 
6.2    External audits x       x x   
7 Approval processes of a safety plan  
  
          
7.1    A safety plan approved by regulators   x   x x     
7.2    A safety plan not approved by 
regulators 
x   x     x x 
8 Disclosure of industrial pipeline 
performances on the website of 
regulatory department  
x x x 
        
9 Changes in technical-regulatory 
specifications in AS2885 
x x x x x x x 
10 Deregulation x x x x x x x 
11 Energy privatisation x x x x x x x 
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to the assemblages across states.  
As Table 4.2 shows, a multiplicity of regulatory practices was evident across states and 
territories, as performed through the interactions between multiple assemblages and 
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regulators across jurisdictions. What is the ‘multiplicity’ concept used in this thesis? 
According to Law (2004), ‘multiplicity: like difference’ (p. 162), represents:  
the simultaneous enactment of objects in different practices, when those 
objects that are said to be the same. Hence the claim that there are many 
realities rather than one. … The additional claim that practices overlap in 
many and unpredictable ways, so there are always interferences between 
different realities (Law, 2004, p. 162). 
Following multiple assemblages that interact with regulators highlights several themes 
relevant to knowledge and power (discussed in the following Sections: 4.2.2.1 to 
4.2.2.8). Themes neglected in the existing literature on risk regulation but shown to be 
important here point to differences in the regulatory practices of each state. The 
practices of each state are different because they are performed through different 
assemblages. The differences in regulatory practices are evaluated throughout the 
discussion in this section. The differences indicate changes between assemblages, 
shaping multiple forms of regulatory practice across Australian states.  
4.2.2.1 Differences between regulatory practices associated with 
accidents and their impacts.  
Similar to other cases in relation to technological-hazardous risk, accidents have 
influenced changes in regulatory approaches to regulating pipeline risks. Such accidents 
are not only limited to pipelines, but include accidents that occur from petroleum and 
energy industries at the international and local levels. The Piper Alpha incident (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.1 (b)) was mentioned regularly by research participants. As a 
result of the Piper Alpha accident, regulation shifted from a prescriptive approach to a 
risk-based approach.  
The Australian pipeline sector adopted a risk-based approach to their regulatory 
operation, embedded in the Australian standard pipelines (AS2885) and the pipeline 
regulations across Australian States. Nevertheless, the structure and implementation of 
risk-based frameworks in each state are different depending on the type of safety system 
employed. The documented safety system must be approved by pipeline regulators. For 
states where catastrophic accidents have occurred (States B and E), a ‘safety case’ 
system is used whereas the other states employ a ‘pipeline management system’ (PMS), 
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following the safety prerogatives outlined under the AS2885 framework. The impacts 
from accidents in each state are presented in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3: Differences between regulatory practices associated with accidents and their impacts 
Impacts of accidents and types of safety 
systems across states 
State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Accident               
   Accidents at the international level  x x x x x x x 
   Accidents at the state level    x     x     
Types of safety systems               
  A ‘pipeline management system’ (PMS) x   x x   x x 
  A ‘safety case’ system    x     x     
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to impacts across states.  
Here I pose an important question: what do the participants know about the differences 
between a safety case and a PMS? Most of the participants, both regulators and non-
regulators, knew little about the differences between these two regulatory models 
(further discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). Only a few knew about the differences 
between the two types of safety system.  
4.2.2.2 Differences between regulatory practices associated with 
resources 
Resource inadequacy is one of the issues most mentioned as a hindrance to regulatory 
effectiveness. Regulators in every state have raised issues about the inadequacy of 
resources (as presented in Table 4.2). Participants including regulators, union officers 
and consultants indicated that the majority of regulators across states do not have 
adequate resources either in terms of financial resources or human resources (i.e., 
regulatory skills, capacities and competency). Regulator participants from a few states 
suggested that they actually had enough financial resources. But, the regulators of these 
states expressed a contrary view, claiming that they do not have enough human 
resources. The issues surrounding inadequate competency and the skills of regulators 
were raised by research participants – not only regulators but also industrial and 
consultant participants.  
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One of the emerging research themes revealed that regulators are required to develop 
their strategies with limited resources. The most common strategy of regulators is to 
adjust their resources and time in accordance with their assessment of the amount of 
risk. Many of the participant regulators mentioned that: (a) they spent more of their 
resources where there is a high population density; (b) where the pipelines are old and 
have thinner walls; and (c) practice less regulation of companies that are involved with 
pipeline activities in remote areas. Regulators adapt their assessment to mitigate 
pipeline risks by ensuring physical controls are established for pipeline risks. These 
strategies are limited by other assemblages associated with salary systems, 
organisational structures, industrial policies and activities within each state. More 
generally, the assemblages are associated in complex relations, forcing differences (or 
incoherencies) in regulatory practices in each state (see the definition of incoherence in 
Section 3.4.3).  
4.2.2.3 Differences between regulatory practices associated with the 
salary system 
The salary system supporting pipeline regulators is of two types: salaries paid directly 
by state governments and salaries funded by licensees or pipeline companies through 
state governments (see Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4: Differences between regulatory practices associated with salary systems.  
Salary systems across states 
State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Salary system               
   Paid directly by state governments       x   x   
   Cost recovery levies: charging licensees’ 
fees against licensees (pipeline companies) 
x x x   x   x 
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to salary systems across states.  
This section does not attempt to evaluate which of the two systems is better but, rather, 
addresses differences and issues concerning the two systems. The findings indicate that, 
in most states and territories, regulators’ salaries were paid through cost recovery levies 
by charging a licensees’ fee against licensees (pipeline companies) although the 
structure of fee collections is different in terms of the rate of licensees’ fees.  
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The relationship between the salary system and the regulation system was ambiguous. A 
regulator participant stated that ‘[r]egulation is a private good, not a public good’. This 
phrase was explained as follows:  
Regulation is not for the public. Regulation might protect the public but 
regulation is only there because some private interest has decided to do 
something which is imposing in cost, potential risk or cost to the 
community. That’s the private goods. So me as a regulator. I am there to 
deal with the private goods so I have to get that money to pay for my time 
from the person who incurs the cost and that is the company. So my license 
fees have to be set at the right level to fund the resources I need to satisfy the 
community and the industry safety. The best way to do [this] is through 
license fees. That is why regulation people have licensee fees to pay for the 
cost of regulation. That is in theory but some governments don’t charge 
enough so they don’t have enough money to pay for the right resources. 
The key message inherent in this statement is that the fee collected from the pipeline 
industry is part of regulatory practice. Regulations are created to manage the industry. 
Regulators who are assigned to regulate the industry should be paid by the industry. 
This regulator and some others were satisfied with how their salaries were arranged 
through cost recovery levies.  
Despite the advantages, there were some contradictions in the salary system. A few 
regulator participants and one union officer were concerned with how the salary system 
influenced regulatory practices. For example, one regulator participant addressed a 
concern about being fully funded by industries, indicating that the cost recovery levies 
have made some regulators feel uncomfortable because ‘who pays’ the salary of 
regulators, or ‘where the salary comes from’ is relatively controversial. The issues of 
transparency, accountability, and the conflict of interests were raised by this regulator 
participant: 
From my point of view, I have a lot of discussion with my colleagues and a 
lot of debate about this issue. I do not feel comfortable. Some of us don't feel 
comfortable with this but it's not our choice. We don't have a choice. We'd 
rather be impartial which means that we are independent from the operators. 
We'd rather be government servants in the true respect of the word, which 
means our salaries are not being funded by the industry. 
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Another issue surrounds industrial intervention. This regulator participant further 
opined that the salary system, whereby regulators are paid through cost recovery levies 
from the licensee’s fee collection, could allow industries to intervene in the regulators’ 
actions on compliance and enforcement as well as in the prosecution process:  
That's a bit of a challenge here because the industry is basically … yeah, the 
first thing is nobody likes to come up with money. Basically the … I mean, 
from the point of view of the operator nobody likes to come with money, out 
of pocket. If they come up with money they want something in return. It's 
only natural, okay? It's like anybody else. At the meeting they try to 
influence … they want to have a lot of say and influence in how money is 
spent. Basically they are not too concerned on how money is spent, I think. 
They like to have a lot of … we find that again a problem with the issues 
with prosecution and all that. You can imagine: how are you going to 
prosecute somebody who pays your salary if somebody commits offence, 
there's a big accident or something happens. Under regulations, the penalties 
of breach of compliance of regulations, we're supposed to prosecute them. 
The question is how motivated are we to prosecute them if they actually pay 
our salary? This is a big challenge. It's one of the challenges we face. Our 
track record, history, of successful prosecutions is pretty poor, very poor. 
There's only one in the history of how many years … successfully 
prosecuted.  
Conversely, some of the regulators claimed that they have a transparent system and 
follow rigorous checks within an independent reporting system to prevent industrial 
intervention. Even so, I argue that there is no room for third party intervention in 
checking such a transparent system and in monitoring the closed relationship between 
the two interdependent parties: pipeline industries and regulators. In summary, different 
types of salary systems have different impacts on regulatory practices with deferential 
outcomes that may lead to subtle forms of ‘regulatory capture’. 
4.2.2.4 Differences between regulatory practices associated with the 
industrial policy and activities 
States have different types of industrial policy and activities (as presented in Table 4.5), 
that influence regulatory practices differently.  
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Table 4.5: Differences between regulatory practices associated with industrial policy and activities.  
Industrial policy and activities 
State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Crude oil production and reserves    x     x     
Refinery x x     x   x 
Production of conventional natural gas   x x   x   x 
Coal Seam Gas x           x 
Shale Gas x   x   x   x 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)         x   x 
Mining x x x x x   x 
Pipeline industry x x x x x x x 
Sources:  The information in this table is drawn from the research findings and following source: Minter Ellison 
Legal Group (2013).  
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to industrial policy and activities 
Pipelines are a fundamental infrastructural activity in every state of Australia. They 
carry energy products to and between industries and domestic households. Although 
some states (States D and F) have a minimum of heavy industry compared to other 
states (see Table 4.5), pipelines pass through to deliver products to domestic residents 
and local businesses.  
The location of pipelines has an impact on regulatory practices and knowledge. For 
example, there are pipeline licensees who own pipelines passing though State F that are 
based in other states. The pipelines are operated by other companies. A regulator 
participant indicated that because pipeline licensees are located in different states, 
pipeline regulators have difficulty accessing the safety documentation particulars of 
pipeline licensees. The issues involve the process of deregulation (the emerging 
assemblage number 10) and energy privatisation (the emerging assemblage number 11), 
which will be discussed further in Chapter 7.  
Unlike others, State A does not have an upstream petroleum industry. The petroleum 
resources that are currently supplied to State A have nearly run out. For this reason, 
State A has proposed coal seam gas as an alternative energy resource, in the main to 
support downstream industrial sectors. A special divisional institution has been set up 
for managing and regulating the new coal seam industry, leading to changes in 
organisational structure. Such changes have had an effect on pipeline regulatory 
practices within State A. The number of pipeline regulators was reduced as they were 
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rearranged to share their roles and expertise. Some were moved to support the coal seam 
gas division.  
The states B, C, E and G have considerable industrial activity. Nevertheless, among 
them, the regulatory departments responsible for industrial activities are arranged 
differently. States B and C have more than one department managing different types of 
industries whereas states E and F have only one department regulating different types of 
industries including regulating the whole gas industry from petroleum exploration to 
BBQ bottles.  
The regulatory practices of State E are relatively distinct: there is only one department 
accountable for heavy industry activities within the state; and the numbers of regulators, 
as well as their technical knowledge and skills, are limited. State E has developed and 
rapidly expanded LNG industrial activities and the total production capacity of LNG 
will be increased more than 50% by 2017. In the meantime, State E passed through an 
organisational restructuring phase in 2014, recruiting new technical regulators and new 
team leaders as part of a political mechanism associated with the state government. The 
previous technical regulators of State E, employed through a contractual arrangement 
under the previous political regime, were dismissed and their agreement cancelled. This 
was not because they did not have knowledge and skills, but due to a political situation 
within the organisation, impacting on the restructuring of regulatory institutions. 
Participants, both regulators and industrial employees, indicated that the consequences 
of the resulting regulatory-institutional restructuring were substantial. Regulatory 
knowledge and skills take time to build. Not only technical knowledge and skills, but 
new regulators need time to learn to establish new relationships and develop trust with 
the industry as part of regulatory practices. Such restructuring of regulatory agencies 
has broken the continuity of regulatory practices and knowledge, in the process 
impacting on the effectiveness of regulating pipeline risks.  
In summary, the differences between industrial policy and activities shape regulatory 
practices differently. The regulatory practices of State E have been massively influenced 
by industrial policy and activities compared to others. The reason is that the relational 
effects of industrial policy and activities are entangled with complex and multiple 
assemblages (i.e., the assemblages related to resources, the salary system and, in 
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particular, the stability of the political regulatory-institutional structure), much more 
than other states.  
4.2.2.5 Differences between regulatory practices associated with 
organisational structure 
The interview evidence of regulatory and industrial participants about the role of 
organisational structure strongly suggested an impact on regulatory practices in nearly 
every state (see Table 4.6). Some states (States A and E) were discussed in the previous 
Section (4.2.2.4). This section will discuss States B, C, and D. 
Table 4.6: Differences between regulatory practices associated with the organisational structure.  
Organisational structure across states State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Organisational structure x x x x x 
  Note: X refers to the presence of data related to organisational structure across states.  
The organisational structure of State B was influenced by catastrophic accidents and the 
process of energy privatisation. A new organisation was set up in relation to part of 
these two material entities. Due to these reasons, State B was able to gain greater 
resources, both human and monetary. A regulatory team was recruited and obtained 
support from the executive team located within the new organisational structure.  
Regardless of catastrophic accidents, findings indicate that State C regulators initially 
restructured their organisation and regulatory framework beginning with the reframing 
of their own regulatory framework, regulatory philosophy and regulatory roles. The 
restructure process was supported by the director and the chief engineer of the 
organisation. Rather than following previous regulations, State C started designing and 
rewriting its own regulations, beginning with a principle of regulation. 
Despite such positive outcomes, there were negative impacts from influence exerted by 
executive directors of organisations. For example, an executive director intervened in 
regulators’ actions against a petroleum company. Regulators wanted to adopt a punitive 
approach, following the sanction enforcement pyramid. Regulators wanted the company 
to make immediate changes to mitigate risks. Regulators intended to send an urgent 
letter to the company, and if the company did not make any change within four weeks, 
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regulators would proceed with a plant shut-down. But, the regulatory processes and 
actions were obstructed by the executive director, who employed a compromising 
strategy to deal with the company instead.  
Considering the overall organisational structure of states, State D is different. Pipeline 
regulators are required to be part of a WorkSafe organisation (the government statutory 
agency dealing with general worker safety issues) within State D, whereas pipeline 
regulators of other states are positioned within a petroleum department (or an energy or 
a petroleum and mine department). The WorkSafe organisations of other states are 
managed separately and associated with other different types of work and industries. 
The separation of organisations and legislative systems has set and limited the 
boundaries of who should be involved in regulatory processes and how (further 
discussed in Chapter 5). This has resulted in an incoherence of practices and knowledge 
in relation to pipeline risks and danger. 
4.2.2.6 Differences between regulatory practices associated with the 
styles of auditing process 
The styles of auditing process are addressed comparatively by research participants as 
presented (see Table 4.7). There are two main styles of auditing process, either audit by 
pipeline regulators, or by others. The latter is undertaken by external auditors, 
independent auditors (or third party auditors). Criticism arises over ‘who pays’ for 
external auditors: either pipeline companies or regulatory bodies. The question of ‘who 
pays’ involves a conflict of interest in audits which I will discuss later in this section.  
Table 4.7: Differences between regulatory practices associated with styles of auditing process 
Style of auditing process across states State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Style of auditing process               
   Field audits x x x x x x x 
   External audits x       x x   
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to styles of auditing process across states.  
Nearly all of the participant regulators preferred to do their own field audits for the 
following reasons. First, the gap between what is expressed in the safety documentation, 
submitted to pipeline regulators, and what happens in field safety practices is disclosed 
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through field auditing. Because this is a key piece of regulatory knowledge and practice, 
most of the regulatory agencies see this as a core task to be done by their  
in-house staff. Second, the problems in field safety practices are passed on to pipeline 
regulators from pipeline field staff. Again, this is a key source of knowledge other than 
that passed on in writing by company management. Pipeline regulators can 
subsequently raise these problems with licensees or CEOs of pipeline companies so that 
the resources are being provided to enable field staff to work in safer conditions. 
Regulator participants indicated that licensees or CEOs are willing to fix the problems 
to prevent deaths. One regulator participant stated: ‘that is very cheap investment, for 
licensees to make it. When they start to understand this, these issues that have been 
raised by the regulator from a field perspective, are not big issues at all.’ Nevertheless, 
industrial participants (in particular, those who work at the sites such as operation and 
maintenance mangers, occupational health, safety and environment (OHSE) managers, 
field managers and field technicians) indicated that in some areas the field staff have 
neither met regulators nor raised their concerns with regulators. The areas concerned are 
located in states that have limited resources for undertaking field audits.  
Some states that had suffered major accidents took on the assignment to make major 
changes in the organisational structures, regulatory devices and strategies, increasing 
regulatory effectiveness. The states that had suffered accidents gained more resources 
than others, both monetary and human resources. Due to the increased supply of 
resources as a result of accidents, they tended to be ‘more stringent’ or ‘more at arm’s 
length’ than others. And, there has been a change towards increased regularity of field 
audits. In addition, senior regulators have had more time to train young regulators to 
enhance the competency and skills of young regulators, compared to others. This is 
against a background wherein the competency and skills of regulators are inadequate in 
all states, an observation made by the majority of participants (see Section 4.2.2.2.). 
Those states that have not had accidents had less resources to do field audits. Regulators 
develop their regulatory strategies in accordance with the amount of resources they 
have, both technical knowledge and skills, as part of their negotiating process when 
dealing with pipeline risks. The use of ‘external auditors’ or ‘third party auditors’ is one 
of the regulatory strategies employed to prioritise regulatory resources and skills.  
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Despite such advantages, the implications of ‘external audits’ are controversial, as 
emphasised by a regulator participant:  
There is no independence. This individual has been conducting the audits for 
ten plus years and sees no fault in their system. However, us as technical 
inspectors/regulators are finding faults within their system which the auditor 
is not recognising, so there is no independence. I believe it’s a very flawed 
system where the auditor and the utility are too close and too interrelated, 
the auditor is paid by the utility to conduct that audit; they will never, ever 
give negative results of the utility’s activities because they’re paid by the 
utility. If they give negative results the utility will find another auditor to 
pay to get the right result and I think it’s a very dangerous practice. 
In addition, an industrial participant said:  
That’s very difficult. That’s very difficult. Some companies will bring in a 
friend of a friend and they’ll write a soft audit. Other companies will bring 
in a very good auditor and they’ll find a list of things like that, that need to 
be improved. It’s tough. It’s tough. Even though they’re external, sometimes 
they’re kind of not. It should be in the report. So in the report there should 
be a scope and a criteria, objectives, there should be the competencies of the 
auditor, the professional competencies of the auditor, the methodology that 
was used to do the audit and then the results. 
The roles and the independence of external auditors are implicated by conflicts of 
interest and accountability, in particular involving states A and E. Although an external 
audit is required by regulators, some external auditors have been paid by pipeline 
companies, not by regulatory departments, the exception with State F.  
Despite such shortcomings, a process of intervention to check external audits has not 
been developed. In addition, there is a lack of rigid guidelines for external auditors in 
their field audits: external auditors have to develop their own guidelines. The process of 
evaluating the work of companies has been left to auditors, who again develop their 
own guidelines. Even though external auditors exercise integrity and competency when 
undertaking the audits, there is no trustee or institution responsible for checking their 
protocol. This can be described as a subtle form of regulatory capture. Regulators have 
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been captured by their own practices. In this case, regulators are captured through the 
process and practices of employing external auditors. 
4.2.2.7 Differences between regulatory practices associated with the 
approval processes of a safety plan 
This section discusses the differences among approval processes of safety plans. 
Pipeline companies need to obtain an approval for their safety plans before they can 
start operations. The approval process of a safety plan is different in each state (see 
Table 4.8) but can be divided into two subcategories: one is a safety document that is set 
up to be approved by regulators and the other is not.  
Table 4.8: Differences between regulatory practices associated with the approval process of a 
safety plan 
Approval processes of a safety plan  
across states 
State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Approval processes of a safety plan                
   A safety plan approved by regulators   x   x x     
   A safety plan not approved by regulators x   x     x x 
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to approval processes of a safety plan across states.  
Under AS2885 requirements, a safety plan is required to be approved either by pipeline 
licensees or their delegates. The safety plan is designed to prove to regulators that their 
infrastructure is being maintained, operated and serviced correctly. Nevertheless, the 
document is not necessarily approved by regulators although some regulatory agencies, 
in particular those having had catastrophic accidents within states (States B and E), have 
practiced a rigorous scrutiny and adopted an onerous approach to approving and 
checking the safety document and auditing the operation of pipeline companies. Some 
criticism has been levelled against regulatory agencies that do not approve the safety 
plan. As one industrial participant commented: 
In some states, they have an attitude of … they won’t approve because if 
something goes wrong and you have a safety plan in place and the regulator 
has approved that. You can say, well you guys approved it, you knew about 
it, you’re liable too … If you kill someone or damage property or something 
like that. So, in some states they have that attitude that ‘we don’t want to 
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know about it’, ‘we’re not gonna approve any … but [the problem is that] 
they don’t go into as much depth, thinking that they don’t have the liability 
then if something goes wrong. 
This criticism involves issues concerning the liability of regulators and the process of 
thoroughly checking and assessing pipeline risks, undertaken by industries. 
The approval process is part of the regulatory strategies utilised in risk-based regulation. 
The strategies are associated with regulatory resources. For example, State A has a 
limited number of regulators who neither have the time nor the resources to assess the 
safety and operating plan. State A has developed a strategy to negotiate their regulatory 
power-knowledge in accordance with the limited resources of regulators. 
Regardless of the strategies used in risk-based regulation, State G has an approval 
process associated with the structure of regulatory frameworks, industrial practices and 
industrial implementation. As part of the legislative frameworks, industrial sectors in 
State G do not need to get an approval prior to undertaking industrial activities. 
According to the Gas Act enacted in State G in 1967, industrial sectors need to get a 
franchise to proceed. The franchise is a system that allows a company to get 
authorisation for a petroleum lease in an area that has attracted their interest. Once 
having obtained franchise authorisation, a company can proceed with any of their 
industrial activities (e.g. drilling petroleum wells, building processing plants, building 
pipelines) in that area. And, when the area belongs to the company, others including 
regulators cannot intervene.  
Regulators in State G have no authority to intervene in industrial activities. Within the 
state’s franchise system, there is no regulatory requirement to seek legislation authority 
before a pipeline is constructed. The pipeline regulators become involved at the 
commissioning and operating phases, after the pipeline construction phase has finished. 
The legislation involved in a construction phase comes under the Workplace Health and 
Safety legislation, similar to other states. Nevertheless, recently, regulators in State G 
began a review of their regulatory framework in order to gain more influence in 
negotiating with the industrial sector. The review is in progress and has not yet been 
finalised. 
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4.2.2.8 Differences between regulatory practices associated with the 
disclosure of industrial pipeline performance 
Disclosure of industrial pipeline performance is part of the regulatory strategies vis-à-
vis negotiating regulatory knowledge and practices with pipeline industries. The states 
taking this approach are presented in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9: Differences between regulatory practices associated with the disclosure of industrial 
pipeline performance 
The regulatory strategy: the disclosure of 
industrial pipeline performance across states 
State 
 
A B C D E F G 
Disclosure of industrial pipeline 
performance on the website of regulatory 
departments 
x x x 
        
Note: X refers to the presence of data related to the regulatory strategy: the disclosure of industrial pipeline 
performance across states. 
Strategies regarding information disclosure are considered as another form of regulation 
(see for example: Cohen & Santhakumar, 2007; Stephan, 2002). Pipeline regulators 
have used this strategy as part of their political-legal mechanisms in an attempt to foster 
positive changes in industrial performances.  
Regulator participants indicated that there are three states taking this approach. A 
pipeline company is required to report their performance annually in an annual report. 
Nevertheless, each state presents the performance of its companies differently. Among 
the three states, State A re-writes and re-arranges the annual reports of companies. 
Similar to State B, the information, which is compiled and written by state regulators, is 
posted on the internet. The information about industrial performance that is presented 
via the websites of regulatory agencies is negotiated between regulators and pipeline 
companies. Among the three states, State C is different. State C presents the annual 
report of companies direct via the regulatory website without rewriting it. Controversial 
issues, including non-compliance, are not made public. One regulator participant 
indicated that the interest groups that show interest in reading an annual report are 
generally pipeline companies or pipeline operators, not the general public. The intention 
of pipeline operators in reading annual reports was addressed by this regulator. He 
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inferred that pipeline operators read the annual report because they want to compare 
their performance with similar others.  
In summary, each state presents the performance of its companies differently. There are 
only three states that have taken the strategy of information disclosure by presenting an 
annual report of a pipeline company on the departments’ website. Nevertheless, to a 
certain degree, the issues around the transparency of industrial performance are cloudy. 
More importantly, the impact assessment of using this political-legal mechanism in 
fostering positive change in regulatory outcomes has not yet been analysed by pipeline 
regulators.  
4.2.2.9 Other assemblages 
The remaining assemblages associated with changes in technical-regulatory 
specifications in AS2885, deregulation and energy privatisation, will be discussed in 
different chapters as they have influenced regulatory practices and knowledge in every 
state (see Table 4.2). These assemblages involve different interest groups of human 
actors outside of the two interrelated actors: industrial actors and regulatory actors. In 
other words, power-knowledge practices associated with changes in technical-
regulatory specifications in AS2885, deregulation and energy privatisation have a wider 
effect across Australian states. A non-human actor: measurement length, which is a 
technical-regulatory specification, has shaped power-knowledge practices in the process 
of risk regulation, discussed in Chapter 6. A discussion of how power-knowledge 
practices have been shaped through the relational assemblages pertinent to deregulation 
and energy privatisation will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
4.2.3 The incoherence of risk-based practices and the challenges  
Although the risk-based regulatory regime has been employed to regulate Australian 
pipeline industries in every Australian state, the findings showed that the risk-based 
regime has been practised differently across states and territories. The differences in 
regulatory practices between jurisdictions have been shaped by differences among the 
multiple assemblages. The regulatory practices of each state are diverse: each is shaped 
by a different series of assemblages. Different sets of assemblages are located at 
different social-political levels: international, national, state and local.  
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The findings about different sets of assemblages across states, in one sense, strongly 
suggest that the regulatory practices of pipeline regulators are multiple. But, in another 
sense, they show that the practices of pipeline regulators are incoherent throughout 
Australian states.  
The multiplicity and the incoherence of regulatory practices revealed here not only 
challenge the ontological-epistemological logic of regulators, that is, a logic reflected in 
set patterns of thinking and practicing in relation to pipeline regulation. They also 
challenge adoption of the Australian pipeline standard (AS2885). This gives rise to the 
question: can Australian states harmonise regulation in the face of such multiplicity and 
incoherence?  
Conclusion 
The use of material semiotics and ANT combined with discourse analysis has revealed 
discourses and practices implicated in power-knowledge relationships around elite-
expert institutions which are not evident in the existing literature pertinent to the 
Australian pipeline contexts. First, the discourses revealed certain ways of thinking and 
doing among regulators which I have theorised as ‘ontological-epistemological logics’. 
In effect, they are embodied in and taken for granted when regulating and controlling 
pipeline risks. Such logics inform the ontological stance of pipeline regulators which 
assembles two elements: realism and constructivism. 
The ontological stance of regulators is composed of five related constituents: risk 
knowledge and regulatory practices as influenced by two interdependent parties 
(government and industry bodies, or pipeline regulators and pipeline industries); 
pipelines being perceived as physically safe; and pipeline regulators employing specific 
sets of regulatory theories and strategies. These constituent assumptions led to 
subsequent assumptions: (a) that it is inevitable pipeline regulators will rely upon the 
knowledge and activities of industries; and (b) that regulation depends on the 
establishment of good relationships with industries.  
Ontological-epistemological logics provide a more comprehensive conceptualisation of 
regulatory capture than that found in existing regulatory theory. This thesis argues that 
regulators have been subtly captured by industries through their own logics and 
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practices. The regulators themselves do not even realise such a form of capture. The 
logics have shaped and constrained the way regulators regulate risks and how regulatory 
outcomes could be. The logics are a fundamental influence which guides and limits 
particular parties to be and not be involved in regulating risks. The logics guide and 
limit particular regulatory specifications and approaches that regulators want and can 
use, and direct the way to use them. These strategies produce effects that may limit 
alternative positive regulatory outcomes associated with a wide range of stakeholders 
and social-technical types of regulatory approaches.  
Finally, this thesis reframes the discourse of risk-based practices. Interviews of 
regulators and non-regulator participants indicated that multiple assemblages influence 
regulatory practices across Australian states. Each state contains different assemblages 
that influence each other and perform a multiplicity of regulatory practices. After 
considering as many of the assemblages as I could conceive, the assemblage associated 
with accidents and their impacts appears to have massively shaped positive changes in 
regulatory reform. The assemblage associated with resources was found to have 
influenced regulatory practices in every state. Even so, the practices of each state have 
manifested differently because of moulding by other assemblages. For example, one 
state has enough financial resources. But, regulators have faced difficulties in practice 
as a result of political interventions within both the state and the department. In states 
that do not have enough financial resources, regulators have developed strategies to 
leverage their power relationships. For example, some states employ a strategy 
involving the setting up of a process involving external auditors to inspect the industry. 
However, the process appears compromised due to a conflict of interest because 
external auditors are paid by pipeline companies. Regardless of the strategies that 
regulators have developed, the majority of regulatory participants emphasised the 
importance of field inspection. 
The multiplicity of realities present difference and incoherence, and indicate that 
regulatory practices are multiple instead of being unified. The relational effects of 
multiplicity and incoherence reflect the contradiction of mono-ontological patterns of 
thinking and practicing in regulating pipeline risks. In addition, the effects of 
multiplicity and incoherence challenge concerns about the establishment of consistency 
and harmony among pipeline regulations across Australian states.  
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Chapter 5  
The incoherence of knowledge and practices within  
regulatory apparatus 
The previous chapter focused on regulator power-knowledge relationships with 
industries and multiple assemblages across Australian states and territories. The 
interaction of these assemblages has both produced and further influenced incoherence 
of regulatory practices across states. This chapter extends the focus of power-knowledge 
relationships to other human entities – in particular, collective workforce groups – 
interacting with the assemblages associated with three regulatory apparatuses: (a) safety 
plans, or safety systems (i.e., the Pipeline Management System (PMS) and safety cases); 
(b) risk-based regulation (a type of safety regime); and (c) social-regulatory controls 
(i.e., tripartite engagement or union engagement, and workforce engagement).  
I have traced and retraced how knowledge and practices involving these apparatuses are 
made, understood and implemented. When unfolding the process of power-knowledge 
performativity associated with these apparatuses, the research themes that implicate the 
incoherence of safety knowledge and practices associated with these apparatuses were 
revealed. Figure 5.1 presents the process of analysis and discussion of this chapter.    
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Figure 5.1: The process of analysis and discussion of Chapter 5. 
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5.1 The incoherence of safety knowledge and safety practices in 
safety plans 
The regulatory apparatus most mentioned by participants was safety plans. Before 
moving on to the findings, I will briefly re-introduce the safety plan process used among 
Australian pipeline regulators and the reasons for revealing the process of power-
knowledge performativity through safety plans.  
5.1.1 A safety plan and the reasons for investigation 
Regulators require pipeline industries to submit safety plans (or safety systems) to 
ensure pipeline risks are safely managed. As discussed in Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.1.1 (b)) 
there are two types of pipeline safety plans. They include the Pipeline Management 
System (PMS, previously called Safety and Operation Plan (SAOP)); and the Safety 
Case. These two systems, which are regulated according to risk-based regulation, 
require pipeline companies to identify major hazards and to put controls in place. Risk-
based regulation has replaced the former prescriptive regulation model because 
prescriptive regulation was believed to have led to catastrophic events in hazardous 
industries (see for example: Hopkins, 2012b, p. 3; Hopkins & Wilkinson, 2005, pp. 4-5; 
National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, 
2011, pp. 251-252). Safety plans are considered to be proactive and ‘living’ documents 
(Tuft, Nessim, & Venton, 2007, p. 7). One of the requirements is that risk assessment 
must be reviewed every five years or sooner if and when changes occur in pipelines 
(e.g., changes in land use) (ibid). 
To date, research into safety regulation of hazardous industries tends to focus on how 
the safety plans and a safety regime (e.g., prescriptive regulation, goal-based regulation 
or risk-based regulation) can effectively regulate hazardous risks (see for example: 
Baram, 2014; Braithwaite, 2011; Hopkins, 2012b; Wilkinson, 2002). Hopkins (2012b, p. 
3), for example, emphasises that in order to make mature safety case regimes, the 
following five necessary features are required: (a) a risk or hazard management 
framework; (b) a requirement to make ‘a safety case’ to the regulator (what a safety 
case is was discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.1 (b)); (c) a competent and 
independent regulator; (d) workforce involvement; and (e) a general duty of care 
imposed on the operator.  
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This thesis argues that the existing literature constructs regulatory theories with 
specified features and strategies (as analysed in Chapter 2) that may directly and 
indirectly influence the process of research exploration and analysis. Thus, some 
accounts of the making, understanding, communication, and implementation of safety 
knowledge in relation to power-knowledge may be underexplored (see also Le Coze, 
2013; Vaughan, 1999).  
This chapter argues that safety knowledge and safety practices are effects of interactive 
relations between safety plans and human entities. An exploration of how they are 
constituted through relations is necessary in order to gain insight into safety knowledge 
and practices shaped through power mechanisms involving elite-expert institutions, 
pipeline risks and risk regulation. Based on this reasoning, in this section I investigate: 
how safety plans are made, understood, communicated and implemented, and what and 
who has influenced them. 
5.1.2 Safety plans in the making 
Safety plans (PMS or safety cases) were described by participants as ‘a bible’ or a vital 
manual or handbook for managing pipeline risks. After investigating the relationships 
between safety plans (PMS or safety cases) and other entities, the emerging theme that 
stood out from the interviews were that the safety knowledge written in safety plans is 
not communicated throughout pipeline organisations.  
Safety plans were described by a regulator participant as something that ‘[industries] 
write for approval and put it in a drawer’. Safety plans have been written by different 
groups of people including in-house and consultant companies. However, the contents 
in safety plans tend to be diverse. People who write safely plans can be located in 
different departments in pipeline companies including a regulatory compliance division, 
or health, safety and environment division, or by consultant companies. Safety cases can 
be written by engineers. One industrial participant criticised the work of engineers as 
follows: 
they’ll read regulations and they’ll get a checklist and they’ll put something 
together that really works brilliantly for them. It works perfectly for what the 
engineers want because the engineers have to tick all these boxes.  
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Nevertheless, safety cases can be written by staff who work in the health and safety and 
document control departments. A regulator participant commented that their focus for 
safety cases is the ‘concept of health and safety, sticking to occupational health and 
safety, with slips and trips and not covering the process safety side as well’. More 
importantly, interviews of regulator participants indicated that people who wrote safety 
plans rarely communicated with others – in particular, frontline workers and technicians 
working in the field. A regulator participant, when commenting on a safety plan, 
stressed that ‘it’s good enough to get approval’, but:  
you can see it’s almost like a disjoint. It doesn’t feel like it flows down and 
then feeds other systems. The technicians on the ground probably never read 
it. It’s not really written in a way they could read it but they should be 
involved and they should read it and they should understand what’s in it.  
I asked the technicians whether any among them had seen or written a safety plan. A 
technician participant, after indicating that he has never seen one, commented: ‘the 
people that write this, they wouldn’t even know what a compressor station looks like.’ 
This comment exemplifies an incoherence between safety plans and operational 
activities. Participants from various groups identified incoherence in the process of 
making and communicating safety plans. Not only regulators but non-regulators 
working in pipeline companies (i.e., technical compliance managers, operation and 
maintenance mangers, occupational health, safety and environment (OHSE) managers, 
field managers and field technicians) along with external auditors and unions have 
identified a process of incoherence around safety plans. 
Such incoherence suggests that workforces are relatively disengaged from analysing 
pipeline risks in a safety plan. The empirical evidence has opened up more questions 
including: what safety knowledge does the workforce employ in their day-to-day work; 
and how do they deal with catastrophic accidents when they occur? How can regulators 
be assured that workforce groups are competent, have the skills and capacity to deal 
with catastrophic accidents when they occur? This chapter will discuss these questions. 
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A review of historical events associated with major accidents in the petroleum energy 
industry15 indicated that workforces who work at the ‘coal face’ are the ones affected 
the most by catastrophic accidents (Lindøe, Baram, & Kringen, 2015, p. 127). 
Nevertheless, when compared to other petroleum energy industries, workforce groups in 
energy pipeline industries have received little attention – as ‘affected groups’ – from 
pipeline scholars and practitioners. The key affected actors in pipeline industries are the 
public and public sector emergency responders or firefighters, not the workforce groups 
working in the pipeline industries; these affected actors have had more potential to be 
affected by pipeline accidents compared to workforces. The loss of members of the 
public and firefighters is apparent in the world’s major pipeline catastrophic events 
including the San Bruno case in 2010 and the Ghislenghien (Belgium) incident in 2004 
(see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.1), the Taiwan pipeline incident, in Kaohsiung in 2014 (The 
Guardian, 2014, para. 5), and the China pipeline incident in Qingdao city, Shandong 
province, in 2013 (Makinen & Kaiman, 2015, para. 5). It became manifest that the 
workforce collective groups are relatively disassociated from – or largely ignored by – 
pipeline scholars and practitioners who appear to regard them as of little importance and 
with little potential to be affected by catastrophic accidents. 
Lindøe, Baram & Kringen (2015, p. 127) classify workforce collective groups into the 
following three categories: (a) company on-site employees; (b) contractor on-site 
employees; and (c) public sector emergency responders. The collective workforce 
groups of this thesis are primarily from groups (a) and (b). However, workforce group 
(c) is also important and needs attention in future research. Emergency services workers 
accounted for most of the victims during the catastrophic events in the Ghislenghien 
pipeline case in Belgium (COWI, 2011, p. 28). 
The process of ‘workforce engagement’ or ‘workforce involvement’16 in assessing risks 
in a safety plan has been repeatedly emphasised as a key element in the majority of 
safety literature about preventing accidents (Hopkins, 2012b, p. 2; Lindøe et al., 2015, 
pp. 129-130). The importance of ‘workforce engagement’ in assessing major hazardous 
                                                 
15 Examples in petrochemical plants are the BP-Texas City Refinery explosion in 2005 (Hopkins, 2008) 
and the Australian Longford gas plant explosion in 1998 (Hopkins, 2000). Examples in offshore 
operations are the Piper Alpha accident (UK) in 1988 (National Offshore Petroleum Safety and 
Environmental Management Authority, 2015) and the Macondo oil rig incident in 2010 in the Gulf of 
Mexico, USA (Hopkins, 2012a).  
16 The emerging themes from interviews indicate that the terms ‘workforce engagement’ or ‘workforce 
involvement’ are problematic. An analysis of the terms is undertaken in section 5.3 and discussion is 
extended later in Chapter 8.   
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risks and co-producing risk knowledge on a safety plan is congruent with the empirical 
findings of this thesis despite the fact that only a few participants, including union 
participants and workforce collective groups, actually emphasised the issue.  
The reason for involving workforces is not only about fairness and equality but more 
importantly because workforces often know what the risks are and how risks should be 
managed in their safety practices. The alternative is an uncritical ‘safety imagination’ by 
experts with overly fixed-prescribed patterns of thinking (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000, p. 
22). A frontline manager commented: 
I think it’s difficult to put a safety system in place without understanding 
what the risks are on the frontline as well. That’s a gap and I think that’s 
been a gap for a long time, not here but everywhere. Instead of coming and 
telling people ‘This is what you’re doing’ and including them in this process 
and understanding what the risks they see every day and then put something 
together to try and minimise that risk as well. But we’ve got this in folders 
in the office, it’s on the intranet but none of my guys walk up and get the 
folder and sit down and read through this. 
How risks are analysed and managed between uncritical safety imagination and field 
safety practices is an ongoing problem illustrated by theories surrounding organisational 
safety (Pidgeon, 1998, pp. 203, 211; Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000, p. 22). Without the 
input of an engaged workforce collective group, the process of risk management may 
become ill-equipped in the face of an incubation period of unanticipated and poorly 
understood hazards. 
The emphasis on ‘workforce engagement’ in co-producing a safety plan has been 
enacted in safety regulations in many countries. Examples are in the UK legislation 
(Trbojevic, 2008), the Norwegian legislation (Lindøe et al., 2015), the Australian 
offshore oil and gas legislation (National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental 
Management Authority, 2015), the Australian onshore major hazard facility (MHF) 
legislation (Safe Work Australia, 2012) as well as in pipeline regulations in Australia 
(Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011a).  
Australia has followed the UK regulatory system, which is known as a safety case 
regime (ibid). The safety case regime was introduced into Australia to regulate pipeline 
industries in two states: Victoria and Western Australia. The regime was introduced 
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after the Longford incident in Victoria State in 1998 (Jaguar Consulting Pty Ltd, 2008, 
pp. 12-13) whereas the safety case regime in Western Australia was required in 1992 
before the Varanus incident in 2008 (Bills & Agostini, 2009, p. 12). Pipeline industries 
situated in both states are required to submit a safety case as a safety plan to regulators. 
Other states have been employing a PMS, following the AS2885 requirement. The PMS 
system and the safety case regime are different in terms of their emphasis on ‘workforce 
engagement’. Under the AS2885 requirement, workforce engagement has not been 
underscored as a key element in co-producing the PMS. Despite the different emphases, 
the interview findings highlight an inadequacy of workforce engagement in assessing 
major hazardous risks among pipelines across Australian states irrespective of the type 
of safety system.  
5.1.3 Tracing the reasons for incoherence between safety plans and field 
safety practices 
I further traced reasons for the incoherence of safety knowledge between safety plans 
and field safety practices. The reasons elicited from interviews involve complex 
assemblages of interacting entities within and beyond organisational structure and 
factors, which I summarise in Table 5.1.  
Table 5.1: Reasons for the incoherence of safety knowledge between a safety plan and safety field 
practices.  
Reasons 
(1) Preparing safety plans to get pipeline licenses, focusing on preparing piles of 
documents rather than on making sure that people who work on sites are safe.  
(2) Safety plans are prepared by technical professions and remote from field 
experience. 
(3) Different views of safety between business managerial managers (driven by 
market-benefits and cost-cutting) and senior engineers or technical professions 
(driven by technical-engineering safety issues). 
(4) Some business managers and senior engineers misunderstand the management of 
technical safety. The reason is related to inadequacies in the ability of workforces to 
understand safety plans (written with high-technical engineering knowledge). 
(5) Safety plans are viewed as strategic plans. Some operation and maintenance 
managers and business managers within pipeline companies see safety plans as 
remote from their knowledge and accountability  
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First, the incoherence between safety plans and field safety practices has been shaped by 
perceptions of safety plans as a formality of regulatory requirements. Regulator 
participants made criticisms that the PMS or safety cases have become mere 
bureaucratic red-tape in order to get license approval. The regulatory requirements are 
seen by some as office-bound and remote from field experience. In addition, regulator 
participants emphasised that the professionals who wrote PMS or safety cases appeared 
to have done little cross-checking with frontline staff. The focus is on preparing piles of 
documents rather than making sure that people who work on sites are safe. 
One of the reasons for the incoherence of safety knowledge is the influence of 
organisational factors which are key elements in causing catastrophic accidents. 
Organisational factors are important in existing theories on organisational safety (see for 
example: Hayes, 2012; Hopkins, 2000; Hopkins, 2012a; Reason, 1997; Vaughan, 1996). 
Organisational causes of accidents are related to decision making within organisations, 
where business safety is prioritised over technical safety, based on budget-cutting 
policies around technical safety. Decision makers within organisations trade-off 
increasing production with reductions in technical safety cost. The business-side view 
of safety among management line managers is driven by cost, reductions and 
maximising profits with the outcome that technical safety budgets are cut. On the other 
hand, technical safety is promoted by technical professionals, both pipeline engineers 
and pipeline field technicians. In other words the existing safety knowledge, influenced 
by the extant theories on organisational safety, is constructed around a dichotomy 
between business management teams versus senior engineers where each group has 
different perceptions, goals and actions involving technical safety. 
Such knowledge was uncovered in my field work. Both regulators and industrial 
participants stressed that business managers who take control of the costs and benefits 
of pipeline businesses have influential views of and actions towards technical safety. 
For example, business managers focus on the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which 
indicate a successful business. When KPIs are related to safety, and when handled by 
business managers, the message about safety may become distorted. Business risk has 
been prioritised over technical safety. A frontline manager commented:  
These days safety is a huge part of KPIs but other than KPIs tailored right, 
you know, not just support corporate HSE rollout or 365 good days and 
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things like that. Are the KPIs tailored to the correct safety message not just a 
compliance safety KPI? If you know what I mean. Are we really 
contributing and making improvements out in the field where the highest 
risk is? Are we implementing things, not just saying ‘Corporate has rolled 
this out, have you told your team about it?’, ticking the box. To me these 
risks have been raised through the year from field staff, what have you done 
to mitigate them, what have you put in place to get rid of them? Them sort 
of things and that way you’re really minimising risks in the field. 
Another frontline manager commented on issues related to organisational factors and 
shaping the incoherence of safety knowledge which is associated with cost-cutting, by 
extension, to the lack of onsite engineers. The frontline manager commented that 
business managers do not arrange and provide engineers who have highly skilled 
knowledge on technical safety at field sites. Instead, workforces rely on field managers 
for safety knowledge and safety practices.  
A range of complex influences that has shaped the misunderstanding and 
mismanagement of technical safety was gradually explicated during research – beyond 
the dichotomy frame (the perception and action of business managers versus those of 
senior technical engineers), constructed by theories on organisational safety. Such 
complexity was traced and captured trough the semiotics of materiality ANT. The 
findings indicated that not only have business managers’ perceptions and actions 
influenced the level of misunderstanding of technical safety, but technical professions’ 
perceptions and actions have influenced the level of misunderstanding and 
mismanagement of technical safety as well. Some misunderstandings in managing 
technical safety are related to an inadequate understanding of the intentions of safety 
plans and workforce roles. For example, some senior technical engineers on the 
operation and maintenance side commented that a safety plan is a strategic document 
written with highly technical engineering knowledge. They stressed that workers do not 
need to understand a safety plan although they need to understand what they are 
responsible for. Even some within the senior technical engineers themselves admitted 
that they do not read safety plans either. In other words, a safety plan is seen as remote 
from the knowledge of senior engineers. An operation and maintenance manager 
asserted that: 
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I think the regulators view the safety case as a reference document. But it’s 
not like that at all. It’s written for them to see what we do. Most of the 
documents that our people would refer to actively are underneath the safety 
case. So for the workforce the work permit system, job hazard analysis, and 
the general work procedures that they use to carry out their day-to-day work 
are the ones that they look at. The safety case is way up here, describes the 
fact that they’ll exist but they don’t read the safety cases. They would never 
have seen it. And from our point of view, we don’t think they need to 
because they just need to understand what they’re responsible for. … I’ve 
never read our whole safety case. I’ve written parts of it but I’ve never read 
the whole thing and no one does, except for the risk and assurance people 
who have to put it up to be accepted. 
The narrative discussed above is absent from the contemporary perspective constructed 
from the theories addressing organisational safety. 
Other absences in the narrative were revealed through findings. The misapprehension of 
risk management by business managers stems not only from incentives for cost-cutting 
but from a complex mix of regulations and issues around accountability. An OHSE 
manager highlighted that business managers do not understand technical safety and how 
technical safety is important. The reason is associated with a complexity of regulations: 
So HSE [health, safety and environment division] can be quite complicated. 
The legislation is high volume. There’s a lot of the legislation. There’s a lot 
of prescriptive requirements. The Australian standard, 2885, which relates to 
high pressure pipelines is a very, very big standard. There’s five different 
standards. Quite often management haven’t had the time to read and 
understand everything. So one of the challenges is to take a document that’s 
this thick and in an hour explain to a manager what they have to do, and then 
to help them understand the relationship between responsibility and 
accountability. 
The emerging theme indicated that the OSHE managers have become interactors (see 
Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.2), and Chapter 8 (Section 8.3.2.1)) as they communicate safety 
issues with business managers, in particular, in relation to how safety and accountability 
are related.  
136 
In sum, the findings not only emphasised the incoherence of safety knowledge and 
practices between safety plans and field safety practices, but also highlighted how safety 
knowledge becomes disassociated throughout the regulatory process from regulators to 
managerial managers, also involving operation and maintenance managers, and 
workforce groups. Safety knowledge and practices are the effect of a complex 
assemblage inherent within and outside organisations, moulded by: (a) regulatory 
complexity in relation to understanding responsibility and accountability; (b) inadequate 
acknowledgement of the roles of workforce groups and workforce day-to-day 
experience in safety field knowledge; and (c) inadequacies of acknowledging the 
importance of risk-based regulation underlined in a safety plan.  
Despite such deficiencies, the findings have also opened up some space for further 
analysis including: (a) understanding and implementing risk-based regulation (see 
Section 5.2); and (b) understanding the concept of safety and complexity of regulation 
in relation to accountability and responsibility towards workforce groups (discussed 
more in Section 5.3.2). The analysis aims to challenge the existing literature that 
addresses the concepts of ‘tripartite engagement’ and ‘workforce engagement’.  
5.2 Incoherence in understanding and implementing risk-based 
regulation in the Australian pipeline context 
Safety plans, both PMS and safety cases, are regulated under risk-based regulation. This 
section argues that although risk-based regulation has become a norm replacing 
prescriptive regulation in regulating energy industries, the process of how risk-based 
regulation is understood and implemented has received little attention in the safety 
literature on pipeline industries. This section investigates this absence.  
5.2.1 How is risk-based regulation understood and implemented in 
Australian pipeline industries?  
Issues of risk and the experiencing of catastrophic accidents have been substantially 
addressed by theories of knowledge and expertise development, in particular those 
drawn from theories of learning processes. These theories on knowledge and learning 
are based on various kinds of experiences including on-the-job experience, hearing 
stories, and working with colleagues and senior colleagues (see for example: Duguid, 
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2005; Lam, 2000; Maslen, 2014; Wenger, 1999). However, this literature does not 
investigate how knowledge and practices in relation to risk regulation have changed 
over time; how experience in encountering catastrophic events has shaped the 
understanding and implementation of risk knowledge in association with regulation. In 
addition, the literature has limited its scope to within organisations. It does not attempt 
to articulate aspects of power-knowledge relations.  
In contrast to the above, the knowledge and practices in relation to risk regulation 
described in this thesis are proposed as relational effects, partly shaped by industries 
who have previously encountered major hazardous risk from catastrophic accidents and 
who have had a long history of using and implementing risk-based regulation. The 
issues were addressed by both a regulator participant and a union member. A regulator 
participant contended that:  
The risk comes about with how well the companies understand that and how 
well they implement it. … [Offshore industries] have certainly had it longer. 
Especially if you go back and start looking at - like one of the big kick 
starters for the current system is the Piper Alpha incident and how that 
happened. … So I think it’s newer to pipelines. 
This participant regulator pinpointed the fact that the understanding and implementation 
of risk-based regulations among pipeline industries has been shaped through the history 
of ‘risk experience’ by catastrophic accidents. The regulator participant compared 
pipeline industries with offshore petroleum industries, stating that offshore industries 
have longer experience in implementing and understanding risk-based regulation as a 
result of catastrophic accidents. The offshore industries are more advanced in 
progressing risk-based regulation. The regulator asserted that the Piper Alpha incident 
was a big kick starter, influencing safety knowledge and safety practices in offshore 
industries by co-utilising the risk-based approach.  
The offshore industries in Australia have followed the UK regulatory system. The risk-
based regulation employed, which is called a safety case regime, follows risk-based 
regulatory principles whereby safety knowledge is produced by a risk-maker (or 
regulatees or companies) articulating with collective workforce groups (Hale, 2014, pp. 
415-417). The experience of dealing with catastrophic accidents helps offshore 
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industries to gain a better understanding of the concept and the relative usefulness of 
risk-based regulation.  
The Australian pipeline industries, in contrast, have never experienced catastrophic 
accidents. Although the industries may feel alarmed by overseas catastrophic accidents, 
they have not been put under pressure to make any regulatory changes, for example, 
through social controls by unions (see Section 5.3) or through public scrutiny (see 
Chapter 6). In addition, the Australian pipeline industries are newer in terms of 
implementing and experiencing the utility of risk-based regulation compared to offshore 
petroleum industries. Risk-based regulation was introduced into the Australian pipeline 
industry after the major revision of the Australian pipeline standard, AS2885, in 1997 
(Tuft, 2009) when offshore industries started using the risk-based regime soon after the 
1988 Piper Alpha incident. In addition, although the application of pipeline regulations 
is flexible following risk-based approaches, findings indicate that pipeline regulatory 
systems contain numerous prescriptive design rules in their regulatory safety systems.  
A regulator participant emphasised:  
The issue with pipelines I see is that they don’t fully understand their 
requirements under the Act, so where you’ve got an offshore operator they 
know all about safety cases and how they’re supposed to work and 
performance standards and fire explosion analysis. Onshore pipeline 
companies are very good at reading 2885 and good at reading prescriptive 
requirements, so you must have signs this far apart in these areas and apply 
where there’s defined rules. They need improvement around trying to 
understand non-prescriptive rules. 
The interviewee is saying here that onshore pipeline systems in Australia tend to follow 
a prescriptive rather than a risk-based approach. The technical knowledge embedded in 
AS2885 is based on prescriptive rules and these prescriptive technical knowledge-based 
rules have continued to change as a result of negotiating processes involving cost, 
technical safety and regulations interacting with pipeline owners and their contractors, 
AS2885 committees, and regulators. 
Experience in encountering major hazardous risk from catastrophic accidents can assist 
industrial actors to immerse themselves in understanding, utilising and implementing 
risk-based regulation. I subsequently raised the following question during interview 
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sessions: ‘do we have to wait until accidents happen before making a change for better 
safety outcomes?’ The primary answers from both regulator and non-regulator 
participants was ‘yes’. They supported their arguments with their own observations of 
historical events: regulatory change and reform has usually happened after catastrophic 
accidents.  
In summary, the findings indicate that pipeline industries have a tendency to follow 
prescriptive rules rather than the risk-based approach to advancing safety knowledge 
and practices that is favoured in other petroleum-based hazardous industries. The 
absence of experience with catastrophic pipeline accidents was a key factor in the 
application of this approach to safety-regulatory systems.  
The industries are reluctant to take initiatives in progressing risk knowledge by 
following principles of risk-based regulation. The reasons for this were traced and will 
be discussed in the next section.  
5.2.2 Incoherence in advancing the implementation of risk-based 
regulation: a relational power-knowledge effect 
According to the principles of risk-based regulation, industries must convince regulators 
that they have good safety plans and safety knowledge when dealing with pipeline risks. 
The platform of risk-based regulation allows both industries and regulators to leverage 
their resources, both technical skills and finances. Nevertheless, the findings indicate 
that industries are reluctant to take any initiative in progressing risk knowledge 
according to risk-based regulation, due to time and cost factors in association with 
issues of power-knowledge. As an industrial participant observed:  
Now what they’re saying is that we need to continuously demonstrate our 
compliance which means we have to continuously prove we’re doing things 
the way we’ve always done them. So it’s much more engaged and much 
more on the onus for us to continually provide something. … So they’re 
talking about us proving our compliance. It’s like proving your innocence 
rather than your guilt. In some ways, when previously it was up to them to 
come and prosecute us for doing something wrong. Now we have to 
continuously prove that we’re innocent and that’s different. So we can just 
do our business with the threat that they could come in and look at us. Or 
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they continually ask us for evidence all the time. Continuously asking for 
evidence just creates work for us and all it does is it enables them to say 
they’re actively regulating us but it doesn’t make any differences to what we 
do. It just creates a whole layer of document exchange for the sake of it. 
At the same time, regulators rely on industry knowledge and activities as part of their 
ontological-epistemological logics. In addition, regulators face limited resources, both 
human capacity and finance; consequently, they only partially assess risk (discussed in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.2 and 4.2.2.6). Their focus is on what is in safety plans, and 
their checks against what has been undertaken in field safety practices is only partial. 
Regulators do not inspect throughout the process of risk assessment. For example, they 
do not thoroughly check how pipeline risks are identified and assessed, who has been 
involved throughout the process, how the industries get these data, and whether the data 
from the risk assessment is valid.  
Regulators use strategies that involve asking questions, asking industries to provide 
information that the regulators request together with developing their own requirements 
to regulate pipeline risks. Nevertheless, pipeline professionals, including those working 
within pipeline companies – together with AS2885 committees, pipeline consultancies 
and external auditors – all claim that regulators across states have developed additional 
requirements that supplement AS2885. These include different styles of auditing 
processes and approval processes (see Chapter 4). However, pipeline industries claimed 
that the additional requirements have become unnecessary burdens for pipeline 
industries. 
The recurring complaint from industries was that pipeline regulations and requirements 
differ across Australian states although each state has adopted AS2885 as part of their 
pipeline legislation. Regulators can impose additional requirements to those of AS2885. 
In addition, industries made the comment that regulators do not have adequate 
knowledge: they do not know which information is important and what they should 
request. During one interview session, I asked a question about whether industries 
shared their knowledge with regulators; for example, what documents should regulators 
ask for and what should they not? The response from an engineering manager was: 
And if they were to ask you what documents they should be reviewing, well 
I would give them advice on what I thought was important, but that might be 
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in conflict with what they…I might steer them away from documents that I 
thought were dodgy, onto ones that I thought were great, without them 
knowing. They could miss a whole bunch of mistakes that I’ve made and I 
might have a self-interest in doing that. 
The above statement confirms that (at least some) pipeline industries assume risk-based 
regulation to be self-regulation, and manage it to serve their company interests. Pipeline 
industries hesitate to share risk-safety knowledge with regulators in order to prevent 
regulatory intervention in their activities. Furthermore, the statement can be interpreted 
to show that pipeline companies do not continually improve their safety plans according 
to the ideal as living documents. This issue was raised by other participants as well 
including industrial compliance officers, technical regulators and external auditors. 
Under regulatory requirements, industries have to re-visit a safety plan every five years 
or anytime when there is a change in their management and operational systems. 
Industries have to continually update their hazard identification and hazard controls 
using a ‘safety management study’ instrument. Nevertheless, the evidence showed that 
risk-safety knowledge in pipeline industries as written into safety plans is not kept up-
to-date. 
Starting in this section (5.2.2), similar themes emerge and are regularly repeated. The 
accounts indicate that industries and regulators are the controlling powers at the 
interstice of regulatory relationships. Both parties use risk-based regulation as a 
platform to negotiate their power-knowledge relationships rather than improving safety 
knowledge and safety practices according to the principles of risk-based regulation. In 
other words, the negotiating process in risk-based regulation is part of their regulatory 
practices. Negotiation introduces the issue of power-knowledge in relation to risk-based 
regulation, made opaque in the regulation literature.  
The dominant interrelationships must be understood in more depth to improve 
transparency and regulatory effectiveness. The concept of ‘risk governance’ was 
promoted to fill a conceptual gap in relation to the broad networks of power relations in 
which risk regulation is practiced (Lindøe et al., 2014; Renn, 2008c). Risk governance 
is thus open to more forms of social control or influence in relation to risk. Self-
regulation (or risk-based regulation), the role of values and norms, and engaging with 
different stakeholders (e.g., investors, consumers, the public, workers, unions et al.) in 
decision-making processes are addressed most often by the literature on organisational 
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safety and regulations. In the main, the concern is with balancing power relations 
among interdependent industries and regulators. The principle of risk-governance 
attempts to balance power relations for transparency in risk regulation by co-operative 
engagement with stakeholders.  
In the organisational safety and regulation literature, workers, unions and the public are 
the primary concerns. The workers and the public can potentially be injured or killed. 
For these reasons, unions collaborate as they are the representatives of the workers. The 
terms ‘tripartite collaboration’, ‘workforce engagement’, and ‘public engagement’ are 
regularly mentioned in the literature on improving risk regulation. In the next section, 
the process of tracing these two concepts will be addressed. 
5.3 Power-knowledge in relation to tripartite collaboration and 
workforce engagement in the Australian pipeline context  
The process of tracing the two regulatory concepts: ‘tripartite engagement and 
workforce engagement’ began with an analysis of data drawn from participants’ 
answers to my opening interview questions (see Table 5.2).  
Table 5.2: The interview-questions of this thesis 
Type of participants The opening question 
Regulators What is the most important issue or challenge that regulators 
encounter these days?  
Non-regulator 
participants 
What is the most important issue or challenge that you encounter 
with safety issues and regulations these days?  
 
As delineated in Section 5.1.2, the literature suggests that workforce involvement is 
important; and the research data suggests that workforce involvement is low, so one 
might have expected that this issue would be raised by some participants in response to 
this question. In fact, few participants raised issues about the inadequacy of workforce 
and union engagement in response to my opening question (with the exception of union 
participants). The responses indicated that the issues of workforce and union 
engagement in relation to safety and regulations are not the primary concern of pipeline 
experts, both regulators and non-regulators. Consequently, I investigated further with 
the following questions: how are the two concepts, workforce engagement and tripartite 
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engagement, understood, and what assemblages shaped such understandings in the 
Australian pipeline case? 
5.3.1 Understanding of tripartite and workforce engagement 
The literature emphasises that the representation of and consultation with workforces 
(supported by unions) is a crucial strategy for strengthening the effectiveness of 
regulatory regimes (see for example: Hart, 2002; Rosness & Forseth, 2014). 
Participatory mechanisms for workforce engagement supported by trade unions are a 
fundamental precondition for the improvement of workforce health and safety. This 
process of tripartite collaboration among employers, employees and regulatory 
authorities is vital (Rosness & Forseth, 2014, p. 310). Nevertheless, in regulatory and 
safety practices, the roles and functions of workforce participation vary among countries. 
For example, in the Scandinavian countries, the union influence supporting workforces 
is stronger than in other countries (Hovden, Lie, Karlsen, & Alteren, 2008) including 
Australia. In Australia, the roles and functions of workforce engagement are stated in a 
mandatory-legislative form (Saksvik & Quinlan, 2003, p. 42). Industrial companies 
including pipeline industries in Australia are required by the occupational health and 
safety (OHS) legislations to elect workforce health and safety representatives (HSRs) to 
promote health and safety issues. They may or may not involve unions. The OHS 
legislative requirements were put aside as I studied how these two concepts: workforce 
engagement and tripartite engagement, enacted with and were understood in my field 
research. 
The process of how knowledge about these two concepts is enacted was investigated 
with follow-up interview questions. I asked participants their opinions about ‘workforce 
engagement’ and ‘tripartite engagement’. The responses from professional participants 
indicated that the two terms are associated with their own professional values. They 
were familiar with the term ‘workforce engagement’ but not with ‘tripartite 
engagement’. They neither knew what ‘tripartite collaboration’ was nor how important 
it was. Workforce engagement will be discussed in Section 5.3.1.2.  
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5.3.1.1 Understanding of tripartite engagement  
When I introduced the meaning of the term ‘tripartite engagement’, two opinions 
became clear. First, participants including regulators, industrial employees and external 
auditors, felt uncomfortable with engaging unions in the pipeline regulatory process. 
They disputed that bringing tripartite engagement could offer benefits such as 
increasing regulatory effectiveness. Their reasons included issues of conflict of interest 
and the goals of unions who primarily assist their workforce members to obtain 
improved working conditions. For example, an integrity engineer asserted that: 
Do the unions have a role in promoting safety? I don’t know if you can tell, 
I’m very cynical of unions. I think that in most cases the unions abuse safety 
in order to push their terms. So they will try and pick a very small safety 
hazard, and then close the site down to manipulate the employer, but I don’t 
think their primary interest is safety, I think their primary interest is money. 
On the other hand, there were some who appreciated the contribution of unions, in 
particular those who work around a pipeline compressor station complex including field 
managers and pipeline technicians. Nevertheless, they had mixed feelings about unions. 
A field manager maintained the following:  
I do think that unions could support work better, in regards to safety I think 
they could. … Unions aren’t just there for purely enterprise agreements and 
getting pay rises and things like that, … I think in a controlled environment 
you should be able to have that communication channel to the union who 
could then have regular meetings with the company and say ‘So and so has 
bought this up, they find that we’re not getting much traction in regards to a 
safety matter’ or whatever. But unions, it depends what their agenda is for 
me. Some unions are good, [some] are terrible.  
A field technician participant offered similar emphasis. He described himself as ‘… 
politically to the right so I don’t really like [it]. I came here thinking I'll join it because it 
seemed like a bit of a closed shop’. Nevertheless, he has appreciated the union 
contribution, in particular, the unions’ roles in assisting their members to negotiate 
better pay rates and conditions. He said:  
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but you have to acknowledge that we wouldn’t be on as good a pay and 
conditions that we’re on if it wasn’t for the union because they’ve been 
really driving hard to get better pay and wages. We’re on good pay and 
wages and I think the union is the main reason for that.  
Apart from the finding relevant to the contribution of unions, interviews also indicated 
that the unions have been disengaged in assessing major hazardous risks from pipeline 
industries in Australia, as well as from other offshore and onshore petroleum industries 
in Australia. This evidence was drawn from interviews with union participants and from 
my observations during meetings with regulators who regulate onshore and offshore 
petroleum industries.  
Because there are two contrasting perspectives on unions, it is not straightforward to 
directly engage unions in assessing pipeline risks along pipeline regulatory processes. 
The current parties: industries and regulators, have a stable, inter-connected relationship. 
Adding unions to the bipartite industrial-regulator network will take time, commitment 
and a new regulatory mechanism that supports this new strategy. In addition, successful 
cases of union collaboration in assessing risks and balancing power-knowledge between 
inter-connected regulator-industry parties are rare. There are only a few successful 
examples. One, ‘the Norwegian model’ of regulatory regime has proven successful in 
collaborating with unions in their offshore petroleum industries. Nevertheless, Norway 
has a long history of commitment and supporting social-regulatory mechanisms that 
facilitate union collaboration (Rosness & Forseth, 2014; Saksvik & Quinlan, 2003, p. 
40). 
In addition, the invisibility of pipelines is salient. According to research conducted by 
Lindøe, Engen, & Olsen (2011), industries with visible risks and relatively immediate 
shows of interest by the public allow easier implementation of regulation with engaged 
social actors. Such implementation of regulation with engaged social actors could prove 
difficult in pipeline situations as pipeline risks and pipelines’ physical characteristics are 
invisible to the public. As a consequence, the public’s interest is not immediatedly 
aroused. Therefore, involving unions in assessing pipeline risks requires the re-
evaluation and revised performativity of new concepts in accordance with new 
ontological and regulatory-instrumental premises. 
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5.3.1.2 Understanding of workforce engagement  
The practice of workforce engagement is different to union engagement. The findings 
showed that unions have been disengaged in assessing major hazardous risk from 
pipelines, whereas the workforce engagement in assessing ‘risk’ was obfuscated and 
ambiguous.  
Many participants, both regulators and non-regulators, stated that workforces are 
engaged in assessing risks but, more precisely, that workforces are engaged in assessing 
risks to their personal safety. Personal safety was interpreted by participants as 
‘workplace health and safety’ or ‘occupational health and safety’. Participants 
emphasised that safety at the personal safety level is much less important than at the 
‘process safety’ level. Another dichotomous entity emerged: personal safety versus 
process safety. The difference between the two safety concepts was traced.  
I asked participants about the difference between these two safety concepts. A pipeline 
practitioner participant offered the following strong criticism:  
the workplace health and safety…[is] very low level…It is about ‘OH&S 
slips, trips and falls, and just personal protection which is normally cuts, 
Band-Aids, maybe broken bone, rolling your ankle, right up to fatality, if 
someone obviously falls and hits their head or something, so someone can 
still die.  
The participant further commented that risk assessment at the personal safety level is 
‘very different to’ process safety17, which is about:  
the pipeline blowing up ... that’s not workplace health and safety, that’s 
society risk from having a high pressure gas or liquid petroleum being 
transported in a pipe where things can go wrong like external interference, 
corrosion, it can ignite, and we could ... many tens and dozens of people 
could be killed as has happened around the world.  
The participants’ arguments seem to be congruent with literature about personal safety 
and process safety. The literature indicates that risks at the personal safety level 
(workplace accidents) are considered to have low societal consequences: they happen to 
                                                 
17 The process safety terms used in relation to energy pipelines include ‘asset integrity’ or ‘technical 
integrity’ or ‘technical pipeline integrity’. 
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individual workers. Experts make the criticism that while avoidance of slips, trips and 
falls is an example of personal safety, taken together it does not represent the 
management of major hazardous risks (Øien, Utne, & Herrera, 2011, p. 158). Risks at 
this level are categorised in the safety literature as a ‘personal safety’ concept (or 
‘workplace health and safety’). 
But, what about major hazardous risks? The safety literature indicates that major 
hazardous risks are considered to be of high societal consequence causing multiple 
fatalities and injuries in catastrophic accidents. The concept of process safety began to 
be widely used and implemented after the 1984 Bhopal accident in India where a 
catastrophic release of methyl isocyanate caused at least 4,000 fatalities and over 
200,000 injuries (Gupta, 2005, p. 195). 
The two safety concepts are made distinct in the safety literature (Hopkins, 2009, p. 
460). Safety scholars argue that each concept assesses different types of hazards that 
need different indicators to measure. Without making a specific distinction, indicators in 
relation to safety concepts can be misinterpreted, miscommunicated and misused, 
causing catastrophic accidents. Such misuse was consistently found in evaluations of 
the catastrophic accidents including the Esso gas plant accident, Australia (Hopkins, 
2000), the Texas City refinery accident, USA (Hopkins, 2008), and BP in the Gulf of 
Mexico (Hopkins, 2012a). For example, the Esso gas plant at Longford in Australia has 
an excellent lost-time injury rate (for personal safety) but a catastrophe occurred 
because the organisation had managed process safety hazards poorly (Hopkins, 2000). 
As a result of the accident investigation, safety scholars emphasised that the process 
safety model must be prioritised to prevent accidents, in particular the developing and 
using of process safety indicators including technical, human and organisational factors 
(see for example: Heath and Safety Executive & Chemical Industries Association, 2006; 
Hopkins, 2009; Moura, Beer, Patelli, Lewis, & Knoll, 2016; Øien et al., 2011; 
Skogdalen, Utne, & Vinnem, 2011).  
My view is that the differences and distinctions between the two safety concepts, as 
emphasised by the existing literature, are relatively appropriate and necessary. 
Nevertheless, what I have found about the use of the two safety concepts in the 
Australian pipeline case is that the pipeline practitioners largely follow the ideal of 
separating the two safety concepts but follow it in an uncritical-routine way. 
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Workforces that have been assigned to assess risk for their personal safety level have 
disengaged from assessing major hazardous risks. Despite the necessity of prioritising 
two safety concepts, the distinction increased the incoherence of relational effects in the 
process of assessing risk in the Australian pipeline context. I further traced and mapped 
the assemblages that have shaped the uncritical-routine risk assessment practices of 
pipeline practitioners (discussed in the following section). 
5.3.2 Shaping the incoherence of risk assessment practice 
The finding emphasised that the incoherence of risk assessment practice in disengaged 
workforces is shaped by: (a) different safety concepts in relation to level and scale risks, 
types of risk assessments and requirements of safety skills, and (b) different and 
complex legislative frameworks and institutional arrangements (see Table 5.3 and 
Section 5.3.2.1 - 5.3.2.2). The finding was analysed to highlight the way the two 
different series of assemblages are interrelated.  
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Table 5.3: The incoherence of risk assessment practice between process safety and personal 
safety.  
Incoherence of risk assessment 
practice is shaped by?  
Process safety (or asset 
integrity or technical 
integrity) 
Personal safety 
1. Differences between process 
safety and personal safety  
  
1.1 Focus on safety Critical controls1 Personal safety – slips, 
trips and falls 
1.2 Level of risks High level (called major 
hazardous risks) – caused 
catastrophic accidents 
Low level (called 
personal risks) – caused 
workers’ injuries  
1.3 Different scales of risks  Major hazardous risks – 
cause catastrophic 
accidents, many people 
will die 
Risk to a person – causes 
workers’ injuries 
1.4 Types of risk assessment HAZOP2 Permit to work or a work 
permit system3, JHA3 
1.5 Requirements of safety 
skills: who assesses risks and at 
what levels?  
Technical-engineer 
professionals, consultants 
OHSE managers, 
workforce groups – field 
technicians 
2. Differing legislative 
frameworks and 
institutionalisation arrangements 
  
2.1 Regulations AS2885, Pipeline Acts Occupational Health and 
Safety (OHS) Act 
2.2 Regulations above are in 
line with what regulatory 
organisations? 
Departments that are in 
charge of pipeline 
licensees (e.g., Department 
of Petroleum and Mines, 
Department of Natural 
Resources and Mines). 
WorkSafe and 
WorkCover 
2.3 Roles of regulators: who are 
involved in managing risks? 
Technical regulators (or 
pipeline regulators) 
Worksafe and 
Workcover regulators  
References: The findings in this Table and the notes are drawn from participant interviews.  
Notes: (1) The concepts of Critical controls or Critical elements are used to prevent major accident events. 
Examples include having cathodic protection, having overpressure protection systems, reviewing the integrity of the 
pipe every five years, setting a thickness requirement for piping, having an orifice plate in piping so it does not flow 
too fast. The critical controls are the design components that companies put in place so that they can prevent 
catastrophic accidents, which could cause multiple fatalities and injuries. Each one of those critical elements will 
have a required performance that companies need to adhere to.  
(2) Hazard and Operability Studies are abbreviated as HAZOP. It is a formal engineering assessment 
technique: the process of HAZOP is to identify major hazardous risks and put the right critical controls in place to 
prevent catastrophic accidents. HAZOP has been employed in assessing major hazardous risks of pipelines since the 
early 1990s (Tuft, 2011). 
(3) A work permit system is a safety system used among pipeline workforces. Pipeline technicians are 
required to submit a work permit system before starting working on sites. A job hazard analysis (JHA) is a risk 
assessment technique employed to assess personal safety, as part of the work permit system. Pipeline technicians are 
required to assess risks and hazards on sites and put controls in place before they start working: they must ring a 
control room so as to get a work permit number before starting working on sites.  
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5.3.2.1 Process safety, personal safety and the incoherence of risk 
assessment practice in disengaging workforces 
Interviews indicated that the majority of participants, both regulators and non-regulators, 
make an uncritically clear-cut distinction between the focus of process safety (or asset 
integrity or technical integrity or pipeline technical integrity) and personal safety in 
relation to the level of risks, scales of risks, types of risk assessment, and requirements 
for safety skills in assigning who should be assessed such risks (see Table 5.3). A risk 
assessment approach (HAZOP) is employed to evaluate major hazardous pipeline risks 
whereas JHA is employed to assess personal safety. HAZOP requires expert 
engineering knowledge to assess major hazardous risks whereas JHA is part of a work 
permit system that does not require expert technical skills. The JHA tool is used for 
helping workforces to identify, analyse and manage the hazards associated with the 
work they are about to undertake.  
The uncritical-routine practice of risk assessment is shaped by differing safety concepts 
that have been set and accepted as normal practice among pipeline professionals (with 
the exception of collective workforce groups). The findings indicated that collective 
workforce groups including field managers and field technicians did not appreciate the 
risk assessment practices that were assigned to them to assess risks at their personal 
safety level. A representative of the collective workforce groups stated:  
So they’ve over-documented things. They’ve taken away the practicality of 
safety. They’ve turned it into a chore and such a paper, time-consuming 
thing that it's lost its importance. It's just a process that you go through, … 
Now, we’re doing a job and we're going to talk about the particular risks in 
that job. We're not going to talk about tripping over and we’re not going to 
talk about wearing these clothes because we're all – that’s just ticking their 
box. If you're inducted, you’ve already gone through all that. Let's just talk 
about what we’re doing, not sign away that says we've read every possible 
risk so that if anything at all possibly happens, you’ve said that that 
shouldn’t happen. … It's a cover arse signature. It’s not a practicality 
signature. 
The collective workforce groups expressed the criticism that the risk assessment they 
experience and assess at the personal safety level was merely bureaucratic red tape. 
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They made the comment that such practices have taken away the core of the safety 
concept by turning safety into a chore. As a result, the important concept of process 
safety they used in relation to catastrophic risk in their operation and maintenance job 
was lost.  
The workforce collective groups have been forced to become silent actors in the 
assessment of major hazardous risks, with the consequence of having limited and 
unequal risk-safety knowledge of dealing with the potential for catastrophic accidents. 
Interviews indicated that while workforce collective groups do follow instructions 
associated with routine maintenance to keep a pipeline operation running smoothly, 
they are not adequately informed with regard to major risks – for example, the necessity 
to do regular checking of pipeline equipment or how to notice warning signs near 
critical control equipment that can result in catastrophic failures. The findings stressed 
that the field safety practices are relatively disengaged from the risk assessment process, 
assessed and developed within and throughout a safety plan. Risk and safety knowledge 
is incoherent throughout pipeline institutions. The question becomes: how do pipeline 
professionals keep reviewing and up-dating risk and safety knowledge on a PMS and a 
safety case as prescribed for a live document?  
The incoherence of risk assessment practice in engaging workforces reflects the first 
constituent assumption of the ontological-epistemological logic of Australian pipeline 
practitioners – the assumption that the primary regulatory actors are regulatory agencies 
and industry (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1) The scopes, types and processes of risk 
assessment undertaken by industry employees were constrained such that field staff 
were excluded in much the same way as members of the public. At the process safety 
level (HAZOP), risk assessment was assigned to technical-engineer professionals and 
consultants, while workforce collective groups were restricted to assessment at the 
personal safety level (permit to work, JHA). Such practices fell into the domain of 
mundane practices and were seldom questioned. Such mundane practices mould the 
limitations of risk-knowledge understanding, implementing, improving and preventing 
with regard to pipeline catastrophic accidents.  
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5.3.2.2 Legislative frameworks, institutionalisation arrangements, and the 
incoherence of risk assessment practice in disengaging workforces  
Using the semiotics of materiality of ANT together with discourse analysis allowed me 
to explicate further the process of power-knowledge performativity through safety 
concepts in relation to workforce disengagement. I investigated how safety concepts 
including process safety and personal safety have been implemented and what has 
influenced such implementation that involves a disengaged workforce in assessing risk. 
As workforce groups in the pipeline case are not involved in assessing major hazardous 
risks, I asked both regulators and non-regulators who was responsible for the workforce? 
The answers were diverse and recorded from licensees (see Chapter 7), pipeline 
operators (ibid) to regulators. In this section, I will focus on regulators. The roles of 
regulators are in line with legislative frameworks and institutional arrangements. The 
findings suggest the existence of two broader sets of regulatory frameworks and 
institutional arrangements that are involved with workforces in pipeline industries 
(presented in Table 5.3).  
There were four sets of answers from participants. First, some technical regulators18 
stated that they were not responsible for the workforces. Those technical regulator-
participants indicated that the WorkSafe or WorkCover regulators (called by 
participants ‘safety regulators’) will be responsible for the workforce, contingent to the 
Occupational Health and Safety Regulations. A similar answer was provided by some of 
my non-regulator participants. Nevertheless, I cross-checked the issue of responsibility 
towards workforces by asking some of the ‘safety regulators’. The safety regulators 
emphasised that they were not involved with pipeline industries. Their involvement was 
limited to within a plant or factory (e.g., onshore petroleum industries, chemical 
factories). Pipelines lie outside the boundaries of plants and, by extension, outside of 
their scope of work. 
The second set of answers showed that some technical-regulator participants indicated 
their responsibility for workforces by making sure that procedures were in place. The 
third set of answers indicated that both types of regulators: technical regulators 
                                                 
18 Technical regulators or pipeline regulators made up the majority of my regulator participants. They 
were in charge of compliance and the licensing of pipelines. They worked within government 
departments, following the pipeline acts and AS2885 as a call-up regulation. The departments and the acts 
were named differently across Australian States. 
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(participants also used the term: ‘gas regulators’ and ‘energy regulators’) and safety 
regulators will be responsible for workforces when there are catastrophic accidents. The 
third set of answers were provided by both regulator and non-regulator interviewees.  
The last set of answers stressed the presence of some loopholes in the regulations, 
leading to ambiguities of accountability. Due to the complexity of the regulations, even 
pipeline industries themselves do not know which regulatory organisations will be 
responsible for their workforces. In addition, an OHS participant stressed that even 
among industries, some of them have misunderstood that industries should comply with 
the pipeline Act and not the OHS Act. Nevertheless, an OHS participant indicated to me 
that pipeline industries comply with both types of regulations.  
The four sets of answers from the interviews reflected that the accountability of 
regulators towards workforces and the public is ambiguous. This ambiguity is partly an 
outcome of negotiations of power-knowledge in relation to safety concepts. Interviews 
indicated that differences among safety concepts have been shaped through differences 
in the legislative frameworks and regulatory institutions of the Australian pipeline case, 
leading to an incoherence of risk-knowledge understanding, assessment and 
implementation in regulating hazardous-pipeline risk. The accountability of regulators 
to workforces has been negotiated contingent to regulators’ roles, regulations, 
institutions, safety concepts, and safety procedures. I will summarise these issues in the 
next Section 5.3.3. 
5.3.3 Power-knowledge in relation to safety knowledge and safety 
practices in pipeline industries  
In the Australian pipeline case, findings indicated that power is relational and not 
limited only to business managers. In addition, power is not limited to regulatory 
government but is associated with the following associations: safety concepts, types of 
risk assessment, regulatory strategies (i.e., risk-based regulation), legislative 
frameworks, regulatory-instructional arrangements and similar relations (hereafter: 
these associations). The power-knowledge practices among technical regulators, 
industrial interests (e.g., management line managers, compliance mangers, OHSE 
managers, field managers and field technicians), external auditors, unions, et al. are 
negotiated through these associations.  
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As a consequence of the negotiating process through these associations, there are at 
least three emerging themes that need emphasising. First, the accountability of 
regulators has become ambiguous. In other words, the ambiguity of accountability is 
part of regulatory practices. Second, the unions’ roles in co-assessing pipeline risks do 
not sit comfortably with pipeline professions. Unions are not welcome to be part of 
assessing pipeline risks. They are interpreted as potentially disturbing to the ontological 
norm of negotiating practices between pipeline regulators and pipeline industries. 
Therefore, although unions make useful contributions to safety practices, bringing 
unions into the assessment of pipeline risks cannot be undertaken through traditional 
power structures. 
Lastly, the roles, safety knowledge and safety practices of workforces have been shaped 
through the ontological-epistemological logic informing these associations. The 
workforces are moulded into becoming silent actors restricted to assessing risks at the 
personal safety level. They are forced into a regime marked by limited and unequal 
safety knowledge of understanding and coping with major hazardous risks. In addition, 
they have not been properly informed of safety knowledge concerning major risks that 
may dramatically impact on their lives. These three themes exemplify aspects of what 
Foucault called ‘power-knowledge’.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has further traced and re-traced power-knowledge relationships involving 
elite-expert institutions. Its focus has been on the interaction of three relational 
apparatuses: (a) a safety system (or a safety plan) (i.e. PMS and safety cases); (b) risk-
based regulation; and (c) concepts related to social-regulatory controls in improving 
safety knowledge and safety practices among the regulatory processes in regulating 
pipeline risks (i.e., risk governance including tripartite engagement and workforce 
engagement). Human entities are those who are involved with the following three 
regulatory apparatuses including: (a) people who work within pipeline industries 
ranging from managerial managers, operation and maintenance managers, OHSE 
managers to field managers and field technicians; as well as (b) those who are 
associated with them including regulators and unions. 
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Safety knowledge and practices are disconnected throughout the regulatory process; 
what has been written in a safety plan is not coherent with what happens in field safety 
practices. The reasons behind the incoherence were traced: organisational factors 
around cost-cutting and other complex issues are involved and captured, including: (a) a 
safety case that is seen by some as bureaucratic red-tape to get pipeline licenses; (b) 
business managerial managers who do not understand technical safety knowledge in 
relation to their responsibility as a result of the complexity of regulation; and (c) the 
intention and principles of workforce engagement in a safety plan are misunderstood. 
The failings reveal various weaknesses of risk-based practices. For example, regulators 
only partially inspect during risk assessment as they have limited resources. In addition, 
as part of the ontological-epistemological logic underlying pipeline regulatory risk-
based practices, regulators rely on industry knowledge and activities to manage pipeline 
risks. At the same time, however, industries do not share their risk-safety knowledge 
with regulators as part of self-regulation and risk-based practices that serve their own 
self-interest.  
The thesis further traces the regulatory apparatus related social-regulatory controls (i.e., 
tripartite or union engagement, and workforce engagement). Analysis of interviews 
indicated that pipeline professionals are neither familiar nor comfortable with the union 
engagement. The workforce is engaged in assessing pipeline risks; but at the personal 
safety level, where it is disconnected from major hazardous risks at the ‘process safety’ 
level. The incoherence of risk assessment practices in engaging workforces is shaped by 
the uncritical-routine practices of elite-expert and industrial entities, illustrating again 
the ontological-epistemological logics of risk regulators. Workforces have become 
silent actors in the assessment of major risks, resulting in their having limited and 
unequal risk-safety knowledge to deal with catastrophic accidents. In addition, 
regulatory accountability towards workforces has become ambiguous due to the 
complexity of regulatory frameworks and regulatory-institutional arrangements.  
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Chapter 6  
The incoherence of knowledge and practices in relation to 
pipeline risks and public safety 
Coherence between knowledge and practice is a crucial requirement in dealing with risk 
and safety throughout the regulatory process. The previous chapter discussed how 
knowledge and practices have been shaped by power-knowledge relationships involving 
elite-expert institutions and their regulatory apparatus: safety plans, risk-based 
regulation and social-regulatory controls. This chapter will explore how knowledge and 
practices have been shaped through an emerging non-human actant (or actor or entity): 
measurement length, created by elite-expert institutions (see the definition of actant in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.1). Risk regulation through technical-regulatory specifications, 
especially measurement length, was one of the key concerns raised by research 
participants. Measurement length as a technical-regulatory specification is used with 
reference to the prevention of pipeline accidents involving the public.  
Technical-regulatory knowledge is central for both the Australian pipeline industry and 
the technical regulators who manage pipeline risks. The emphasis on technical 
knowledge about risk and safety is part of their ontological stance (as discussed in 
Chapter 4). The Australian pipeline industry has invested much effort in engineering 
research to improve technical knowledge. Such knowledge is not only used to reduce 
costs, but also use to maintain safety. The results of engineering research have informed 
the technical-regulatory specifications in AS2885.  
The focus on technical evaluation, in particular, enquiries based on technical-realist 
perspectives that analyse and regulate technological risk, have been widely criticised by 
critical social science approaches (some of the arguments and solutions have been 
discussed in Chapter 2 and 5). For example, analysis of risk based only on technical 
premises cannot capture the entire complexity of human activities and consequences. 
Social science scholars have typically urged a reference to value, experience, culture 
and other social dimensions when managing risks (see for example: Beck, 1992a; Dietz 
et al., 2002; Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982; Luhmann, 1993; Zinn, 2008a). Some scholars 
have emphasised the concept of lay or public knowledge as a counterpoint to expert 
knowledge (Wynne, 1992; Wynne, 1996). Others have promoted social controls as a 
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means of engaging opposite and different stakeholders in analysing risk including the 
tripartite engagement framework and the risk governance framework (discussed in 
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.1.2 and 2.1.3 consecutively). Among the pipeline safety 
literature, organisational models including Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model and safety 
models (e.g., safety culture) offer preventive strategies for avoiding accidents (see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.1.2.1). The safety culture model was viewed by participants, both 
regulators and non-regulators, as a very important practice. Safety culture is a crucial 
concept for the effective operation of High Reliability Organisations (HROs), which 
include energy pipeline industries.  
The existing social science theoretical perspectives, either arraying against the 
technical-realist perspectives or proposing alternative frameworks by using social 
controls, have drawbacks, however. These perspectives are limited in how they capture 
discourses associated with technical-scientific specifications that have been performed 
through time, and the consequent analyses are limited to questions about social and 
political effects. Discourses involving knowledge and practices shaped by non-human 
actants created by elite-expert institutions, therefore, have been overlooked in the 
existing literature. Actor Network Theory (ANT) scholars who emphasise the 
importance of non-human actants argue that artefacts are part of the negotiating process 
in performing knowledge, a process normally dismissed by ‘social’ scholars (Latour, 
1992). The organisational safety models that are used among pipeline regulators and 
pipeline industries also have limits in capturing the interwoven issues of power 
relations, technical meaning, and values (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991, p. 42).  
In this chapter, the focus will be upon how changes in technical-regulatory 
specifications that are enacted by elite-expert institutions have shaped knowledge and 
practices in the process of risk regulation. Measurement length, as a relatively new 
technical-regulatory specification, is the primary ‘non-human’ actant (or performing as 
a part-human actant) and the entry point for investigation in this chapter. Measurement 
length was enacted to regulate pipeline risks in 2007, more than four decades after the 
first Australian pipeline was established in 1964. The enactment of measurement length 
at a late stage in the history of Australian pipelines has become problematized because it 
contradicts the emphasis that pipeline regulatory institutions and pipeline industries put 
on the integrity of pipelines in the face of catastrophic accidents and public safety.  
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A number of assemblages emerged concomitant with the process of tracing this 
measurement length actant (see Figure 6.5). An investigation of these assemblages 
revealed research themes specific to the incoherence of knowledge and practices 
concerning pipeline dangers (or pipeline risks) and public safety. Such knowledge and 
practices will be discussed throughout this chapter (summarised in Figure 6.5).  
The research themes were revealed in response to guiding questions. The latter were 
created by employing the method assemblage of this thesis (presented in Figure 3.3) to 
explore the process of performing power-knowledge relationships through measurement 
length and its series of assemblages that shape regulatory practices. The first Section 
(6.1) explored: what is measurement length and how is it important to the regulating of 
pipeline risks? In addition, I investigated how measurement length was enacted, and 
who had been involved? What were the influences that led to the enactment of 
measurement length? In the second Section (6.2), I explore the transitions of knowledge 
appertaining to pipeline dangers. What has changed after the introduction of 
measurement length, who has been involved and how? In the last Section (6.3), I 
explore how knowledge of pipeline dangers has been understood among third parties 
subsequent to the enactment of measurement length. How have protective devices been 
used, who has been involved, and how have they functioned? What are the 
inconsistencies (or incoherence, see Section 6.2) associated with the employment of 
these devices to regulate pipeline risks? An outline of this chapter is presented in Figure 
6.1.  
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Figure 6.1: The process of analysis and discussion of Chapter 6. 
6.1 The enactment of technical-regulatory knowledge of pipeline 
risks 
Much of the existing literature on pipeline dangers pays primary attention to external 
interference which is claimed to be the dominant cause of pipeline failures in many 
areas, including Europe, USA, the USSR (before disintegration), and Australia (see for 
example: Papadakis, 1999; Papadakis et al., 1999; Tuft & Bonar, 2009). Tuft and Bonar 
(2009) highlight the fact that more than 80 per cent of pipeline incidents in Australia are 
caused by external interference rather than by corrosion and other factors.  
Australian pipeline industries and regulatory institutions focus their attention on third 
parties (Standards Australia, 2012a, p. 72), who are considered to be the major cause of 
external interference. A broader typology of third parties includes groups of people who 
work and live along the pipeline, including the public. Specifically, the groups that 
pipeline institutions are most concerned about are those who have tendencies to cause 
harm to pipeline assets. External interferers include local governments, underground 
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utility companies (e.g., electricity companies, communications companies, water 
companies), developers, builders, their contractors and sub-contractors, excavators, as 
well as landowners who have pipelines located on their land. Within the typology of 
third parties, the general public are peripheral.  
The issue of external interference has increased among Australian pipeline industries 
and regulatory institutions because of an increase in the volume of urban encroachment 
near to and on pipelines. This increased activity nearby renders pipeline failures more 
likely. Increased urban density is also likely to lead to greater consequences if such a 
failure were to occur. The number of people in Australia has almost doubled in the last 
40 years (Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2011).  
The expansion of urban encroachment and increased level of external interference are 
becoming more manifest as two interrelated causes of increased risk around pipelines. 
Land use and development adjacent to pipelines, in particular in capital cities, has 
increased dramatically (ibid). For example, there are now sensitive areas including 
schools, kindergartens, hospitals and rest homes that have been located either on top of 
or nearby to high pressure gas transmission pipelines that were originally constructed 
under the rubric of different planning zones (e.g., rural zones that have become urban). 
Since the engineering requirements for pipelines vary according to surrounding land use, 
the pipeline risk of multiple facilities and injuries has escalated around these sensitive 
zones. 
Such core concerns have led to Australian pipeline industries co-opting with regulatory 
institutions. Rather than attempting to change and comprehend how pipeline dangers are 
understood by third parties and planning authorities, Australian pipeline industries and 
regulatory institutions have centred on setting up and implementing physical and 
procedural controls to manage and regulate pipeline risks. The development of the 
concept of measurement length and the enactment of measurement length (Australian 
Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2014b) have accompanied these changes. Physical-
technical approaches are a standard part of the ontological practices of Australian 
regulatory institutions and Australian pipeline industries’ management of pipeline risks. 
Physical controls and procedural controls are now mandatory regulatory requirements 
(Tuft, 2009, p. 7). Physical preventive controls are used to both prevent accidental 
contact with pipelines, and to increase the number of physical barriers to prevent 
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pipeline penetration (Standards Australia, 2012a, pp. 72-73). Procedural controls are 
protective devices used to minimise the likelihood of human activities with the potential 
to damage pipelines (ibid). Both preventive controls are summarised in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1: Physical and procedural controls employed by pipeline institutions to prevent external 
interferences.  
Types of controls Type of technical 
tools used 
Technical tools 
1. Physical-
technical controls 
1.1. Separation 1.1.1. Considerations of pipeline burial 
depth 
1.1.2. Restriction of access, via bollards 
and fencing.  
1.1.3. Relocated pipelines1 
 1.2. Resistance to 
penetration 
1.2.1. Increased pipeline wall thickness 
1.2.2. Increased penetration barriers (e.g., 
buried concrete or other hard cover above 
or adjacent to pipelines 
 1.3. Changes in 
technicality  
1.3.1. Reduced pipeline Maximum 
Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP) 2 
2. Procedural 
controls 
2.1. Public awareness 2.1.1. Liaison with landowners and third 
parties (e.g., local government, utilities, et 
al.) 
2.1.2. Community awareness program 
2.1.3. One-call service known as ‘Dial 
Before You Dig’ 
2.1.4. Pipeline marking (warning signs and 
buried marker tape) 
2.1.5. Agreements with other users of 
shared corridors 
 2.2. External 
interference detection 
2.2.1. Patrolling 
2.2.2. Planning notification zones 
2.2.3. Remote intrusion detection 
Sources: Sea Gas Ltd. and Epic Energy Ltd. (circa 2014); Standard Australia Limited (2012a, p. 8); Tuft (2009). 
Notes:  (1) The relocation of pipelines is unlikely because of cost and impact on gas supplies (Sea Gas Ltd. & Epic 
Energy Ltd., circa 2014, p. 21).  
(2) Reduction of MAOP is assumed to be generally impracticable due to reduction in pipeline capacity and 
the reduced availability of gas supplies (ibid). 
For any given pipeline, the question for engineers is whether and/or how each of the 
above controls should be implemented. A parameter in making this decision is how the 
land around the pipeline is used. That is, where the concept of measurement length first 
arises. The question of what measurement length is and how it is enacted in the power-
knowledge assemblage will be explicated in more detail in the next section.  
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6.1.1 Measurement length and its enactment in a power-knowledge 
assemblage  
The definition of measurement length was invested in the AS2885 Australian pipeline 
standard committee on the revision of AS2885 during 2007. The committee members 
are composed of pipeline industrial professionals (two-thirds), and pipeline regulators 
(one-third). The committee has formulated a hard science, technical-engineering 
definition, which excludes social dimensions. According to AS2885, measurement 
length is ‘the radius of the 4.7 kW/m2 [and 12.6 kW/m2] radiation contour19 for a full 
bore rupture, calculated in accordance with Clause 4.10’ (Standards Australia, 2012a, p. 
64). Technically, it is used to identify the distance from pipelines, and the effect of a 
person’s exposure to radiated and intensified heat from an ignited full-bore rupture. 
There are two types of radiation levels addressed in AS2885: 4.7 kW/m2 and 12.6 
kW/m2. 
The distance, calculated relative to 4.7 kW/m2, is several hundred metres for a full bore 
pipeline rupture. The effect of exposure to heat at this level will directly cause pain in 
unprotected people within 15-20 seconds (O’Neil, Hunichen, & Walters, 2013, p. 27) 
and will cause injury after 30 seconds exposure, at least second degree burns (Standards 
Australia, 2012a, p. 173). The simplified meaning of the technical definition is that 
unprotected people who stay, work or live within the calculated distance will suffer 
severe burns in less than a minute; and in general, their severe burns will demand a long 
recovery time (Peter Tuft & Associates Pipeline Engineering Consultant, 2015, p. 5). 
In addition, the distance, calculated relative to 12.6 kW/m2 is several hundred metres for 
a full bore pipeline rupture which will bring a significant risk of fatality after extended 
exposure and a high risk of injury (O’Neil et al., 2013, p. 28) after 30 seconds exposure 
for third degree burns (Standards Australia, 2012a, p. 173). The simplified meaning of 
the technical definition is that unprotected people are likely to receive fatal burns 
following a short exposure (Peter Tuft & Associates Pipeline Engineering Consultant, 
2015, p. 5).  
This concept was introduced in order to codify the link between engineering and 
procedural controls for pipelines and the expected activities in areas surrounding the 
                                                 
19 Radiation contours depend on various pipe sizes and types of gases (Standards Australia, 2012a, p. 64). 
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said pipelines. The more people are potentially exposed to pipeline failure the more 
controls are required by the standard. But, this technical concept clearly has non-
technical implications for land use planning and for those who live and work within the 
measurement length of a pipeline.  
What is the measurement length in non-technical understanding? The measurement 
length can be simplified as a technical concept related to adverse, devastating impacts of 
pipeline catastrophic events caused by full bore ruptures of high pressure gas pipelines. 
The impacts from full bore ruptures have a certain length of heat radiation, a round 
shape. The impacts can potentially cause catastrophic harm to both humans and 
environment within less than a minute.  
The findings suggest that the technical meaning as defined by AS2885 committees is 
too technical and obfuscates the understanding of catastrophic risk from pipelines. This 
was addressed by both regulator and non-regulator participants (i.e. industrial, planning 
and consultant participants). It has been criticised as ‘not a very descriptive term’ 
(Geelong Council, 2013, p. 18). In lay terms, participants described measurement length 
as ‘a blast zone’, ‘a kill zone’ or ‘a danger zone’. Some either interpreted it as an 
incineration zone and blast radius (NH Pipeline Awareness, n.d.) or as a ‘heat flux zone’ 
(Geelong Council, 2013, p. 18). This measurement length terminology is, however, only 
used within Australian pipeline institutions. In other pipeline literature it is described 
differently, using terms including ‘safety distances’ (Fateen, 2012; Sklavounos & Rigas, 
2006) or ‘buffer zones’ (Fateen, 2012).  
The technical specification of pipeline risks under AS2885 is narrow. A ‘blast zone’ is 
contingent upon the sizes of and pressures within pipelines. But, the Australian 
pipelines and regulators have largely emphasised only two zones at a radiation level of 
4.7 and 12.6 kW/m2 from an explosion of high pressure gas transmission pipelines. A 
blast zone can occur in gas distribution pipelines, which are used to transfer gas through 
residential areas. In addition, people living, working or studying outside the 
measurement length when a full bore rupture occurs can be burned, injured or die if they 
have not been evacuated before heat radiation transfers to them. 
Before moving on to the next section, I will illustrate the effects of a blast zone or 
‘measurement length’ by providing some visual figures from the catastrophic event of a 
pipeline rupture in San Bruno city in California, USA. I would have preferred to use 
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examples from the Australian pipeline literature; however, I could not find clear photos 
carrying an explanation. This may indicate that the technical knowledge of a blast zone 
itself is not transparent in Australia. The description of a ‘blast zone’ is more open in 
countries such as the USA wherein a catastrophic pipeline explosion has already 
occurred. Figure 6.2 shows the blast zone of the San Bruno pipeline explosion and the 
consequence. Figure 6.3 presents an overview of the fire. Figure 6.4 presents the burned 
houses around the San Bruno pipeline explosion.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: An illustration of a blast zone (600 feet or 183 meters) of the San Bruno pipeline 
explosion and the consequence. The San Bruno gas transmission pipeline was 30 inches in 
diameter, had a 0.375 inch wall thickness, and a pressure of 375 pounds per square inch (psi) 
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2010b, p. 19).   
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Figure 6.3: An overview of the fire at San Bruno (National Transportation Safety Board, 2010b, p. 3). 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Burned houses around the site of the San Bruno pipeline explosion (National 
Transportation Safety Board, 2010b, p. 20). 
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6.1.2 Incoherence of knowledge about pipeline dangers among actors 
The zone of pipeline danger was unregulated before 2007, or more than 40 years after 
the first Australian Pipeline was built in 1964. Pipeline regulators and the Australian 
pipeline industries have claimed that they have no control over the changes in planning. 
Is this claim valid? What are the reasons behind such a late establishment of a blast zone 
related to a full bore rupture of pipelines? The research themes involving knowledge 
vis-à-vis the dangers of pipelines were gradually exposed.  
The enactment of ‘measurement length’ was my entry point to tracing how risk 
knowledge of pipeline danger is performed and changes over time. After I asked 
participants how measurement length was established, the AS2885 committee 
participants and pipeline industrial participants revealed that the intention was to use 
measurement length as a regulatory specification only by pipeline designers and 
operators. This group had to be assured that the design and operation were appropriate 
for acceptable risk, and not likely to cause catastrophic pipeline failures. There were no 
specific intentions to distribute knowledge about the danger zones of pipelines to others.  
After the measurement length was enacted, pipeline regulators and the Australian 
pipeline industries were forced to involve other parties in measurement length, 
especially those outside of pipeline industries and regulatory institutions. These other 
parties included those associated with land use planning and those contiguous with 
pipeline assets. They included the developer, local council and planning authority. 
These parties are required to know about measurement length because, to quote a 
pipeline consultant: ‘the consequences of failure are part of the argument necessary to 
persuade the developer to maximise separation from the pipeline’. 
Some interviewees, including regulators, industrial and consultant participants, 
observed that a number of groups are not required to know about the dangers of 
pipelines. Such groups included the potential buyers of land within and around a blast 
zone, as well as members of the public living within and near the blast zone. A pipeline 
consultant put forward a reason for this exclusion:  
[t]he industry is very concerned about scaring the public and do not wish to 
create alarm by informing too many people about the consequences of a 
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catastrophic failure, especially members of the general public who live 
within the measurement length.  
On the surface, the perspective concerning the public’s fear of technological risks have 
become a normative assumption. As I have suggested earlier in this chapter, some social 
science scholars have concluded that the experts’ normative assumptions indicate that 
experts have misunderstood how lay people understand science (see for example: 
Wynne, 1992; Wynne, 1996). Lay people are unwitting victims who rarely participate in 
debates and decision-making about the appropriateness and usefulness of the 
technosciences. As a consequence, the structure of the counterpoint between lay people 
and experts, nevertheless, has become problematised. Callon and Rabeharisoa (2008) 
urge the avoidance of dichotomy traps because the structural assumptions of lay-expert 
counterpoints have a tendency to omit other assemblages and discourses embedded in 
power-knowledge in relation to the development of technosciences and their impacts 
(Callon & Rabeharisoa, 2008, p. 231).  
The assemblages and their effects as they relate to knowledge and practice about 
pipeline risk were exposed when investigating the enactment of measurement length. 
Pipeline regulators and pipeline industries have chosen which groups they want to keep 
informed about pipeline danger in relation to a blast zone (within measurement length), 
and which groups they do not want to keep informed. In other words, the elite-expert 
institutions and the industry pipeline institutions have shaped the incoherence of 
knowledge about pipeline danger. 
6.2 Enacting measurement length and the distortion of risk 
accountability, assessment, and communication  
This section aims to discuss the research themes that emerge from the negotiating 
process (or the translation process) of measurement length. The translation process of 
assemblages is defined as ‘the continuity of displacements and transformations’ of 
assemblages and their relations in the process (Callon, 1986, p. 223) (the translation 
process is discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.3).  
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ANT scholars prefer to begin at a different entry point from that of conventional 
dichotomous models (e.g., lay people and experts) in order to establish a process of 
revealing assemblages and their effects (Callon & Rabeharisoa, 2008). Researchers can 
begin their research with non-human entities, and follow how they interact with other 
entities in enacting realities. Or, researchers can start with controversial issues, by 
tracing connections among such issues. They can trace how controversies are enacted 
rather than attempting to extract solutions to cure controversies (Latour, 2005, p. 23). 
By following the enactment of measurement length herein, an attempt was made to 
reveal the assemblages and their effects. 
This chapter explored the controversial issues pertinent to measurement length, and the 
elite-expert and industrial entities that created this non-human entity (measurement 
length). In the Australian pipeline case, the controversial issues involved the concerns 
of pipeline institutions (both industries and regulators) about the public’s apprehension 
of and fear towards pipeline catastrophic accidents. Such concerns contradict the roles 
and accountability of pipeline institutions in and towards public safety. Investigation of 
these controversial issues through the transitional changes of measurement length led to 
a number of assemblages emerging beyond the public, laypeople and dominant 
institutions. They were categorised into three groups (see Figure 6.5): technical-political 
assemblages; social-political assemblages, and economic-political assemblages.  
Following the interactions of these assemblages and their effects, research themes 
involving incoherence among knowledge and practices in the process of risk regulation 
were further revealed. Such knowledge and practices have been generated though the 
power-knowledge effects involving these assemblages. These research themes are 
included: (a) the distortion of risk accountability and risk assessment; (b) the muddle of 
risk communication; and (c) the uncommon knowledge of pipeline risks. These themes 
will be discussed throughout the rest of this chapter. The process of performing power-
knowledge in relation to measurement length before and after its enactment, and the 
assemblages that have been involved are explicated in Figure 6.5 together with a 
summary of the themes revealed throughout this process. 
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Figure 6.5: A summary of the assemblages and the research themes. 
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6.2.1 The incoherent practice of accountability and risk assessment 
Subsequent to the enactment of measurement length, Australian pipeline industries have 
co-operated with regulatory institutions to negotiate with planning authorities over the 
control of pipeline assets. The two interconnected bodies; the pipeline industry and the 
pipeline regulatory body, have formed a Pipeline Corridor Committee – facilitated by 
the Australian Pipelines & Gas Association Ltd. (APGA). APGA is the representative 
body of the Australian pipeline industries (Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 
2013). The Pipeline Corridor Committee is composed of senior state regulators, pipeline 
company representatives, industry consultants, representatives of the AS2885 
Committee and the APGA (Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2014b). The 
Pipeline Corridor Committee aims to develop a ‘notification zone’ to be implemented 
nationally which is acceptable to pipeline licensees, planning authorities and developers 
(Tuft & Davies, April 2011). 
The practice of risk accountability is distorted by obscurities in the meaning of 
measurement length, enacted by pipeline regulators and the pipeline industry. The 
meaning of measurement length is obscured in its description as a ‘notification zone’, a 
term used by Australian pipeline industries and regulators to refer to a danger zone. The 
obscuring of ‘measurement length’ has resulted in a misrepresentation of how 
measurement length should be regulated, and by whom? Regulators and the pipeline 
industry have made planning authorities accountable for the notification of development 
and land use changes to pipeline licensees, or pipeline owners (Cronin, 2015, p. 3; 
DePrinse, 2015, p. 1). As a pipeline regulator has claimed:  
Planning schemes largely fail to recognise and address the planning 
constraints posed by existing pipelines licensed under the Pipelines Act 
(2005) (licensed Pipelines). This means that pipeline licensees are often not 
notified of development and land use changes within a pipeline’s 
measurement length early in the planning process, if at all, and prospective 
purchasers of land located within the measurement length of the pipeline are 
not aware of the existence of the pipeline or the risks associated with it 
(Cronin, 2015, p. 3).  
The obfuscation of the meaning of measurement length and the misrepresentation of 
accountability has resulted in messiness in practicing risk assessments around the 
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measurement length zone. A research theme involving the distorted practice of risk 
assessment was revealed when following the technical-political assemblage: Safety 
Management Studies (SMSs). The findings indicated that the key principle of assessing 
pipeline risk in accordance with the SMSs had been distorted. The actors involved with, 
living and working within the measurement length had been excluded from the practice 
of the risk assessment process.  
The distortion of SMS is evident in the narrow and technical definition of SMS, defined 
within AS2885:  
the process that identifies threats to the pipeline system and applies controls 
to them, and (if necessary) undertakes assessment and treatment of any risks 
to ensure that residual risk is reduced to an acceptable level (Standards 
Australia, 2012a, p. 16). 
The regulatory institutions have primarily centred their assessment of pipeline risk on 
the construction phase. A pipeline licensee or representatives of pipeline licensees must 
conduct an SMS at the design and construction stage to consider pipeline risk. Their 
design plan must incorporate physical and procedural controls to prevent pipeline 
explosions (Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2014a, p. 4). The physical-
technical controls that emerged from the interviews include: changing design factors, 
Maximum Allowance Operating Pressure (MAOP), and depth of cover.  
Pipeline licensees are required to act on SMSs in order to protect vulnerable groups. 
The latter are classified as those living in and attending sensitive use zones including 
schools, hospitals, aged care facilities and prisons (ibid, p. 9). If there is a change in a 
pipeline location class in the vicinity of a pipeline corridor or a pipeline easement, an 
additional SMS must be taken (ibid). The fundamental element of location class is 
established as technical specification to classify vulnerable groups of people who are 
unable to protect themselves and subject to the possibility of adverse impacts. The 
presence of such groups would normally lead to a new pipeline being routed elsewhere. 
Or, if it remains in the vicinity, then pipeline licensees are required by AS2885 to 
essentially design-out the full bore rupture case for the pipeline by using physical and 
procedural controls (Table 6.1). The SMSs should be composed of a location class 
review, pipeline risk assessment and a review of the possible mitigation measurements 
(ibid).  
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The practice of risk assessment is made messier when one pipeline is handled by 
complex ownerships involving several companies under contractual arrangements. One 
example is when the pipeline owner, the pipeline facilitator, and the pipeline operator 
are located in different states but handle the same pipeline. The complexity of 
ownership has been amplified by neoliberal government programs, a topic I discuss in 
Chapter 7. An illustrative structure of the complexity of ownerships is presented in 
Figure 7.2 (Chapter 7, Section 7.2.2). 
The research theme involving the distorted practice of risk assessment was further 
exposed. I had no prior knowledge of who would be included and excluded from the 
process of SMSs. During an interview with a field manager, working for the pipeline 
operator (the subcontractor), I asked if I could observe the SMSs process conducted 
within the company in order to gain background knowledge about SMSs. The 
participant field manager mentioned the case of a kindergarten near to where the 
company needed to assess risks. The participant field manager emphasised that the 
kindergarten was located within a danger zone, a problem discovered by his pipeline 
patrol staff. Because the pipeline did not belong to the pipeline operator (the company 
he worked with), he reported the situation about the kindergarten to the pipeline 
facilitator who then reported to the pipeline owner. The SMS was subsequently 
conducted but took time due to the complexity of ownership. 
I was invited to observe the SMSs process in assessing pipeline risks around the 
kindergarten located within the danger zone. I imagined that representatives of those 
affected people had been invited and were coming to co-assess risks with the pipeline 
operator. I planned to use snowball sampling to interview them later, but my assumption 
was wrong. The SMS was conducted by a consultant company, hired by the pipeline 
owner. The initial outcome was to construct physical and procedural controls for 
managing pipeline risks from a full bore rupture of a high pressure gas transmission 
pipeline. The stakeholders in the SMS workshop were representatives of pipeline 
owners, the patrol staff and the field manager of the pipeline operator (or the pipeline 
subcontractor). The kindergarten school developer, the affected groups of people 
working and studying at the kindergarten school, the pipeline regulators, and the 
planning authorities were not present. 
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The case epitomises how the practice of risk assessment has been negotiated among 
actors around changes to the technical-regulatory specifications involving measurement 
length. The process of risk assessment can be straightforward and serve the principle of 
protecting public safety. Nevertheless, the process was twisted as a result of the 
obscured meaning of measurement length. The obscured meaning was enacted 
contingent to the ontological practices of regulators and pipeline industries (these 
ontological practices are discussed in Chapter 4).  
6.2.2 The practice of risk communication is muddled  
This section will briefly introduce and problematize the contemporary concepts 
associated with risk communication required to analyse their interaction with the 
incoherencies associated with measurement length discussed above. Risk theorists have 
proposed the concept of integrative risk governance to enhance the communication of 
risk in order to manage the effects of technological risk. The risk governance approach 
is underpinned by the deliberative concept of Habermasian discourse theory (Habermas, 
1984; 1987) (discussed in Chapter 2, Section 2.1.3). This concept advocates a 
deliberative democracy of public participation in communicating and integrating with 
different stakeholders. The deliberative concept is ideal for creating democratic 
processes to solve conflicts of risk in the public space (Wardman, 2008, pp. 1623, 1628). 
Conversely, the deliberative approach has been criticised by ANT theorists for reducing 
the role and identity of the public in the public space. The democratic process, utilising 
communicative rationality and reasoning, can omit accounts of difference and the roles 
and identities of other groups, who are impacted by technological risk (Barry & Slater, 
2005b, p. 118). In addition, the ideal of the deliberative approach in offering ‘what 
should be done’ (Wardman, 2008, p. 1629) leads to neglect of investigations into how 
practice in the process of risk communication has been shaped in this case, by the 
measurement length entity and those who enacted it. 
Pipeline regulators and pipeline industries are forced by the material entity: 
measurement length, to communicate with others but the practice of risk 
communication has become muddled as a result of the obscured meaning of pipeline 
risks. The research theme involving the muddled practice of risk communication was 
revealed by following the controversial issues around measurement length in relation to 
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an emerging social-political entity: the independent planning panels who I refer as 
‘interactors’.  
The term ‘emerging concerned groups’ (Callon, Lascoumes, & Barthe, 2009, p. 29) was 
coined by ANT scholars investigating controversial and contradictory discourses over 
uncertainty and risk in relation to technologies. The emerging concerned groups are 
unacknowledged actors who are under-explored within the existing contemporary 
literature. As suggested earlier, the authors of the existing literature either develop their 
arguments vis-à-vis the counterpoint between laypeople and experts, or propose 
solutions by engaging them together to assess risks. Both ways, researchers can fall into 
a dichotomy trap, a dilemma that ANT scholars prefer to avoid. 
The ‘emergent concerned groups’ are groups of people who have received adverse 
impacts from technologies. More importantly, these groups have taken action to conduct 
research using themselves as objects of their own study (ibid, p. 147). The process is 
called objectification (ibid). The ‘emergent concerned groups’ are not stereotypical 
victimised groups such as laypeople, the public, communities, workers; nor non-
governmental organisations that represent these groups. The ‘emergent concerned 
groups’ can be patients suffering from new forms of diseases, or those affected by 
technologies.  
In the Australian pipeline case, instead of alluding to them as emergent concerned 
groups, I would rather call them ‘interactors’ (or ‘inter-emergent groups’) because their 
roles and actions are different from the emergent concerned groups. In this case, the 
interactors are the independent planning panels. They do not suffer direct impacts from 
pipeline risks and conduct the process of objectifying research in a similar way to the 
emergent concerned groups. Interactors play their roles in re-identifying public safety 
and accountability in the pipeline case. They are independent, separate from the 
interconnected bodies, regulators and pipeline industries, but share relevant knowledge. 
Those interactors have sympathised with the affected groups and have willingly set up a 
model to help inform affected groups about pipeline risks.  
The muddled practice of risk communication was exposed by following the interactors’ 
approach to controversial issues of measurement length. A case occurred in a local 
council, located in one of the Australian States. In this case there was conflict associated 
with a planning scheme developed by the local council. This particular conflict was 
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brought into being because a pipeline licensee and pipeline regulators had submitted a 
submission objecting to a particular planning scheme because there was a high pressure 
gas transmission pipeline buried under the area. It had been there for more than 30 years 
and its existence was poorly known. Nevertheless, pipeline regulators and the pipeline 
licensee were forced to communicate with the local council. Their decision was 
prompted by measurement length because sensitive facilities under the planning scheme 
including schools, kindergartens and a community centre were to be constructed within 
measurement length.  
The independent planning panel took the initiative to rearrange the new practice of risk 
communication in relation to measurement length. The panel wanted to set up public 
notification to notify the danger zone to potential buyers who were planning to buy land 
within the measurement length. Public notification changes the current practice of risk 
communication in relation to how pipeline risks should be communicated, who needs to 
know about pipeline risks and how? The public notification is contingent to the 
principles of public right to know, openness and transparency. Before development 
commenced, the panel wanted to devise a mechanism to advise the purchasers of the 
property near the danger zone by notification of agreements over land titles. The panel 
insisted that land purchasers should be informed of the existence of the pipeline so that 
they would be free to make their decision to invest and live with full knowledge of the 
hazardous nature of the pipeline and its accompanying risks.  
The research practice of following interactors and observing their actions revealed the 
power-knowledge dynamics implicated in the muddling of the practice of risk 
communication. In response to advice from the independent planning panel on public 
notification, the interview data showed that the pipeline licensee and an Executive 
Director of one of the institutes for urban development in Australia wrote a letter to the 
Planning Minister expressing their disapproval of public notification. I asked to see the 
letter but I was refused due to the issue of confidentiality.  
The reasons given for opposing public notification20 were influenced by the ontological-
epistemological logic underlying the current knowledge and practice of elite-expert 
institutions: (a) pipeline ruptures are very rare events; and (b) the Australian pipeline 
industry operates with high standards together with an excellent safety record. In 
                                                 
20 The data was gathered from interviews and secondary resources 
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addition, the pipeline had co-existed with communities since 1999 without an incident 
affecting residents and other land users. Moreover, physical controls must be adopted 
according to AS2885 to protect external interference including: (a) resistance to 
penetration by virtue of wall thickness; and (b) using sign posts and marking. The 
putative lack of technical competency among the public in relation to their lack of 
understanding of ‘measurement length’ and the potential for public anxiety and fear was 
another reason. The Planning Minister disapproved the submission due to these reasons:  
this requirement is unnecessary as gas supply infrastructure is common to 
the majority of urban areas … and the pipeline that runs through the … site 
has been designed and constructed in accordance with the relevant 
Australian Standard (AS 2885.1-2012) for a Residential (T1) environment 
(Geelong Council, 2014, p. 6).  
This case illustrates the power-knowledge dynamics implicit in risk communication. 
The new way of risk communication, arranged by the interactors, has forced pipeline 
regulators, the pipeline industry, and developers to renegotiate their current power-
knowledge practice. Nevertheless, in this case, the arrangement proved unsuccessful. 
The reasons were investigated and are discussed in the next section. 
6.2.3 The incoherent practice of risk communication 
Interviews involving a pipeline regulator and a planning participant indicated that an 
attempt to rearrange the current process of risk communication initiated by the 
interactors failed because of cost and accountability issues associated with the existing 
power-knowledge practice of the elite-expert and industrial entities. In terms of cost, the 
public can use awareness and knowledge of pipeline risks to negotiate the price of land 
within, nearby and around measurement length. The price of land may be reduced and 
this could raise questions of compensation. In addition, pipeline licensees will be 
required to prevent pipeline risks by using physical and procedural controls to prevent 
pipeline explosions. Potential changes in technical-physical controls, emerging from 
interviews, include MAOP, design factor, wall thickness, and depth of cover (see other 
controls in Table 6.1). The cost of construction of physical and procedural controls can 
be very expensive. 
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Public notification can create new forms of power-knowledge relationships across the 
Australian states and territories, potentially impacting on and dismantling the existing 
form of power-knowledge practice of the two interconnected entities: pipeline 
regulators and the pipeline industry. If a public notification mechanism had been set up 
as advised by the independent planning panel, other local governments across 
Australian states may well have done the same. As a consequence of the requirement for 
public notification, pipeline licensees may face difficulties when constructing new 
pipelines. In addition, pipeline regulators and the pipeline industry will be forced to 
rearrange their current ontological practices in regulating pipeline risks despite a 
reluctance to change in the face of a lack of regulatory support mechanisms.  
The rearrangement of the current ontological practices is associated with accountability. 
The question of ‘who will pay for this’ has become a key concern among participants 
including pipeline regulator participants and pipeline industrial participants. ‘Who will 
pay for this’ in this context is not only associated with who will pay the costs, but more 
especially who will be accountable for the consequences of implementing measurement 
length?  
The research theme on the muddling of the practice of risk communication concerning 
measurement length reflects ambiguous accountability in relation to pipeline risks. I 
asked the pipeline regulators: who will be responsible if there is a pipeline failure 
associated with unregulated measurement length? A number of pipeline regulators 
replied that pipeline licensees are accountable for pipeline failures, based on law. 
Regulations require pipeline companies to reassess risk, and to demonstrate how they 
are going to control such risks in order to get or extend their licenses in accordance with 
SMSs. If licensees can demonstrate how they are going to establish control, regulators 
are relatively satisfied. In addition, some pipeline regulators in some states said that 
under their pipeline act, regulators have neither the right nor the obligation to regulate a 
danger zone.  
Some regulators emphasised that ‘I don’t know’ who will be accountable because issues 
of accountability are rather complex involving a complexity of actors and laws:  
We have a sort of a regulatory responsibility as far as pipeliners complying 
with the standard that has this process for doing a safety assessment if land 
use changes. But that standard has no power over developers or planners, 
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there's no requirement on them to comply with it, and we have no power 
over those people at all. So there's a sort of an expectation that something's 
going to happen that a standard can't force to happen, the licensees can't 
force to happen, and we can't force to happen.  
Findings suggest that pipeline licensees and regulators are forced to become involved 
with unregulated measurement length. For example, there are approximately 400 
pipeline licensees across Australian states that are required to identify changes of land 
use, re-assess risks around pipelines, and even to rearrange pipeline routes which is an 
expensive option. With such large numbers of pipeline licensees across Australian 
states, a regulator reflected that ‘is way beyond what a pipeline, licensed pipeliner could 
really be expected to sort of monitor’. Additionally, in cases involving accidents ‘the 
regulator will be investigated and found potentially to have been ineffective’, and ‘in 
this case there’ll be evidence around the planning functions that aren’t helpful’.  
The above findings indicated that pipeline regulators and pipeline industries are at an 
interstice of negotiations with regards to their accountability. Pipeline regulators and 
pipeline industries have claimed that they have been working with developers and 
pipeline industries together with government bodies – to set up a planning process. One 
regulator asserted that:  
to come to an outcome where no single person is responsible, so it means 
that all parties need to meet their obligations, and we need a framework in 
place so that that can happen.  
The question is how to regulate against pipeline dangers (or pipeline risks) when 
knowledge about pipeline risks is available but the elite-expert and industrial entities are 
in a transitional process of negotiation about their roles, power-knowledge, and 
accountability? Instead of making no single person accountable for the unregulated 
measurement length, should every single person be made accountable with reference to 
improving knowledge and practices around the pipeline blast zone? And, if so, how?  
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6.3 Knowledge about pipeline risks is uncommon and made 
uncommon 
Measurement length was enacted in 2007. This means that pipeline licensees and 
pipeline regulators are in a transitional period of regulating the zone of pipeline danger. 
A question arises as to what pipeline licensees and pipeline regulators can do to regulate 
existing pipeline risk vis-à-vis situations where pipeline licensees lack information 
about the past (and therefore cannot go back to re-assess risks), and furthermore, in 
cases where licensees cannot meet their new obligations?  
Both interconnected parities have tried to control third parties, many of whom have high 
potential to spoil and disturb pipeline assets. Pipeline industries are highly concerned 
about third parties. As a measure of approachment, the pipeline industries have 
established ‘Dial Before You Dig’ (DBYD) together with physical and procedural 
controls including signposts (warning signs) notifying third parties of the existence of 
pipelines (see Figure 6.6). 
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Figure 6.6: Illustrations of a sign post near a residential area.  
Note: The photo on the top was taken on the 10th September 2014. The photos on the middle and bottom were taken 
on the 25th May 2014. Photos by Dolruedee Kramnaimuang King.  
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Studies have been conducted in an attempt to understand the levels of awareness about 
pipelines among third parties in Australia. Pipeline industries express concern about 
their pipeline assets and want to protect their pipelines from interference by external 
parties (McDermott & Hayes, 2014). However, pipeline industries do not have control 
over all activities near pipelines that pose a risk to the public (McDermott & Hayes, 
2014, p. 15). Working around this claim, McDermott and Hayes set up their study to 
investigate the organisational structure of third party groups, with specific reference to 
local councils and underground companies with their contractual chains, and their 
responsibility for public safety. In their view, some questions remained underexplored, 
such as: how do pipeline industries view their responsibility for public safety? How 
have pipeline industries enacted and transferred risk-safety knowledge to third parties? 
And, how do third parties (both within the researchers’ focus (local councils and 
underground companies with contractual chains) and beyond the researchers’ focus 
(landowners and the public in general)) understand risk-safety knowledge? 
McDermott and Hayes’ analysis indicates that the third-party groups are primarily 
concerned with their own business risk. They want to protect their assets and have a 
tendency to shift their responsibility to frontline personnel who work around their assets 
(Hayes, McDermott, & Lingard, 2015, p. 105). In conclusion, Hayes et al. (2015) 
commented that third-party groups prefer to protect their businesses rather than prevent 
catastrophic accidents that might impact on public safety (ibid, p. 113). On the other 
hand, pipeline regulators have become ‘toothless tigers’ (McDermott & Hayes, 2014, p. 
52). They do not take any action to assist third parties, to sanction the pipeline sector, or 
to share regulatory responsibility to prevent repercussions from third parties (ibid, p. 50-
51).  
The usefulness of the research is that it points out some of the limitations of dominant 
regulatory institutions; but, there are drawbacks. An unintended outcome has been a 
series of dichotomies. In this case, the dichotomies are not between experts and 
laypeople but between pipeline industries and third parties, between third parties and 
their frontline workers, between business safety and public safety, between pipeline 
industries and pipeline regulators, and between the roles of pipeline regulators and 
public safety. Such an analysis, to a certain degree, has provided insight into issues of 
power but framed within traditional arrangements of power. 
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I have taken a different entry point from McDermott & Hayes’ research. In order to 
provide new insights by employing a different approach to regulating pipeline risk, I 
have rearranged and dismantled the series of dichotomies and the ontological identity of 
‘dominant’ institutions and actors by emphasising non-human entities in a more equal 
way compared to human entities in performing knowledge and practices.  
In the next section I will discuss how pipeline risks have come to be understood by third 
parties since the measurement length was enacted in 2007. I have followed the process 
of performing power-knowledge practices through two non-human actants: the ‘Dial 
Before You Dig’ (DBYD) and the ‘signposts’ actant. As discussed in the beginning of 
this section as well as in the beginning of this chapter (Section 6.1), these two actants 
are procedural controls. They are mandatory requirements under AS2885. The pipeline 
industry and regulators use them to communicate information about pipeline dangers to 
third party groups. I explored how knowledge of pipeline risks was shaped through 
these two regulatory requirements; how they were used, and how they have functioned. 
Furthermore, I discussed the inconsistencies of using these requirements to regulate 
pipeline risks. 
6.3.1 Knowledge of pipeline risks is uncommon among third parties 
Through the process of investigating these two regulatory requirements, interviews 
indicated that knowledge of pipeline risks is uncommon among third parties. As 
outlined in Section 6.1, the third party group includes the public in general, landowners, 
contractors and subcontractors of local councils and underground utility companies. 
Third parties are not being made aware of pipeline risks from full bore ruptures. This 
section will discuss how each type of third party (i.e. the public, landowners, contractors 
and subcontractors) understand pipeline risks, consecutively.  
Regulator participants and industrial participants highlighted that the public in general 
either does know about nor understand pipeline risks from full bore ruptures in relation 
to a danger zone or measurement length. One of the regulator participants stressed that:  
At the moment no one in the public would understand about measurement 
lengths on pipelines. You might be well enough informed to, you know, like 
you do before you buy a house you might check whether there's any 
planning for new freeways, or you might know that you can get an easement 
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look at their pipelines, you know, like overhead power lines, pipelines, I'm 
not sure if people know but they think oh it's just a gas pipeline. But on the 
other hand, and then I guess the backdrop to all this is obviously pipelines 
and community have to be together, because they're bringing essential 
energy to the community. And of course the other thing is that pipelines are 
very, very safe. When you think about how many millions of kilometres of 
pipelines are around the world, and how many incidents there are, the safety 
record is very, very good, and then Australia it's even better than anywhere 
else in the world. So you say, well how much though do you tell people? 
Now telling the public and then having to explain all this it's very 
complicated, it takes people even in the industry six months to get their head 
around what all this means. So how do you explain this to the public in 
simple terms? 
The above narrative shows that the information about pipeline risks from full bore 
ruptures has not been directly communicated to the public. There are many reasons for 
this. First, part of the reasoning is related to ontological-epistemological logics: pipeline 
risks are perceived as very safe by the pipeline industry and the pipeline regulatory 
authorities (see Section 4.1.1.2). In addition, industry and regulators tend to form their 
own assumptions about the public’s fear of technological risk. Industry is particularly 
concerned that the public may intervene and obstruct the pipeline industry’s activities 
(see Section 6.1.2). Furthermore, the public has never been informed about pipeline 
risks: the regulator participant claims that it is too complicated to explain and inform 
people about pipeline risks in simple terms.  
Second, the findings indicated that there has been communication between landowners, 
pipeline technicians and pipeline patrol staff. However, when I asked about what 
information the industry communicated with landowners, or what information had been 
passed to landowners, an industrial participant said:  
it generally says, you know, this is your annual mail-out confirming to make 
contact with you, you know, basically reminding them that the pipeline’s 
there and using them as a mechanism to make sure that their contact details 
are correct, and reminding them that at any time if they’re digging near the 
pipeline or have any questions that they can ring the 1-800 number, dial 
before you dig, etcetera. So it’s normally to reinforce those processes and 
procedures are there once again to protect the pipeline. 
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The quote above refers to the fact that in the main, landowners are ill-informed about 
pipeline risks from full bore ruptures associated with measurement length. The 
information offered to landowners is in the form of a regular-routine check so that the 
pipeline industry can ascertain whether there are any changes in landowners, and also 
remind landowners to follow a mechanism of DBYD if they are going to dig near 
pipelines. The information about what landowners have to do if a pipeline accident were 
to occur was not properly communicated. In other words, the communication made with 
landowners is done with an intention to protect pipeline assets and not to protect 
landowners’ and the public’s safety. 
Third, not only is knowledge of pipeline risk uncommon among landowners and the 
public, interviews with regulators and industrial participants showed that some of the 
sub-contractors and contractors of third-party groups (local councils and underground 
companies) (hereafter called the contractual chains of third-party groups) who 
sometimes work near high pressure pipelines, have little understanding about pipeline 
risks. The issue was exposed in the context of dealing with low pressure gas pipelines. 
According to a pipeline field manager, the rate of accidentally hitting low pressure gas 
pipelines was high. For this reason, the danger may seem to be less than that incurred 
when hitting a high pressure pipeline. Nevertheless, there is still risk of an explosion 
from low pressure gas pipelines in certain circumstances, an eventuation that the 
contractual chains of third-party groups may not properly understand. 
Apart from the issue of uncommon knowledge, recent research conducted by Hayes et 
al. (2015, p. 113) (described early in Section 6.3) discovered another problem occurring 
through contractual chains of third-party groups. Hayes et al. (2015, p. 109) emphasise 
that frontline workforces of contractual chains of third-party groups work within time 
and cost constraints so as to meet incentives for timely project completion. The frontline 
workforces are not remunerated for the extra effort to work safely and they trade off this 
risk against their own economic survival regardless of having, or not having, knowledge 
of pipeline risks.  
There is a further reason why there is an inadequate knowledge of pipeline risks among 
the contractual chains of third party groups. The reason that emerged from an interview 
with a field manager is related to, quote: ‘no-one else is telling them’. There are no 
technical and regulatory mechanisms for informing and empowering the contractual 
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chains of third party groups about pipeline risks. In addition, they lack pipeline trade 
training: they are not raised and educated in the pipeline trades. As the field manager 
suggested:  
we’re talking about excavator operators and that sort of stuff that don’t have 
much education anyway in the first place, so how are they ever going to find 
out.  
The warning signs indicating DBYD and the location signposts are the only controls in 
place to protect against pipeline accidents. Despite these efforts aimed at protection, 
some participants highlighted that the DBYD and warning signs do not function well 
because the reason behind dialling a DBYD number is not well explained. As the field 
manager asserted: 
that’s the only industry awareness that is officially put out there and doesn’t 
tell anyone anything, it just tells people that you’ve got to dial 1100 before 
you dig, which is helpful but doesn’t tell anyone why they’ve got to do it.  
Some contractual chains of third party groups may have been aware of the possibility of 
getting a fine if they hit a pipeline, quote: ‘but no-one tells you that you’ll lose your life 
if you hit that’.  
The field manager participant emphasised that it is crucial to inform contractual chains 
of third party groups about knowledge surrounding pipeline risks, in particular, about 
pipeline failures that may eventually result from damage to a pipe coating (pipelines are 
coated to prevent external corrosion). The participant further commented that 
contractual chains of the third-party group do not understand how a pipeline could fail 
in time after it has been hit. There is danger if someone digs near a pipeline, damages 
the protective coating and then covers it up without telling pipeline companies.  
The delayed risk of failure from damage to a pipeline coating is invisible to contractual 
chains of the third-party groups because they do not usually receive the direct and 
immediate impact of pipeline strikes or explosions. As, one industrial participant 
suggested, quote: ‘that’s a ticking time bomb’. Sooner or later, after the pipeline has 
been hit, the pipeline may fail. Concern about this kind of damage is described by an 
industrial interviewee:  
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I’m not concerned about [directly hitting a pipe] because we know about the 
damage and know it’s there, I’m more concerned about the people that hit 
the pipe, cover it back over and we don’t know what’s there, that’s a ticking 
time bomb, you don’t know when that will fail because you don’t even 
know that there’s damage there until you do some of your survey stuff later 
on, that’s the scary stuff. So that’s what we try to tell people as well, it’s 
very important you tell us about any damage that you do, doesn’t matter 
how insignificant you need to tell us, yes, you know what, you shouldn’t be 
hitting it but if you do make sure you tell us. 
The knowledge about pipeline failures as a consequence of hitting a pipeline is 
uncertain and unmanaged. Pipeline operators must rely on contractual chains of third-
party groups to inform them about any invisible risks. However, contractual chains of 
third-party groups do not have knowledge about how to detect invisible risks. Although 
it is important for contractual chains of third-party groups to be informed about 
unacknowledged pipeline risks, the question is: who will inform them and who will pay 
for their training? 
A pipeline failure that occurred in Belgium is a good example (see Chapter 1, Section 
1.2.1). In this case, the pipeline ruptured not because of direct penetration from hitting 
and digging into a pipe; instead, it was indirectly caused by a previous disturbance 
associated with an earth moving machine. The pipeline was gouged and had a big dent 
put in it. The disturbance led to an increase in the internal pressure of the pipeline, and 
two weeks later the pipeline failed. The pipeline company was not aware of the damage 
done to the pipeline. In addition, knowledge about how a pipeline could potentially fail 
was inadequately transferred from the sub-contracting chain to their workforce groups 
(AFESAC, 2014b). One consequence of this accident has been an unofficial change in 
policy with the outcomes that workers now get informed about pipeline risk and how to 
react and behave when things go wrong. This information is placed on action cards.  
The pipeline industries and pipeline regulators primarily emphasise the procedural and 
physical protections in managing, assessing and communicating pipeline risks (see for 
example: Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2016) (some of them discussed 
in Section 6.2), but the empirical evidence indicates that these controls are insufficient 
to protect pipeline catastrophic incidents. As an adjunct to my main research, I 
informally interviewed twelve people who live in a residential area near a high pressure 
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gas pipeline, and pass by a ‘high pressure gas main’ sign regularly. Ten of the twelve 
had not previously noticed the sign despite its location near the footpath they were 
currently using. This suggests that their awareness of pipeline risks is low. Nevertheless, 
eleven participants out of the twelve were aware that digging near pipelines can lead to 
pipeline ruptures. The concern is that if the pipeline leaks without obvious digging 
damage, how will the public know about the risk?  
6.3.2 The incoherent knowledge of pipeline risks within pipeline industries, 
regulatory institutions, and other authorities  
The findings indicate that not only is knowledge about pipeline risks uncommon among 
third parties, but knowledge of pipeline risks may also be inadequate among pipeline 
industries, pipeline regulators and other industries and authorities including planning 
authorities, transportation and resource departments, planning ministers, energy 
resource ministers, safety MHF regulators, independent planning panels, and developers. 
One of the issues raised by regulator participants is that the existence of pipelines is not 
well documented. The inadequacy of the pipeline database indicates an inadequacy of 
risk knowledge within pipeline institutions.  
A pipeline patrol participant reported that along some pipeline routes, there are no 
signposts that normally indicate pipeline locations. The pipeline patrol had to mark 
where the routes were and put a new signpost in place. In addition, regulator 
participants said that signposts were not positioned correctly, causing incidents and 
creating uncertainty about pipeline management among field pipeline staff and the 
DBYD team. In addition, one regulator participant said that the database showing 
pipeline locations is not well documented, in particular with reference to those pipelines 
outside of the mainlines. Reflecting on insufficient knowledge of pipeline routes, the 
regulator was concerned that, even themselves, they do not fully comprehend a 
complete picture of pipeline routes. Therefore, regulators cannot inform the public 
about pipeline risks.  
Recent information from the Australian Pipelines and Gas Association (APGA) states 
that the APGA has developed an Australian Pipeline Database (APD). Subsequently, 
APGA has offered it for use by planning authorities and other planning stakeholders 
(Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2016, p. 1). The APGA has passed 
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information about APD on to the Major Hazard Facilities (MHF) Advisory Committee. 
The MHF have been appointed to improve land use buffers around the MHF. Pipelines 
are being brought into consideration by the MHF Advisory Committee for developing 
buffer requirements (Victoria State Government & Planning Panel Victoria, 2015, p. 1). 
The information has been reported as being composed of the pipeline centreline and 
measurement length (Australian Pipelines and Gas Association Ltd, 2016, p. 1), in 
which pipelines outside of the mainlines may not be included. The database needs 
further development and improvement in order to create a complete map including 
pipelines outside of mainlines. Co-operation between pipeline owners and their 
contractual arrangements will be essential.  
Similar databases are available to people outside pipelines in other countries including 
the USA (NH Pipeline Awareness, n.d.; No NEXUS Pipeline, n.d.; Pipeline Safety 
Trust, n.d.-b). The availability of databases has been influenced by catastrophic pipeline 
incidents, non-profit organisations, communities and families where members have died 
from accidents (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, n.d.; Pipeline 
Safety Trust, n.d.-a). In addition, there are non-governmental organisations working 
with communities to provide information about pipeline risks to the public. Pipeline 
regulators in the USA have regulatory mechanisms in place that allow them to engage 
with and listen to the public, lobbyists, and workers, the aim being to reduce 
catastrophic incidents (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, n.d.).  
In Australia, these ‘initiatives’ have little presence as yet. The pipeline industries and 
pipeline regulators have not been forced to take further action to protect the public 
safety and provide information about pipeline risks to the public. In Australia, the 
pipeline industries and pipeline regulators have insisted that the knowledge of pipeline 
risks must not be released to the public because of the likely emotional impacts, cost 
and accountability.  
Some commentators have asserted that there are serious pipeline failures in the USA 
despite the knowledge of pipeline safety available to the public. In addition, public 
interest groups and environmentalists do not lobby pipeline regulators. The regulator 
institution in the USA is the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) (Leven, 2016).  
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The Australian pipeline case is different from the USA for the following reasons: the 
issues are not so much about lack of impact from accidents and the public in influencing 
regulatory initiatives; instead, authorities themselves do not fully comprehend pipeline 
risks. Only a few of my research participants, specifically: certain regulatory, planning 
and industrial participants emphasised the importance of providing information to the 
public. But, one regulator participant insisted, before informing the public: ‘involved 
authorities have to work out what risks are and understand them and know what they 
have to do, then you start informing people. Otherwise, when passing information, the 
people will ask you what the authorities are going to do about it’. Another regulator 
participant raised a concern about security risk if knowledge of pipeline risks is made 
transparent. My empirical evidence indicates that there has been a lack of regulatory 
mechanisms to support the roles and activities of pipeline regulators and involved 
authorities in taking regulatory action to protect the public. The Australian pipeline 
regulators and involved authorities are in a deadlock, each group playing their 
independent regulatory roles and actions to engage with the public and lobbyist groups. 
Because of the above reasons, pipeline risks have become more complex and difficult to 
regulate. What has occurred is that specific knowledge about pipeline risks has become 
uncommon to nearly every group; not only the public, but also to the safety MHF 
regulators, third parties, planning authorities, independent planning panels, developers, 
planning ministers, and energy resource ministers. Even the pipeline industries 
themselves do not fully comprehend pipeline risks in terms of technical knowledge 
about pipeline existence. The pipeline regulators themselves have been inactive in 
ensuring public safety due to lack of support for regulatory mechanisms.  
I argue that instead of blaming public and lobbyist inefficiency, a new regulatory 
mechanism platform for regulating pipeline risks must be developed. The new platform 
needs to establish a regulatory mechanism that offers independent support and co-
operation with others to maintain public safety. In addition, it is necessary to set up new 
ontological stances and new accountability systems of all interested parties in order to 
understand and manage pipeline risks.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has presented how measurement length – a regulatory concept and a non-
human actor has been created by human actors but has had an effect in shaping and 
changing knowledge and practice among human actors in an incoherent way. First, 
although measurement length was developed by experts (i.e. pipeline regulators and 
pipeline industry representatives) with good intention to prevent accidents for the sake 
of public safety, these experts expressed no intention to communicate knowledge about 
pipeline danger related to measurement length with the public. The rationales are 
associated with cost and accountability. The term measurement length itself is a 
misguided one, resulting in the obfuscation of knowledge about pipeline risk, the 
distortion of risk assessment, and ambiguous accountability among actors.  
The effect of enacted measurement length has put pipeline regulators and industry in a 
deadlocked state concerning the management of pipeline risks. They have faced 
difficulties with efficacy in managing their physical-technical controls in attempts to 
regulate pipeline risks with third parties. They have also faced difficulties transferring 
knowledge of pipeline risk to third parties. In addition, they have faced difficulties 
pertinent to the limited availability of databases showing pipeline locations, in particular 
those outside of mainlines which are not well documented.  
In the next chapter, I will discuss how knowledge and practices relevant to risk 
regulation have been shaped through the last relational assemblage – deregulation and 
energy pipeline privatisation.  
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Chapter 7 
The influence of deregulation and energy pipeline privatisation 
on the coherence of power-knowledge practices 
Knowledge and practices involved in the regulation of pipeline risks are produced 
through a web of heterogeneous relationships and assemblages created by and 
associated with elite-expert institutions (see Chapters 4-6). This chapter will explore 
how knowledge and practices in relation to risk regulation have been shaped through 
assemblages associated with neoliberalism, a subject that remains largely unexplored in 
the contemporary literature. By contrast, conventional types of risk agents are described 
in the integrative risk governance framework (Renn, 2008c). The risk governance 
framework is largely silent on how features of the institutional and regulatory 
environment have shaped knowledge and practices in relation to risk regulation. This 
chapter will explore this gap by tracing neoliberalism though empirical analysis.  
Here, neoliberalism is described as a process and, following Foucault, as a rationality of 
governance: a way of thinking that informs the practice of governance. Neoliberalism 
has produced a range of discourses about government that are operationalised through 
specific techniques and entities (see for example: Foucault, 1991; Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Rose, O'Malley, & Valverde, 2006). A range of neoliberal rationalities and discourses 
about government including specific techniques and entities that emerged from 
empirical findings were explored during the research. The question of how they were 
enacted into a power-knowledge network that performs knowledge and practices in 
relation to risk regulation was put to analysis. This was done against the historical 
background of Australia’s energy pipeline industry.  
In most cases, Australian pipeline industries were initially developed as publicly owned 
infrastructure prior to being privatised in the 1990s. Various discourses about 
government, including specific techniques and entities, emerged from the findings. 
They included: (a) discourses about government including deregulation and energy 
privatisation; (b) specific techniques including contractual arrangements, Key 
Performance Indicators (KPIs), red tape reduction, external auditors, and building 
blocks; and (c) other entities including: regulators, pipeline licensees, pipeline engineers, 
pipeline technicians, and the public. 
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This chapter begins with the introduction of existing concepts associated with 
neoliberalism and the discursiveness of power-knowledge, which is a primary concern 
of this thesis (Section 7.1). The question of what neoliberalism is, and how it is related 
to deregulation and energy pipeline privatisation, will be examined in Sections 7.1.1-
7.1.2. Concepts of governmentality, technologies of government, conduct of conduct, 
and governing at a distance (or action at a distance) will be discussed in Section 7.1.3 in 
the context of the underlying rationality of governmentality approach.  
In Section 7.2, I will analyse how deregulation and energy privatisation have been 
enacted into a power-knowledge network to produce risk-safety knowledge and 
regulatory practices in energy pipeline industries. I will ask who has been involved and 
how? In the last Section (7.3), the effects of the heterogeneous and interactive 
assemblages implicated in neoliberalism will be revealed. The following four effects 
that were revealed from findings egress in an unpredictable and uncontrolled way: (a) 
deficits of accountability; (b) the limitations of regulatory actions in mitigating pipeline 
risks; (c) the unavailability of knowledge of services and knowledge of risk-safety to the 
public; and (d) the discontinuity of knowledge transfers among pipeline companies. The 
effects highlight some difficulties faced by regulatory institutions that challenge 
existing concepts including inclusive risk governance.  
In the last section, the question of how neoliberalism has created unpredictable and 
uncontrolled effects will be discussed. Analysis has revealed discourses involving the 
incoherence of knowledge and practices in the process of risk regulation, influenced by 
deregulation and energy privatisation. An outline of this chapter is drawn and presented 
in Figure 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1: The process of analysis and discussion of Chapter 7. 
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7.1 Existing concepts of deregulation and energy pipeline 
privatisation associated with power-knowledge 
This section starts by tracing existing concepts used in contemporary research to 
explore energy in relation to deregulation and energy privatisation, and its association 
with power-knowledge. Castree (2010) states that deregulation and energy privatisation 
are embodied within the neoliberalism concept (p. 1728). The question of what 
neoliberalism is – and how it is related to deregulation and energy privatisation in 
energy research – will be introduced in the following section.  
7.1.1 Neoliberalism  
Neoliberal theory proposes that the well-being of humans can be advanced though an 
institutional-regulatory system that supports free markets, free trade and private 
property rights (Harvey, 2007, pp. 1-2). In its bit to serve neoliberal strategies, the state 
has played its role in creating supportive institutional-regulatory institutions and 
frameworks (ibid). By contrast, state intervention in markets is avoided (ibid). 
Neoliberalism, as well as being perceived as the most powerful ideology in the global 
economy (McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck & Tickell, 2002), has acted to promulgate 
reforms to enhance a free economy under market rules (Peck & Tickell, 2002).  
The dominant criticism of neoliberalism is that it is structured around capitalist power 
relations that exacerbate economic inequalities. For example, neoliberal ideology serves 
market-fundamentalist policy and institutions (Williamson, 2000, p. 251). According to 
Harvey, the policy has been transformed into a system of economic rationality and 
management (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Economic rationality has been used by macro-scale 
institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) 
and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), to open up national economics to 
multinational corporations and global institutions (Larner, 2003, p. 509). Such a process 
is called neoliberal globalisation (ibid) or globalisation (Harvey, 2007, p. 2).  
The dominance of neoliberalism has been widely criticised (see for example: Barry & 
Slater, 2005b; Gibson-Graham, 2006; Harvey, 2000; Jessop, Bonnett, & Bromley, 1990; 
Larner, 2006; McCarthy & Prudham, 2004; Peck, 2001; Rose, 1996a; 1999). The 
perspectives of neoliberal globalisation have been challenged as globalisation scripts 
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(Gibson-Graham, 2006, p. 145) which need to be reconsidered in order to open up space 
for alternative narratives and exploration. Neoliberalism can be interpreted in the 
following three ways: (a) neoliberalism understood as a policy framework; (b) 
neoliberalism construed as ideology; and (c) neoliberalism as a rationality of 
governance (Larner, 2006, p. 200). Among these interpretations, the conceptualisation 
of neoliberalism as a rationality or way of thinking informing the practice of 
government – a conceptualisation drawn from Foucault’s lectures on ‘governmentality’ 
– is most relevant to understanding the discursive and material relations embedded in 
power-knowledge (ibid, p. 206) (see Chapter 2 (Section 2.1.2.3) and further discussion 
in Section 7.1.3). Although neoliberalism is associated with the idea of minimal 
government intervention, government has never really been absent but, rather, re-shapes 
the ways in which it seeks to govern economic arrangements (Barry, Osborne, & Rose, 
1996). 
7.1.2 Neoliberalism in the energy sectors 
So, how does neoliberalism emerge in the energy sectors of Australia? The narratives 
about neoliberalism in the energy sector are similar to the dominant critique of 
neoliberal globalisation. To date, the research has in the main been undertaken in 
Australia’s energy electricity sector, not in its energy pipeline sector. The dominant 
criticism emerging from the energy electricity sector is that neoliberalism is negative. 
This critique is made, however, with a priori assumptions, for example, the assumption 
that neoliberal programmes support elite institutions taking control of energy services 
and setting prices, detrimental to the public interest (Peters, 2012; Quiggin, 2002; 2014; 
Walker & Walker, 2000). Law and Singleton (2014) argue that by utilising a priori 
suppositions, researchers tend to produce one singular narrative, called an ontological 
singularity (p. 387), that may omit unexamined and crucial discourses.  
The dominant critique as discussed above regarding the Australian energy electricity 
industry needs to be contextualised. Chester (2015) contends that there are misleading 
claims about what happens after electricity privatisation regarding impacts on prices by 
both the pro-privatisation side and the anti-privatisation side. Such claims are based on 
ideological positions (Chester, 2015, p. 219). The Liberal Party, business groups and 
others claim that private electricity companies will be more efficient and prices will be 
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lower. Conversely, those against privatisation including the Labor Party and the unions, 
claim that prices will be higher and jobs will be lost.  
In response, Chester (2015) argues that electricity prices are driven by a complex web 
of regulations involving human actors who are involved with regulation (e.g., the 
national regulator (the Australian Energy Regulator (AER)), the market operator (the 
Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO)), and networks of electricity businesses 
including the distribution sector and the transmission sector.  
Apropos of energy industries, research into pipeline industries has been limited, partly 
due to the invisibility of pipelines which are primarily buried under the ground. 
Nevertheless, some research has been undertaken, in particular, where pipelines have 
become more visible, including: (a) when the pipelines have exploded (Hayes, 2014; 
Hayes & Hopkins, 2014a); (b) when pipelines pass through more than one country 
(Barry, 2013; Stulberg, 2012); and (c) when pipeline construction has impacted on 
indigenous communities (Barry, 2013). Pipeline risks in Australia lack visibility; 
therefore, pipeline risks in relation to power-knowledge practices and elite-expert 
institutions are likely to remain undiscovered, an issue that needs to be explored. In the 
next section, I will discuss the existing concept of governmentality and its associated 
concepts. 
7.1.3 Governmentality in governing pipeline risks at a distance 
Traditional concepts involving hierarchies and structures of power envisage government 
as a monolithic state, exercising a linear and singular source of power to control the 
conduct of citizens. Such concepts fail, however, to capture the diversity of political 
rationalities, powers and actions or the complex assemblages of economics, politics, 
society, laws and individuals implicated in governing (Rose & Miller, 1992). 
Traditional concepts are misleading because political power is exercised not by a state 
as such but through various ‘technologies of government’ (ibid, p. 183) and different 
institutional arrangements to indirectly govern economics, society and individuals (ibid, 
p. 174). Governance needs to be understood more broadly, as the ‘conduct of conduct’, 
rather than being seen as the sole province of the state (Foucault, 1982, pp. 789-790; 
Lemke, 2002, pp. 50-51). Conduct of conduct involves authorities, rationalities, and 
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strategies which governments and others use in their attempts to exercise power (Rose 
et al., 2006, p. 101).  
The form of control is diverted: control has become indirect through subtle forms of 
technologies of government. The terminology for this process is ‘governing at a 
distance’ (Rose et al., 2006, p. 89) or ‘government at a distance’ (Miller & Rose, 1990, 
p. 9). The government has developed technologies of government embedded in 
regulatory mechanisms so that they can govern ‘at a distance’ to fulfil their economic-
political strategies to conduct individuals and organisations (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 1).  
The term ‘governing at a distance’ or ‘government at a distance’ has been drawn from 
the concept of ‘action at a distance’ (Latour, 1987, p. 219), a part of Actor Network 
Theory (ANT) in which science and technologies are used by scientific experts to act on 
spatial entities without direct contact (Rose et al., 2006, p. 89). The government (or state, 
or political institutions) use technologies to exercise authority, negotiate, intrigue, 
calculate and persuade persons, places and activities in specific practices (Rose, 1996b, 
p. 43).  
The concepts of governmentality and governing at a distance provide a framework to 
explore political rationalities which underlie neoliberal programmes (see for example: 
Burchell, 1996; Higgins & Lockie, 2002; Lemke, 2007; Lockie, 1999; 2002; O'Malley, 
1996; Ruhl, 1999). The rationality of the governmentality approach is consistent with 
the approach of this thesis albeit I argue that the above concepts can be overgeneralised 
when investigating the power-knowledge struggles of government or the public 
institutions themselves. I have articulated ANT, together with the concept of 
Foucauldian power-knowledge, to expand the understanding of power-knowledge 
mechanisms as influenced by neoliberalism. 
This chapter investigates and maps out how neoliberal rationalities, discourses of 
government (i.e., deregulation and energy privatisation) and neoliberal techniques are 
brought into power-knowledge assemblages, and how they have performed with and 
shaped risk-safety knowledge and regulatory practices in the Australian energy pipeline 
industry. This requires questions vis-à-vis who has been involved and how. The 
enactment (or performing) process of deregulation and energy privatisation will be 
discussed in the next section (7.2).  
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7.2 The performativity of deregulation, energy privatisation, and 
neoliberalism  
Deregulation and privatisation are commonly involved in debate over the restructuring 
of the welfare state (Larner, 2006, p. 199). What are the differences between these two 
discourses about government? Larner (2003) argues that the differences and relations 
involving deregulation and energy privatisation have been rarely discussed and explored. 
Not only have they been inadequately explored, but the techniques of neoliberalism 
used and embedded within them have also been insufficiently investigated (ibid).  
Despite these criticisms, there has been no offer of an alternative theoretical-
methodological approach to explore the differences or relationships between these two 
discourses about government. The underlying reason for this omission may be related to 
how neoliberalism is understood (ibid). In the main, neoliberalism is understood as a 
unified set of policies or a political ideology (Larner, 2006, p. 200). The relational 
process of power-knowledge, deregulation, energy privatisation, and the techniques of 
neoliberalism are absent from such understandings.  
This section aims to bring an alternative explanation of power-knowledge performance 
(or enactment) among regulatory practices, as a performative effect of deregulation, 
energy privatisation, and the techniques of neoliberalism. The concepts of semiotics of 
materiality, ANT and power-knowledge are explored so as to investigate and map out of 
how neoliberal characteristics and neoliberal techniques used in energy sectors are 
performed, and who has been involved and how? 
The term performativity is explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.1.2): a concise reiteration 
introduces this section. Law (2009, p. 150) proposes that: ‘crucial to the new material 
semiotics is performativity’. The term ‘performativity’ refers to: ‘the claim that 
enactments produce realities’ (Law, 2004, p. 162). The ongoing enactment of practices, 
depending on who and what crafts them, produces realities, which is what there is in the 
world (ontology).  
The ontological perspective of ANT is performativity. Following the importance that 
ANT places on non-human entities as equal to human entities (Latour, 1992), subtle 
economic-technological assemblages used in association with deregulation and energy 
were revealed through empirical investigation. I have formulated a new approach that 
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follows both non-human and human in performing risk-safety power-knowledge and 
regulatory practices, also revealing other assemblages in the process.  
Here I call the process of performativity of assemblages in the power-knowledge 
network the translation process of neoliberalism. The translation process is defined as 
‘the continuity of displacements and transformations’ of entities and their relations in 
the process (Callon, 1986, p. 223) (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.1.3). The translation 
process is a political process (Barry & Slater, 2005a, p. 9) by which ‘we understand all 
the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence thanks to which 
an actor or force takes, or causes to be conferred on itself, [the] authority to speak or act 
on behalf of another actor or force’ (Callon & Latour, 1981, p. 279).  
The translation process involves the method of following and analysing assemblages to 
the extent that effects are revealed. As a consequence of using this method, I was able to 
conceptualise how power-knowledge relationships associated with neoliberalism and 
the shaping of regulatory knowledge and practices were performing.  
7.2.1 Deregulation 
Deregulation is considered as one of the characteristics of neoliberalism. The majority 
of arguments centring on neoliberalism involve the impacts of energy privatisation. 
Little attention is given to deregulation. So, what is deregulation? According to Castree 
(2010, p. 1728), deregulation is the process of removing or reducing regulatory 
intervention to increase the ‘freedom of choice’ for energy firms and consumers. The 
findings herein indicate that deregulation contains diverse forms irrespective of the 
‘freedom of choice’ (discussed further in Section 7.2.3). Different forms have 
continually been initiated over time to leverage the financial and human resources of 
pipeline regulators (or technical regulators). Analysis of interviews indicated that some 
forms of deregulation were employed as part of government-industry functions even 
before the energy reforms in the 1990s. For example, some participants (regulators and 
pipeline consultants) stressed that contractual arrangements, as one of the forms of 
deregulation, have been employed by the government since pipelines were first 
introduced in Australia, as well as during the processes of gas discovery and exploration. 
Gas was not able to be commercialised or serviced without strong support from 
government. This policy extended to owning and managing gas pipelines, as well as 
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facilitating land access and supporting gas consumers (Kimber, 2009, p. 1). 
Nevertheless, deregulation has continued until the present throughout the neoliberal 
process. 
7.2.2 Energy privatisation 
Energy pipelines in Australia were involved at the start of the privatisation process in 
the early 1990s (Productivity Commission, 2009, p. 185), promoted by the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 2003). Privatisation was a key component of economic 
reform among the OECD countries (ibid, p. 3) and Australia was one of the leading 
countries that advanced privatisation among the OECD countries (Kain, 1996).  
The process of energy privatisation involved legal and forced changes in energy 
institutions, both public and private organisations, and in managing energy sectors 
(Productivity Commission, 2009, pp. 185-186). The process has transferred the 
management and assets of the energy sector from public hands to privately owned firms 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2003, p. 19). Privatisation 
policies aim to increase energy competition, promote efficiency through private 
ownerships, and decrease government’s burdens in regulating-managing energy sectors 
(ibid). 
The contemporary literature emphasises that the pressure for neoliberal reform in 
energy privatisation was influenced by active external institutional forces at the macro 
structural level. In the 1990s, these included the OECD, development banks and 
international trade agreements. Interviews conducted during this research indicated that 
energy pipeline privatisation was enacted as part of a network effect with no boundaries 
among macro, meso and micro structures. Energy pipeline privatisation did not occur in 
isolation through macro structural reform but was concomitant with a need from the 
Australia states and federal government to gain additional revenue to balance budgets 
and reduce debt (Kimber, 1996, p. 3; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, 2003, p. 8).  
The findings revealed that the neoliberal concept in relation to energy pipeline 
privatisation was performed as part of government-industry functions before and 
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throughout the neoliberal reforms of the 1990s. A regulator participant emphasised that 
pipelines have never been the interest of governments alone. While pipelines may have 
been owned by the public sector, they have been outsourced and managed by private 
companies through a form of sub-contracting of construction, operation and 
maintenance. The form of contractual arrangements is embedded in the neoliberal 
concept of deregulation and privatisation. In addition, state governments and pipeline 
industries have been dependent on each other since gas was discovered, reliant on 
licensing and contractual arrangements with the state governments (Asher, 1999, p. 2).  
The process of investigating the performativity of energy privatisation has revealed 
complex relations between the public actors and economic institutions. Energy 
privatisation has been associated with changes in pipeline ownership, the restructuring 
of institutional arrangements, and legislative action at national, state and local levels. 
These processes drive reforms in relation to selling, buying and regulating energy 
pipelines (see example in Figure 7.2).  
Pipeline consultants contended that the process of transferring pipeline ownership had 
been confusing and messy. The process of transferral involved heterogeneous actors, 
aspects and arrangements including commercial, financial, regulatory, technical safety 
and institutional arrangements. The Council of Australia Government (COAG) – 
mandated to drive economic reform across all sectors of the Australian economy given a 
lack of national or state codes of practice or legislation to regulate the pricing of 
services such as energy – has played a major role in the reform process. In addition, the 
Australian Energy Market Agreement (AEMA) was set up to establish a legislative and 
regulatory framework for Australia’s energy markets. The AEMA established two 
institutions to oversee the Australia’s energy market including the national Australian 
Energy Regulator (AER) and the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC). The 
AER’s role is to monitor and enforce national energy legislation. The AEMC 
undertakes energy market development. The summary of economic-national regulation 
and national market institutions, established to drive energy privatisation, appears in 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.1: Summary of national regulation. 
Regulations Details of regulations 
Australian Energy Market Agreement 
(AEMA) (2004) 
An agreement between the Australian, 
state and territory governments to set the 
agenda for a transition to national energy 
regulation as part of the National Energy 
Market (NEM) 
National Gas Law (NGL) (2008) The NGL replaces the Gas Pipelines 
Access Law and the National Gas Code. 
The NGL established the enforcement 
framework and obligations surrounding 
access to gas pipelines and the gas market 
bulletin board. The gas market bulletin 
board is a website that facilitates trade in 
gas and pipelines by providing information 
on the state of the gas market, system 
constraints and market opportunities. The 
NGL is applied by state and territory 
legislation in New South Wales (NSW), 
Victoria (VIC), Queensland (QLD), South 
Australia (SA), Tasmania (TAS) 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and 
Northern Territory (NT). Western 
Australia (WA) is not covered under NGL.  
National Gas Rules (NGR) (2008) The NGR are enacted under the NGL, 
dealing with the details of the access 
regime and bulletin board.  
Source: Productivity Commission (2009, p. 187). 
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Table 7.2: Summary of market institutions of key relevance to the national energy market. 
Institutions Details of institutions 
Policy  
    Council of Australia Government 
(COAG) (established in 1992) 
The COAG was established to drive 
economic reform across all sectors 
including energy. 
    Ministerial Council on Energy (MCE) 
(established in 2001) 
The sole government institution for 
initiating and developing Australia’s 
energy market policy reform for 
consideration by the COAG. In addition, 
the MCE’s role is to monitor and oversee 
the implementation of energy policy 
reform, agreed to by the COAG.  
Rules development  
    Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC) (established in 2005) 
The AEMC is responsible for the  
rule-making process under the National 
Gas Law and making determinations on 
proposed rules and market development in 
the National Energy Market (NEM). The 
AEMC is funded by the states and 
territories that are party to the AEMA. 
Regulator and market operator  
    Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
(established in 2005) 
The AER enforces the National Gas Law 
and Rules and regulates covered gas 
transmission and distribution pipelines 
(except in Western Australia state). The 
AER is fully funded by the Australian 
Government. 
    Australian Energy Market Operator 
(AEMO) (established in 2009) 
The AEMO merged the roles of the 
National Electricity Market Management 
Company (NEMMCO) with the gas 
market operators in NSW, ACT, QLD, 
Vic, and SA to form a single, industry-
funded national energy market operator for 
both gas and electricity including 
pipelines. In addition, AEMO is 
responsible for the operation of the gas 
bulletin board. 
Source: Productivity Commission (2009, p. 188). 
This thesis emphasises the grounded empirical context where human and non-human 
assemblages enact through networks and change over time. This section draws upon an 
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example of a complex assemblage involving contractual arrangements (see Figure 7.2 
and 7.4). For example, one pipeline can be owned by different entities across different 
geographical levels: either by an international corporation, a national or local company, 
a bank, a state or a combination of them.  
The primary concern of this chapter is to explore how changes in the transferral of 
pipeline ownerships and restructured institutions have influenced risk-safety knowledge 
and regulatory practices in energy pipeline industries. It is important to note that due to 
time constraints and the nature of my research, I did not explore all of the entities, in 
particular, the international entities and some of the national entities. Nevertheless, I 
explored the flow of key actors from international to national and local entities through 
the contractual arrangements of pipeline owners, operators, facilitators and 
subcontractors of pipelines.  
 
 
Figure 7.2: An example of the complex assemblage through contractual arrangement 
Note: The Figure is drawn from interviews. 
7.2.3 Other neoliberal forms or techniques  
Some of the neoliberal techniques were revealed in earlier sections. In this section, I 
will identify the specific techniques and instruments through which deregulation and 
privatisation were operationalised.  
7.2.3.1 Contractual arrangements 
Participants (i.e. regulators, industrial employees and a regulatory expert) identified that 
the contractual arrangements have created stewardship complexity among owners, 
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operators and their contractual chains. The contractual arrangement has resulted in a 
deficit of accountability in regulating-managing pipeline risks (discussed further in 
Section 7.3). For example, pipelines could be owned by an international company, an 
Australian company, a bank, a state, or a combination of these. The owners of pipelines 
and the pipeline operators (the companies that operate pipeline facilities), can be 
different. The owners of pipelines can subcontract their operation and maintenance 
work to operators. The operators can subcontract their work to the facilitator, who 
carries out some administrative work. The facilitator then employs other companies as 
subcontractors to do the operation and maintenance work. The pipeline companies 
outsource their work to contractual chains. This situation is typical because pipeline 
owners cannot manage all their work due to inadequacies of technical skill and 
competency. Nevertheless, risk still intrudes and the question of who will be responsible 
when pipeline failures occur may be difficult to answer. 
The contractual arrangement of pipelines across Australian states can be very 
sophisticated. There are approximately 400 onshore pipeline licenses in Australia 
(Australian Pipeline Industry Association Ltd, 2014). Each pipeline license has a 
different structural arrangement. However, the information, about who owns what and 
how is not readily available to the public. Only regulators and pipeline industries can 
easily access that information. I was not given access to it, despite requesting access 
during an interview session. Nevertheless, based on the available evidence, an 
illustration of stewardship complexity is drawn in Figure 7.2. 
7.2.3.2 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
With the burgeoning of contracts defining relationships between organisations, business 
has turned attention to how to define the success of various undertakings in order to be 
able to link success to economic reward. A common way to address this is to define the 
required outcomes in the form of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). KPIs are largely 
employed among hazardous industries, articulated within the safety literature (see for 
example: Hayes & Hopkins, 2014b; Hopkins, 2008; Hopkins & Maslen, 2015) 
including pipelines. Nevertheless, the KPI practice, as a neoliberal technique, has rarely 
been addressed (Larner, 2003, p. 511). The pipeline companies and their contractual 
chains use KPIs to measure performance in relation to cost, incentives, productivity and 
efficiency. The KPIs are enacted in the contractual agreement and so reflect what is 
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important. The temptation, therefore, is to assume that KPIs represent everything that 
must be attended to, including safety.  
A regulator participant commented that contracts were likely written for high 
productivity, not for regulatory-technical competency. KPIs are not about doing quality 
work but about cost efficiency using indicators such as number of jobs, volume of work, 
number of calls answered, and the number of things responded to. In addition, 
interviews indicated that the use of KPIs is primarily related to financial repercussions 
and the level of incident failures. In the case where a subcontracted company has a 
lower level of incident failures (not about the partial loss of pipeline containment or loss 
of containment), subcontractor companies will not report to the company that contracted 
them or to the regulators because they are concerned about losing their contracts. As a 
regulator participant said: ‘this is synonymous in safety everywhere’ under the 
contractual arrangements. KPIs have been employed to obscure the comprehension of 
incident failures and safety accountability. For example, from a regulator participant’s 
perspective, the lower number of incident failures are important in order to show there 
is monitoring and effective management of controls over incidents.  
Due to the KPI rationales among pipeline owners and their contractual chains, the 
findings suggested that the quality of maintenance and operations on pipelines was 
being compromised. The deficiency of KPIs in relation to contractual arrangements has 
been acknowledged by both regulator participants and industrial participants. Some 
pipeline companies have rethought and attempted to take some work back from their 
contractual chains so that they can have more control and keep improving their in-house 
skills and knowledge.  
The contractual arrangement has become a loophole in the technical regulations 
pertaining to pipelines. The regulators primarily deal with licensees or pipeline owners. 
Regulators do not have adequate time, financial resources, technical skills, or technical 
capacity to check through the actions of pipeline contractual chains.  
7.2.3.3 Red tape reduction 
The term ‘red tape’ refers to excess bureaucracy and regulation that increases the cost of 
business activities (Mazzarol, 2012). Red tape reduction has been used globally to ease 
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the practice of business (The World Bank, 2016). Red tape reduction was an important 
neoliberal technique emerging from interviews. Red tape reduction has been used to 
alleviate the regulatory burden on business from Australian regulations (Productivity 
Commission, 2009). Although the policy on red tape reduction was a particular focus on 
the Australian government for the period September 2013 to September 2015, a review 
of the literature indicates that the red tape reduction was employed earlier than 2013-
2015. It was used in the 1990s as part of the process of energy reform (Productivity 
Commission, 2009), initiated irrespective of political affiliation. Its purpose was to 
enhance regulatory consistency across Australian states and the Commonwealth (ibid, p. 
iv-v). For example, a risk-based approach was proposed to assist regulators to reduce 
compliance costs for firms (Commonwealth of Australia, 2014, p. 13). The findings 
suggested that a risk-based approach is used to leverage resources and negotiate power-
knowledge between pipeline regulators and pipeline companies (see Chapter 5, Section 
5.2).  
Red-tape reduction is commonly understood as a neoliberal term for one way to reduce 
the regulatory burden. This attitude to regulation, that it is a ‘burden’ on industry, 
impacts regulatory practice in other ways. Nevertheless, the question of what techniques 
are used in relation to red-tape reduction within pipeline regulatory agencies has been 
under-addressed. Examples include reduced resourcing levels within regulatory 
agencies and increased use of external auditors (discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.2.2.6 
and later in this chapter, in the next section).  
One OHSE manager indicated that the number of regulators was reduced as a result of 
red tape reduction during the 2013-2015 period. Resource limitations are a typical 
problem for regulators; but, the red tape reduction renders the inspection process more 
risky. Regulators have indicated that they would like to obtain more resources. But, the 
following question is raised: who is going to pay for that?  
Some regulators appreciate the red-tape reduction approach. They agree with the red 
tape regime’s scope because it helps them to target outcomes more than the process. 
Some regulators felt that red tape reduction has allowed them to engage and negotiate 
more with industries instead of using penalties or the force of sanctions. The question is: 
how do regulators know whether pipeline risks have been properly regulated if they 
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have not maintained a sufficient level of inspections as part of the process of risk 
assessment throughout the regulatory system?  
7.2.3.4 External auditors  
The utilisation of external auditors is another neoliberal technique, embedded within the 
risk-based regulatory practice of AS2885. It has been described as part of a light-handed 
approach to regulation, favoured by both regulator and industrial participants. 
Regulators have employed the light-handed approach to leverage their resources, 
capacity and accountability. In light-handed regulation, firms are pursued with less 
action and intervention from regulators. Regulators are unlikely to go out to inspect 
pipeline companies’ activities and they avoid approving pipeline companies’ safety 
documents. The approval process is associated with accountability. Without approval, 
regulators do not share accountability when something goes wrong, leaving pipeline 
licensees accountable. The onus is then on pipeline companies to do the right thing and 
convince regulators that pipeline companies have got safety systems in place that work 
reliably and safely.  
External auditors are employed in some Australian states. Despite the benefits of light-
handed regulatory practices, there are some drawbacks according to participants both 
regulators and industrial participants. Some concerns regarding external auditors are 
related to conflicts of interest because external auditors have been paid by pipeline 
companies, as required by regulators in some states. For this reason, one regulator and a 
minority of pipeline industry staff have commented that external auditors and pipeline 
companies may misrepresent risk by manipulating the inspection report. More 
importantly, there has been no process of intervention from third parties to monitor the 
relationship among regulators, external auditors, and pipeline industries. Some external 
auditors commented that the quality of external auditors can vary and their suggestion is 
that it may be best for regulators to employ their own auditors but paid by the pipeline 
companies.  
7.2.3.5 Building blocks 
A building block is one of the neoliberal-economic techniques employed to forecast the 
cost of services over a regulatory period (Asher, 1999, p. 18). How the technique is 
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associated with safety practice in pipelines is underexplored in the existing literature on 
risk, safety and regulation. This section will begin by defining building blocks before 
analysing their relationship with safety-regulatory practice.  
Generally, a building block is a technique used to calculate the maximum allowable 
revenues (MAR) of pipeline companies. The MAR are the prices or revenues that 
pipeline companies are allowed to collect. Should they collect more than the specified 
amount of revenue each year, they are obliged to call in economic regulators. 
MAR is the sum of the return on capital, the return of capital, and operating and 
maintenance expenditure. The depreciation and returns are calculated over the life of the 
pipeline assets. The building block is presented as the following equation:  
MAR = return on capital + return of capital + operating and maintenance expenditure 
(O&M) 
MAR  = (WACC * WDV) + D + O&M 
where  WACC  = weighted average cost of capital 
WDV   = written down (depreciated) value of the asset base 
D   = depreciation allowance  
O&M   = operating and maintenance expenditure (including 
administrative costs) 
Considering the definition and the economic equation, as described above, the discourse 
of safety-regulatory practice in relation to the building block is relatively absent. 
Evidence from interviews indicated that the majority of technical regulators, with few 
exceptions, do not acknowledge the influence of the building block and its calculative 
practices on safety-regulatory practice.  
The building block was sarcastically explained by a technical regulator participant, who 
had a background in economics, as ‘very simple accounting’. It is ‘depreciation, return 
and your operating costs’, but it is misused. The cost that has been negotiated among 
economic regulators, technical regulators and regulatees is the cost based on operating 
and maintenance costs. Some commentators have pointed out that economic regulators 
are not interested in setting the operating and maintenance expenditure forecasts (Asher, 
1999, p. 19). Economic regulators can introduce the operation and maintenance costs as 
an unnecessary regulatory risk (ibid, Fletcher, Kimber, & Venton, 2004, p. 2). In 
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circumstances where the cost of operation and maintenance is necessary, according to 
economic legislation under privatisation reform, economic regulators can pass the cost 
on to users, consumers or the public.  
The interviews with pipeline regulators showed that economic regulators and technical 
regulators work independently in regulating pipeline industries – rarely cross-checking 
each other’s work. The majority of technical regulator participants pointed out that they 
have never suffered intervention by economic regulators.  
An issue around cost-cutting in pipeline maintenance work manipulated by economic-
regulatory practice was alluded to by an integrity engineer, who said that some assets 
may be sold because of unprofitability. In these cases, the new owner may try to make 
an asset more profitable by deliberately cutting costs on maintenance of the asset. 
A number of participants insisted that cost-cutting on safety management could occur in 
both direct and more subtle ways, and at least one regulator participant stressed that it 
did not necessarily occur through deliberate manipulation of the building block 
framework. In other words, the relational assemblages in which building blocks, cost-
cutting and safety are enmeshed can go unacknowledged by regulatory institutions. 
The safety cost was explained by a manager of a sub-contractor company as a ‘hidden’ 
cost with no money allocated to it: 
Safety is something that’s always absorbed into people’s businesses, no-one 
quotes for a job and says it’s going to cost you $20,000 to build this and I’m 
going charge you another $5,000 for safety stuff, it’s not written anywhere, 
no-one ever sees it, it’s very hidden, so it’s hard to justify it and everyone 
fits it into their business somehow, they cost it out in their budgets and it all 
gets fitted in. 
The question is: how do regulatory inspections assess safety and the potential for cost 
cutting when these are treated as ‘hidden costs’ in contractual arrangements and how is 
this practice of treating them as ‘hidden costs’ related to the building block framework 
managed by economic regulators? There is no process of intervention to check either 
the hidden costs or the interventions of economic regulators in technical regulators. 
Thus, the knowledge and practices in regulating pipeline risks and maintaining public 
safety could be incoherent between economic regulators and technical regulators.  
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More importantly, the analysis above has shown economic regulation to be its own 
black box. While the full impact of this black boxing cannot be determined from this 
research, it can be suggested that the process hides the cost of safety and provides 
incentives to keep this cost as low as possible. This does not mean, however, that 
pipeline companies will necessarily underinvest in safety. Rather, what it does mean is 
that the regulatory system does not have a clear process in place to ensure safety 
expenditure is adequate. 
7.3 Complex stewardship structures: the unpredictable and 
uncontrolled effects of neoliberalism 
On the surface, the concepts of governmentality, conduct of conduct and governing at a 
distance might be used to comprehend the empirical findings of this chapter. For 
example, deregulation, energy privatisation and neoliberal techniques can be 
summarised as ‘technologies of government’ (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 1). Technologies 
of government are an aspect of economic-political rationality relevant to the concept of 
governmentality. They are a diverse set of regulatory mechanisms employed by 
government to indirectly conduct individuals and organisations (ibid). Regulatory 
mechanisms are employed by governments so that they can attempt to govern at a 
distance to fulfil their political-economic strategies aimed at controlling individuals or 
organisations (Miller & Rose, 1990, p. 1).  
This pipeline case, nevertheless, is different. Interviews of regulators and industrial 
participants have revealed effects from assemblages associated with neoliberalism. The 
effects indicated the difficulties that regulators and pipeline companies face when 
managing pipeline risks. The effects have shaped knowledge and practices in the 
process of risk regulation. Four of the effects that emerged from the interviews are 
performed as consequences of the complexity of stewardship structure including: (a) 
deficits in accountability (discussed in Section 7.3.1); (b) regulatory actions in 
mitigating pipeline risks (discussed in Section 7.3.2); (c) the process of knowledge 
distribution and services to the public (discussed in Section 7.3.3); and, (d) the process 
of knowledge transferral among pipeline engineers and pipeline technicians (discussed 
in Section 7.3.4). These issues were identified by both regulators and industrial 
participants.  
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My research indicates that the effects of neoliberalism are performed in an 
unpredictable and uncontrolled way. Unpredictable outcomes affect not only individuals 
and the public but especially public institutions and pipeline companies. Where 
regulators have become inactive in dealing with the effects of neoliberalism, public 
institutions are in a situation of uncertainty in relation to the adequacy of regulatory 
strategies that rely on ‘action at a distance’ (or ‘governing at a distance’). Public 
institutions now face higher levels of unpredictability in relation to the control of risk 
due to the precarious regulatory regimes they have built around the rationality of 
neoliberalism.  
7.3.1 Deficits of accountability 
So, are the deficits of accountability a consequence of contractual arrangements? 
Analysis of interviews as part of this research revealed that these consequences can lead 
to situations where nobody is accountable if pipeline failures occur. However, according 
to law, some parties are always legally accountable including technical regulators and 
pipeline licensees. This is because contractual arrangements involve a complexity of 
stewardship structures of pipelines among owners, operators and their contractual 
chains (referred to in Section 7.2.3.1, and Figure 7.2). Some technical regulators 
acknowledged such complexity: others did not.  
I asked the question: who will be responsible if there are pipeline failures? Both 
regulators and industrial participants insisted that the ‘licensee’ will be responsible 
based on the extant laws. I subsequently traced, analysed and then asked the questions: 
what is a licensee and does the definition by law refer to the complexity of pipeline 
stewardship structures? The findings indicate that the term ‘licensee’ is incoherent 
among regulations across Australian states and the 2007 AS2885 revision. For example, 
according to the AS2885 revision definition, a licensee is: 
1.6.27 Licensee 
The organization responsible for the design, construction, testing, 
inspection, operation and maintenance of pipelines and facilities within the 
scope of this Standard. The Licensee is generally the organization named in 
the pipeline licence issued by the Regulatory Authority (Standards Australia, 
2012a, p. 14). 
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According to the definition above, the licensee is an organisation under the regulatory 
authority within each state. The definition of licensees has been widely debated by 
regulators and pipeline companies, in particular, by those who have been involved in the 
Australian Pipeline Standard AS2885. The question of who the licensees are can 
become ambiguous when the ownership structure is made more complex through 
contractual arrangements. The companies who own the pipelines are not always the 
companies who operate the pipelines. The debate has resulted in changes to the 
definition of licensee during the AS2885 revision in 2013. The term has been amended 
in 2015 to:  
1.5.4 Licensee 
The entity that the regulatory authority holds accountable for the pipeline. 
NOTES: 
1. The Licensee may or may not be the pipeline owner and may or may not 
be a licence holder under legislation. 
2. The Licensee may be a different entity at different points in the pipeline 
life cycle from design through construction to operation and abandonment 
(Standards Australia, 2015, pp. 1-2). 
While the new definition is more flexible than the earlier version, it is also more open to 
opportunity for debate or change. Although regulator participants emphasised that 
licensees will be responsible if a pipeline explodes due to their duties as defined in 
legislation, the new definition can become ineffective under a realm of stewardship 
complexity, for example, where deregulation and energy privatisation hold sway. 
Licensees can become muddled as a result of the complex structure of pipeline 
ownerships where the owners of pipelines can be an international corporation, a bank, a 
local company, a state, or a combination of these. 
The increasingly complex structure of pipeline ownerships leads to a strategy of ‘risk 
shifting’. This concept describes a situation where the responsibility of employers is 
shifted to those at the bottom of contractual chains: subcontractors and workers who are 
assumed to carry out actions to ensure safety because of concern about their own safety 
(Gray, 2009, p. 327). Regulators have failed to proceed with legal prosecution to 
mandate employer responsibility because regulatory frameworks and enforcement are 
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not sufficient for multi-tiered contracting arrangements (Quinlan, Hampson, & Gregson, 
2013, p. 285). The concept in one sense can describe the case that has emerged from 
this thesis. For example, based on the empirical findings of this thesis, interviews 
indicate that international corporations and banks can exercise attitudes and strategies 
when doing business and considering issues of risk and safety that are different from 
what authorities expect. They may not respect local laws and authorities. More 
importantly, technical regulators cannot prosecute international companies who own 
pipelines but technical regulators can prosecute anyone within their own state.  
Apart from the inability to prosecute international companies, some of the regulator 
participants insisted that if anything goes wrong, they will be unable to deal with any of 
the contractual chains of licensees as some of the contracts are not enforceable by law. 
Based on participants’ (regulators, industrial staff and a regulatory expert) observations, 
when catastrophic incidents involving hazardous industries have occurred, the owners 
usually pass the responsibility on to contractors and subcontractors, even though by law 
safety responsibility cannot be contracted out. It may be that the deficits and complexity 
of accountability and legislation will only be revealed in public when a catastrophic 
incident occurs. 
The technical regulators are unable to govern effectively at a distance when regulating 
pipeline risks due to the complexity of pipeline stewardship structures. A regulator 
expert stated: ‘this is going to be a whole new thing in terms of risk’. This whole new 
thing in terms of risk has a cause. The deficits of accountability are more complex, 
uncertain and ambiguous beyond what Renn (2008c, pp. 74-78, 165) delineates in terms 
of risk characteristics in his concept of integrative risk governance. Risk 
characterisation is classified on the basis of technical types of risk agents. The types of 
risk agents include technologies, nature, and environment (including nuclear energy, 
dams, large-scale chemical facilities, earthquakes, Genetic Modified Organisms (GMO), 
nanotechnology, volcanic eruptions, new infectious diseases, and climate change) (ibid). 
Risks instigated by neoliberalism in relation to energy are beyond the scope and cannot 
be applied in the direct approach of risk governance. Risk governance, therefore, needs 
to take account not only of the types of risks involved, but also of the institutional and 
regulatory environment in which governance is enacted. 
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The consequences of stewardship complexity lead not only to deficits in accountability, 
but to intervention in risk-safety knowledge and practices throughout regulatory 
processes, discussed in the following sections (Section 7.3.2 to 7.3.4).  
7.3.2 The limitations of regulatory action in mitigating pipeline risks 
The findings showed that regulators have faced difficulties in mitigating risks as 
indicated by unpredictable effects and influenced by neoliberalism. In particular, 
difficulties have occurred between interconnected pipelines where two state authorities 
are involved in managing one interconnected pipeline under a complex stewardship 
structure. For example, a pipeline is owned, operated, and maintained by companies 
located in different geographical locations. The owners of pipelines are in one state and 
the operators, as well as contractors and subcontractors are in another state (Figure 7.3).  
 
Figure 7.3: Illustration of one interconnected pipeline located between two state authorities under a 
complex stewardship structure. 
The difficulty is that regulators in each state have different requirements; nevertheless, 
the operator only wants to follow one state, not the other. The reason is relevant to cost 
and conflict of interest. As one participant regulator stated:  
probably because it is cheaper…that would be one of the reasons why they 
wouldn’t want to comply, if it’s more expensive, when I say more 
expensive, it depends on the size of the operation or what would be required 
to upgrade say the pipeline to meet the requirements. If they change the 
technical specifications, how do you upgrade a pipeline? Do you replace it? 
I mean it might be something literally as the pipeline’s got to be replaced 
every x years or something. I don’t know about gas pipelines, how long they 
last for. I imagine they last for quite some time. But presumably you’ve got 
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to do constant checks to make sure you haven’t got leaks and all that sort of 
thing. Now if the requirements of [one state] are more rigorous than [the 
other] they’d be more expensive to implement. It’s a conflict of interest. 
The discussion of this issue is illustrated by using a diagram, illustrating a contractual 
chain (Figure 7.4).  
 
Figure 7.4: Illustration of a contractual chain.  
Regulators have faced difficulties in accessing information about operation and 
maintenance work when the pipeline crosses the border between states. Regulators face 
less difficulties when the owner, the operator and their contractual chains are located in 
one state; or, when the owner, the operator and their contractual chains are in a different 
state but owned by the same company. When the structure of ownerships is complex 
and where a pipeline is owned, operated and maintained by different companies and 
located differently in two states or more, the situation becomes what I term ‘precarious 
conduct of conduct’.  
When regulators have to deal with the mess of stewardship complexity in a pipeline, 
regulators have difficulties accessing information about operation and maintenance due 
to manipulative strategies employed by companies under the complex structure. 
Companies can make the information unavailable, uneasy to access, or it may take a 
long time. Although the information may be finally presented, that can be too late to 
prevent pipeline accidents or explosions. This is an example of a precarious regulatory 
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regime. The government has become ineffective in using their own technologies of 
government, shaped through neoliberalism.  
7.3.3 Knowledge about services is unavailable to the public 
A regulator participant commented on the monetary charge for providing the 
information (requested by regulators) about the operation and maintenance of pipeline 
companies: 
If I apply to [Company E] they don't own the information, they have to 
apply to [Company D] who then have to apply to [Company F] to supply 
that information. Every time that you apply for something that contractor 
will put a charge on that cost of retrieving that information. Company F, 
they will charge [Company D] and then [Company D] will put a charge back 
to [Company E]. So every step there’s an 18% charge.  
The above interview emphasises that the complexity of contractual arrangements leads 
to a ‘gouging’ process where each company within that complex structure takes 
advantage of the other (Figure 7.4). The charge is usually debited to customers as 
indicated by a regulator participant:  
It’s called the deregulation of the energy industry and what they’re saying is 
consumer pays, but the way the companies are being structured, they’re 
paying a far higher cost in price for the consumable goods or the services 
they’re receiving through indirect management structure. 
A regulator participant indicated that each company demands profit rather than 
delivering best services to consumers, the public or users. Such ‘gouging’ has been a 
normal practice since well before the neoliberal reform of the 1990s and has continued 
until the present throughout the neoliberal process. A regulator participant stated:  
Yeah, it’s quite commonly referred to in the industry as gouging. What it 
does is an entity such as ... any entity, it’s like the old pyramiding system 
which was outlawed in the 80s where you pay a certain amount of money to 
one person, they pay a certain amount to another person and instead of a 
service costing $100 it ends up costing $350 for a very simple service. So 
the consumer is getting ripped off. 
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The public, consumers or users are those who pay for the additional cost. For example, 
a regulator participant said that when customers face problems related to cost or 
maintenance issues (for example, when the gas has been cut off or needs to be fixed) 
they lack information about which institutions can provide a solution. The customers do 
not know who to talk to. In addition, the company can charge for the service provided 
without telling the customers what they are paying for. At the same time, the customers 
do not ask about those costs because the additional cost has been made a normal 
practice by the technologies of government. 
The problem is that there is no regulatory mechanism available to intervene in the 
gouging process (see Section 7.2.3.5). The regulators and the government are in a 
situation involving a precarious regulatory regime or a situation of precarious conduct 
of conduct wherein they cannot control the effects of stewardship complexity. In 
addition, together with limited financial resources, limited human resources and time 
constraints, regulators do not inspect throughout the contractual arrangements. In sum, 
the regulatory knowledge and practices are shaped by an effect of stewardship 
complexity which is performed through the process of neoliberalisation. 
7.3.4 Discontinuities of knowledge transferral among pipeline companies  
In addition to the public and public institutions, pipeline engineers and pipeline 
technicians also face difficulties in accessing and knowing about risk-safety knowledge. 
The complexity of stewardship structure through contractual arrangements has shaped a 
series of deficits of safety knowledge transference.  
7.3.4.1 Risk-safety knowledge has been lost during the hand-over to new 
owners  
Although in minority, a number of experienced regulators and industrial participants 
reported that knowledge in relation to risk and safety was lost when a change of 
ownership occurred. This occurred prior to the pipeline reforms in the 1990s, and 
happened after the pipeline system was built by a contractor company and handed over 
to government. In addition, there have been cases where pipeline ownership has 
changed through several owners over time. A technician working in that pipeline 
contended that procedures and documents have been left by the wayside and old safety 
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procedures were not saved. The technician was assigned to re-write the procedures as 
the relevant documents had been lost. Thus, he was tasked with the job of finding who 
had used that equipment and writing it up from scratch. 
7.3.4.2 Discontinuities in transferring safety knowledge between pipeline 
engineers and pipeline technicians 
Gas pipelines cover long distances. The companies and the structural divisions are 
diverse and located in different locations. For example, one pipeline may have several 
pipeline stations and control office centres (see Figure 7.5). Certain industrial 
participants, who manage the operation and maintenance on-sites, emphasised that they 
did not have engineers they can consult on-site. The pipeline technicians rely on the on-
site manager’s knowledge (not engineers with educational training). A manager who 
works in a subcontracted company revealed that previously there were engineers on-site 
with whom they could share knowledge. The situation has changed towards one of 
higher risk.  
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Figure 7.5: An illustration of pipeline stations and control office centres (Goldfields Gas 
Transmission Pty Ltd., 2014, p. 6) 
In association with the discontinuation of the transfer of knowledge between pipeline 
engineers and pipeline technicians, another problem was raised during an interview with 
a technician participant. He said that apart from having good engineers on site, he would 
prefer to have another technician who could co-work and double check his job and co-
make decisions with him. The technician worked on-call; and on one occasion had to fix 
a compressor station by himself in the middle of the night. He personally considered a 
compressor station a complex piece of equipment, dangerous and expensive. The case 
not only involved a discontinuity of knowledge transfer between engineers and 
technicians, but also involved a lack of sharing of risk-safety knowledge and 
responsibility in relation to costs and management. 
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7.3.4.3 Knowledge is not shared among pipeline technicians and training 
systems lack structure 
Analysis of the interviews in this research indicated that the training system became less 
structured after energy privatisation. Because of the complexity of the stewardship 
structure, new technicians and potential managers of operations and maintenance have 
been assigned to learn through an online system, as a result of resource constraints 
related to the geographical landscapes of companies. There has been little interaction 
with trainers and others. In addition, when technicians, who work on a field site have a 
problem, they rely on the knowledge of their senior peers. The industrial participants 
suggested that some of the ‘senior staff’ did not have much experience due to a high 
turnover within pipeline companies. Thus, some of the ‘senior staff’ who had been 
assigned to train the new staff had been working for the company for only a few years. 
One technician participant admitted that he had not mastered pipeline knowledge and 
that he himself was still learning. In addition, one field manager indicated that 
technical-pipeline knowledge was not shared between different sites in the same 
company. The reason was that the company had been in a transitional period of handing 
over pipeline assets and was restructuring pipeline management.  
In sum, the structure of contractual arrangements (as an effect of the neoliberal process 
of deregulation and energy privatisation) has led to deficits in the transferral of safety 
knowledge between pipeline engineers and pipeline technicians and between pipeline 
technicians themselves. Such deficits, together with the limitations of online training 
systems and cost constraints, may lead to greater risk and catastrophic pipeline 
accidents.  
A question is that we do not know how many companies have faced this kind of 
situation. In addition, with limited resources and capacity, regulators have become 
incapable of checking through the entire process. This is another situation of precarious 
conduct of conduct, or uncertainty of governing at a distance: regulators are bound to 
precarious regulatory regimes. In the process, both technologies of government and 
regulators have been made less capable of regulating pipeline risks. 
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Conclusion 
Neoliberal reforms that have proliferated since the late 20th century have had major 
impacts on the regulation of energy pipelines. The projects of privatisation and 
deregulation have been operationalized via a number of techniques and entities 
including contractual arrangements, KPIs, red tape reduction, external auditors, and 
building blocks, technical regulators, economic regulators, pipeline licensees, engineers, 
operators, technicians, contractors, and subcontractors. However, while the broad thrust 
of these reforms is to encourage government ‘at a distance’, several factors hamper the 
ability of regulators to regulate effectively. As part of neoliberal reforms, deregulation 
and energy privatisation have been aggravating factors, creating new types of risks. The 
new types of risks are less predictable and controllable by regulators, including: (a) 
deficits of accountability; (b) limitations of regulatory action in regulating pipelines; (c) 
limitations in public knowledge about additional costs charged for consumable goods or 
services, about which institutions they can approach for advice, and about the 
appropriate steps to take for repairs when the gas has been cut off or requires fixing; and 
(d) discontinuities in risk-safety knowledge transfer between pipeline engineers, 
pipeline field managers and pipeline technicians.  
Accountability has been made ambiguous as a result of stewardship complexity from 
contractual arrangements through deregulation and energy privatisation. As a 
consequence of contractual arrangements, knowledge of risk and safety has been made 
unavailable to different groups of actors. Technical regulators have faced difficulties in 
mitigating pipeline risks, in particular when pipelines pass through interconnected states. 
The regulators have become less effective in accessing knowledge about risk and safety 
of both the operation and maintenance of pipeline companies. The public lack 
information about an additional charge for services and they do not know where they 
can seek solutions. Furthermore, contractual arrangements have impacted negatively on 
the continuity in transferring safety knowledge among pipeline engineers and pipeline 
technicians. 
The above unpredictable and uncontrollable effects reflect the precarious situations of 
regulatory regimes, in which regulators have been made less capable through the use of 
their neoliberal techniques and strategies to shape the conduct of pipeline companies, 
their own authorities, and individuals. They have become less able to govern at a 
 223 
distance through their technologies of government. Neoliberalism has negatively 
moulded the precarious ‘conduct of conduct’ and uncertainty of ‘action at a distance’ 
(or uncertainty of governing at a distance).  
The new risks associated with neoliberalism have led to an increase in the incoherence 
of knowledge and practices throughout the process of risk regulation. The incoherence 
of knowledge vis-à-vis risk and safety and regulatory practices can result in an increase 
in pipeline risk that variously pose a threat to workforces, the public and those who 
work and live around pipelines.  
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Chapter 8 
Performing new power-knowledge practices in a precarious 
regulatory regime  
This chapter discusses how to improve processes of risk regulation with the goal of 
achieving better regulatory outcomes. It will begin by addressing the challenges 
emanating from the empirical findings (see Section 8.1). The first challenge concerns 
incoherence of knowledge and practices in the process of risk regulation, shaped by the 
series of assemblages described in Chapters 4-7. Another challenge, associated with the 
key argument of this chapter, emerges from the suggestions of interviewees about how 
to improve regulatory practices and effectiveness. The implications of these interviews 
will be analysed to assist in remediating the incoherence of knowledge and practices 
pertinent to risk regulation.  
In an attempt to overcome limitations stemming from incoherence, the findings will re-
theorise the ontology of risk (discussed in Section 8.2). The process involving the re-
theorisation of the ontology of risk not only concerns ‘what is’ but also ‘who has been 
involved’, and ‘how’? In other words, the ontology of risk is viewed as a relational 
process. The ontology of risk proposed here realises the power relations in regulation. 
The method of re-theorisation is inspired by ANT and the concept of Foucauldian 
power-knowledge, exploring and following whoever and whatever are associated and 
disassociated in producing knowledge and practices that are related to regulatory 
outcomes in the process of risk regulation (referred to as power-knowledge practices). 
The ontology of risk will be used as a starting point to discuss and analyse potential 
improvements in the process of risk regulation which may lead to improvements in 
regulatory outcomes (see Section 8.3).  
In the last Section (8.3), I argued that in order to improve the process of risk regulation, 
the process of power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation must be performed 
differently. Here, I offer a process of new performativity in three stages. The first stage 
(Section 8.3.1) is to re-arrange the ontology of risk. I discuss the first stage by using 
examples from the findings to re-arrange: (a) ontological-epistemological logics; (b) 
process safety; (c) public safety; and (d) unacknowledged assemblages associated with 
invisible risk. The second stage involves co-performing power-knowledge practices 
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with other actants outside of the traditional form of power relations so as to strengthen 
the process of co-regulation involving regulators and industries. In order to co-perform 
power-knowledge practices with others outside of the conventional ones, the following 
three concepts are proposed: (a) rearranging the ontological identity of actors; (b) 
developing the concept of deliberative democracy; and (c) developing the concept of 
hybrid regulatory forum. The last stage involves the process of co-accountability, 
discussed in Section 8.3.3. 
The outline of this chapter is drawn and presented in Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1: The process of analysis and discussion of Chapter 8. 
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8.1 Proposals for the improvement of regulatory practices and 
effectiveness 
This thesis challenges mainstream criticism that targets regulatory experts (or ‘elite-
expert institutions’) and technical-regulatory approaches to regulating risk (discussed in 
Chapters 1 and Chapter 2). Such criticisms have black boxed the exploration of 
assemblages behind power mechanisms employed by regulatory institutions, the 
mechanisms that have shaped the knowledge and practices of regulators and their 
impact on regulatory outcomes. 
The failure to explore these assemblages, knowledge and practices leads this author to 
propose a key research question: who and what entities are involved as regulators 
perform their power-knowledge practices and how have these relationships shaped 
knowledge and practices in relation to regulatory outcomes? In the process of 
investigating these questions, the research themes involving an incoherence of 
knowledge and practices in the process of risk regulation were revealed (as summarised 
in the conclusion section of Chapter 4-7 and in Table 8.1). Knowledge and practices 
have been performed by a precarious web of assemblages associated with elite-expert 
institutions, grouped into four sets of relational assemblages (see Table 8.1, discussed in 
Chapters 4 to 7). 
Table 8.1: Four sets of relational assemblages that shape knowledge and practices in the process 
of risk regulation.  
 
Sets of relational assemblages  
(non-human and human) 
Research themes 
involving incoherence 
of knowledge and 
practices 
The first set 
(Chapter 4) 
Different assemblages, 
emerging from 
geographical space 
and social-political 
levels (i.e., 
international, national, 
state and local 
councils), that have 
influenced power-
knowledge and 
practices of each 
Australian state across 
Australia. The 
Regulators and 
industries, 
interacting as 
interconnected 
bodies. 
Pipeline regulators 
have certain ways of 
thinking and doing, 
theorised as their 
ontological-
epistemological logic. 
The logic is embodied 
in taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the 
control and regulation 
of risk. These 
constituent 
assumptions are 
 227 
assemblages are 
associated with: 
accidents and their 
impacts, resources, the 
salary system, 
industrial policy and 
activities, 
organisational 
structures within 
regulatory 
departments, styles of 
auditing process, the 
safety plan approval 
process, disclosure of 
information about 
industrial pipeline 
performance written in 
the form of annual 
reports over regulatory 
departments websites, 
changes in technical 
specifications, and 
deregulation and 
energy privatisation.  
inadequate in dealing 
with the multiplicity 
and incoherence of 
regulatory practices 
across Australian 
states and territories. 
In addition, the 
harmonisation of 
pipeline regulations is 
constrained in the face 
of such multiplicity 
and incoherence.  
The second 
set (Chapter 
5) 
Regulatory 
apparatuses (i.e., 
safety plans (PMS and 
a safety case) and risk-
based frameworks), 
and contemporary 
concepts of social 
control (i.e., risk 
governance, including 
tripartite engagement 
and workforce 
engagement). 
Groups of pipeline 
industries working in 
different divisions, 
interacting with 
regulators and 
unions. 
- What has been 
written on a safety 
plan is disassociated 
from field safety 
practices.  
- Pipeline professions 
are unfamiliar with 
union engagement; 
workforce is engaged 
in assessing risks at 
their personal safety 
(low risk level) and 
not involved with 
assessing major 
hazardous risks (high 
risk level). 
The third set 
(Chapter 6) 
Measurement length 
as  
a technical-regulatory 
AS2885 specification 
in regulating pipeline 
risks. 
The interaction 
between two 
interconnected 
bodies with other 
human entities 
involved with public 
safety around the 
danger zone of 
pipeline risks. The 
entities include: 
- Knowledge about 
pipeline dangers and 
pipeline risks are 
incoherent among 
actors. 
- The practice of risk 
accountability and risk 
assessment towards 
pipeline risks is 
distorted. 
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planning authorities, 
groups doing 
activities near a 
pipeline easement 
(e.g. local councils, 
underground utility 
companies (e.g. 
electricity 
companies, 
communications 
companies, water 
companies), 
developers, builders, 
their contractors and 
subcontractors, 
landowners and the 
public)  
(see Figure 6.5). 
- The practice of risk 
communication is 
muddled. 
- Knowledge of 
pipeline risks is 
uncommon and made 
uncommon.  
The fourth 
set (Chapter 
7) 
Neoliberal 
rationalities, 
discourses about 
government (i.e., 
deregulation and 
energy privatisation), 
and neoliberal 
techniques (i.e., 
contractual 
arrangements, KPIs, 
red tape reduction, 
external auditors, and 
building blocks). 
Multiplication of 
human actors, 
including pipeline 
licensees, pipeline 
owners and their 
subcontractors, 
technical regulators, 
and economic 
regulators. 
Inequality among 
actors in knowing and 
accessing risk-safety 
knowledge: not only 
affecting regulators 
but also pipeline 
engineers, pipeline 
field managers, 
pipeline technicians 
and the public. 
 
 
Such knowledge and practices were revealed to be even more challenging than those 
raised by conventional critiques, in particular, when seeking concrete and practical 
solutions for regulators to improve the process of risk regulation so as to mitigate 
pipeline risks and improve regulatory outcomes.  
This section focuses on challenges for the improvement of regulatory practices and 
effectiveness. The second key question of this thesis: how can the process of power-
knowledge in relation to risk regulation be improved, is the subject of examination here. 
Participants suggested ways to improve regulatory practices and effectiveness, based on 
their knowledge. The themes to emerge were based on empirical data, in accordance 
with ‘what’ needed to be improved; how regulators can improve it and who needs to be 
involved (see Table 8.2).   
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Table 8.2: Proposals for improving regulatory practices and effectiveness, based on participant 
knowledge. 
Areas for improvement raised by 
participants 
Proposed methods of improvement raised 
by participants 
Technical aspects  
1. Technical competency  Training 
 Training arrangements through law 
enforcement 
 Establishing relationships with industry  
 Learning by attending industrial 
conferences 
 Employing consultants who are approved 
by regulators to conduct third party 
reviews 
2. Database of regulatory knowledge  Documenting what has been undertaken 
through communication with regulatory 
teams 
3. Learning from incidents Sharing with industries information about 
root causes  
4. Improving management of change Undertaking a process of risk assessment 
5. Learning from process plants Focussing on Major Accident Events 
(MAE), focussing on safety critical 
elements 
6. Improving the quality of HSE 
professionals who work with workforces 
and managers 
HSR professionals need to have 
qualifications and skills 
7. Improving workforce knowledge of 
safety systems 
7.1 Informing workforces about safety 
cases with specific information, rules and 
reasons as to why the rules are important 
rather than writing generic motherhood 
statements 
 7.2 Making the process of safety systems 
easier for workforces to use 
8 Improving the risk assessment process 
with workforces 
Assessing risk by involving with 
workforces using workforce terms and 
processes, for example, participating with 
them in the field rather than doing risk 
assessment by bringing in the workforces 
for demonstrations in offices. 
9. Improving knowledge of pipeline 
dangers, especially around pipeline 
easements and measurement length  
9.1 Facilitating and cooperating by 
governments to set up regulatory 
enforcement 
 9.2 The co-production of a safety 
management study between pipeline 
companies and third parties, in particular, 
the underground services.  
 9.3 Using and understanding a safe work 
method statement that explains the 
230 
process of digging a hole and avoiding 
physical contact near pipeline assets 
 9.4 Posting a letter about DBYD in 
relation to pipeline dangers to every 
house 
Regulatory aspects  
1. Changing the external auditing process Regulators need to hire their own 
auditors and approve auditors’ work by 
themselves 
2. Doing more field audits N/A 
3. Harmonised pipeline regulations Involving third parties to oversee and 
mandate the review of regulation 
4. Understanding the roles of regulators 
by ethical considerations 
N/A 
5. Cooperation between two acts of law: 
Pipeline Acts and Work Health and 
Safety Act 
N/A 
6. Learning from other countries, in 
particular, those in the North Sea (UK, 
Norway).  
N/A 
7. Changing the process of submitting 
and reviewing a safety plan 
N/A 
8. Emphasis on using a more prescriptive 
approach and adopting a stringent 
approach in the wake of deregulation and 
privatisation  
N/A 
Organisational aspects  
1. Changing organisational structures  Re-arranging organisational structures 
2. Having leadership roles and cultures N/A 
3. Increasing salary of regulators  Collecting a fee from industries 
Social-regulatory aspects: tripartite 
engagement (or union engagement) and 
workforce engagement 
 
1. Union engagement  1.1 Engaging unions as part of the 
workforce groups, not just treating unions 
as a third party 
 1.2 Rearranging the definition of unions: 
unions are more than just union officers: 
they include all of the workers who are 
union members and work in the 
workplace 
Social-regulatory aspects on workforce 
engagement 
 
2 Workforce engagement 2.1 Involving workforces in decision-
making processes so that they take some 
ownership of safety operations 
 2.2 Setting up conditions in respect of 
health and safety by including Enterprise 
Agreements  
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 2.3 Empowering ‘health and safety 
representatives’ (HSRs) to be de facto 
inspectors, assisting regulators to monitor 
and regulate risk. This needs to be 
supported by the federal government 
Note: N/A refers to not-applicable. No proposed solutions where raised for these items. 
The research themes concerning regulatory improvement in accordance with 
participants’ views were broadly organised into four categories: technical; regulatory; 
organisational and social-regulatory aspects with reference to tripartite engagement (or 
union engagement) and workforce engagement. The majority of suggestions, 
nevertheless, were relatively limited within the first three aspects although they were 
associated with each other. The interviews indicated that participants are rarely focussed 
on the last category (social-regulatory aspects).  
The overall recommendations concerning technical aspects include: improving the 
database of regulatory knowledge; learning from accidents; learning from process plants; 
and improving the management of changes. The primary suggestions were shared as 
expert knowledge between regulators and the pipeline industry, for example, a regulator 
participant stressed:  
I think the biggest thing we can do to improve [the knowledge of 
regulators], is exposure to industry. Spend more time actually out there with 
the people learning about it. … To learn how their plant works, to 
understand the intricacies of it. So we’re not just coming in as someone to 
stand back and point at things so we understand what’s happening as part of 
the process. That’s probably where the biggest knowledge improvements 
can occur. 
Some participants including regulators, industrial participants and external auditors, 
additionally, suggested further improvement of knowledge already held by workforces 
about safety systems and risk assessment, and knowledge of pipeline dangers and 
measurement length associated with third parties. Nevertheless, these suggestions are 
focussed on technical aspects. Workforces need specific information, rules and guidance 
about the gist of operating in a safe manner. The suggestion vis-à-vis the social aspects 
of engaging workforce in co-producing safety plans was rarely addressed by 
participants. A regulator participant highlighted: 
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The gap is a safety case which is implemented that actually has an impact, 
their awareness that it has an impact and writing it in such a way that it’s 
actually useful to the guys on the tools, so it is to the point and, you know, 
‘These are the rules that you need to comply with and this is why it’s 
important.’ So, give them something specific rather than generic 
motherhood statements. ‘We will operate in a safe manner,’ doesn’t mean 
much, or ‘PPE’. You need some specifics. ‘Don’t drive your car into the 
hazardous areas,’ you know, ‘Make sure your gas tester is tested every day 
to do this and this and this and this and this.’ The actual useful stuff. 
Similar to the process of improving the knowledge of actors in relation to pipeline 
easements and measurement length, in the main the participants’ suggestions were 
focussed on technical-regulatory aspects, and not on involving actors in co-performing 
knowledge and practices. Various technical tools were suggested including: (a) 
facilitation and cooperation by governments to set up regulatory enforcement; (b) 
employing a safety management study and a safe work method statement; and (c) 
providing information about DBYD to every household. The process of co-opting 
stakeholders into the decision-making process pertinent to risk identification, risk 
assessment, and risk regulation has been given little attention by the majority of 
participants. This reflects the ontological-epistemological logic articulated by pipeline 
regulators (as discussed in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1, summarised in this chapter in Table 
8.1, and the subject of further discussion in the next two paragraphs). The knowledge of 
risk, safety and regulatory practices is shared and influenced by two interconnected 
bodies: pipeline regulators and pipeline industries. Pipeline regulators rely on the 
knowledge, skills and activities of pipeline industries. 
The suggestions regarding regulatory aspects and organisational aspects were narrowly 
focussed. The regulatory aspects include: the auditing process; doing more field audits; 
harmonising pipeline regulators; emphasising the use of a prescriptive approach; and 
increasing the level of regulatory stringency. The last recommendation was emphasised 
most strongly when dealing with deregulation and energy privatisation. The 
organisational aspects include change in organisational structures, leadership roles and 
cultures, and salary increases for regulators. 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, it was uncommon for regulators and 
industrial participants to focus on improving social-regulatory aspects: tripartite 
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engagement (or union engagement) and workforce engagement. These improvements 
were only recommended by a few participants who are union officers. In one case, a 
union officer advised that it was necessary to re-define what a ‘union’ is and what it 
does. He contended that the union is not a third party, confined to union officers who 
work in union offices, but the term ‘union’ refers to all of workers who are union 
members working in the workplace. Companies need to be involved with workforces in 
the decision-making process so that workforces can feel like part of the decision-making 
and that they have ownership of safety matters. In addition, conditions concerning 
health and safety can be included in an Enterprise Agreement.  
Another union participant urged improvement through empowering the roles and 
capacities of health and safety representatives (HSRs), becoming ‘…de facto 
inspector[s]’, assisting regulators to monitor and regulate risks so as to enhance the 
implementation of safety systems and outcomes of health and safety without ‘having to 
provide the resources in-house’. The union member said:  
But if you’ve got an embedded HSR, that is a sponsored agent of the 
regulator, they should have under law … And they can work with the other 
HSRs and management and they can have the right, if they see anything 
wrong with these contractor companies, in the way that they manage health 
and safety, they can trigger an inspection, investigation or review from the 
regulator. … and if they find anything that they think needs addressing, 
immediately they can notify the regulator and say come here. Because what 
that does is it gives the regulator tentacles. It gives them greater coverage.  
The union emphasised that the process of being ‘a de facto inspector’ requires support 
from a ‘courageous federal government’. The alternative is that it could be triggered by 
‘a horrible major event, where not only is there loss of life, but there will be serious 
damage to [the] economy’.  
Although engaging unions and workforces is useful and regulators can gain benefit, 
regulators and industries feel uncomfortable about engaging with them. The overall 
suggestion about how regulators can improve technical knowledge falls into the realm 
of ontological-epistemological logics (discussed in Chapter 4). Regulators are focused 
on improvements that utilise specific technical-regulatory aspects and specific groups 
within the tradition of a regulatory network. They rely on industry knowledge with an 
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emphasis on establishing relationships with industries. Among participant regulators’ 
suggestions, engagement with non-conventional actors (discussed in Section 8.3.2.1) 
was largely not mentioned. Participant regulators neither address nor note issues 
associated with their own power-knowledge practices; in particular, where regulators 
have been subtly and indirectly captured by industry using regulatory logics and 
practices (as a new form of regulatory capture (see Chapter 4, Section 4.1.2)).  
Although there was advice suggesting that regulators can learn from other countries, 
especially the UK and Norway, none of the participants provided concrete advice on 
how to learn from these countries and in what way. The question of what is so unique 
about the regulatory regimes in UK and Norway that leads to successful outcomes was 
not addressed. Instead, participants merely asserted that the UK and Norway regimes 
are progressive because both countries have longer experience. A regulator pointed out 
that: ‘[t]he UK and Norway have been doing this sort of stuff in the North Sea for 60/70 
years. They are usually considered the best’. 
In one way, perhaps suggestions regarding the methods proposed by participants can be 
applied directly as policy amendments. Nevertheless, the challenge is that they may not 
be in line with – and be insufficient to cope with – the incoherence of knowledge and 
practices that persist throughout the regulatory processes. Such incoherence is defined 
as the sense of becoming disassociated through fragmentation and obfuscation around 
the processes of risk identification, risk assessment, risk communication and risk 
accountability (summarised in Table 8.1). This definition emerged during the analysis 
of my findings (discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4.3). Pipeline risks are the 
performative effect of negotiating processes of multiple interactive assemblages, and the 
trend, although subtle, is towards greater risk. Risks are associated with issues of 
power-knowledge. On this basis, the question of how can the process of power-
knowledge in relation to risk regulation be improved (or, how regulators can improve 
their regulatory practices and effectiveness) requires an in-depth analysis and 
exploration, in particular concerning the issues of ontology of risk in relation to power-
knowledge practices. 
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8.2 Ontology of risk in association with power-knowledge practices 
The extensive literature on improving regulatory practices and effectiveness in the 
process of risk regulation has focussed on a paradigm shift and regulatory reform 
through conditional strategies (or pre-requisites) attached to regulatory regimes (see for 
example: Lindøe et al., 2014). The well-known risk governance framework exemplifies 
the paradigm shift from government to governance. Risk governance provides a series 
of stages (i.e. pre-estimation, interdisciplinary risk estimation, risk characterisation, risk 
management, and risk communication and participation) (Renn, 2014, pp. 11-29) for 
setting up a communicative dialogue with main actors and other stakeholders, in 
particular, the interested public, about being adversely impacted by technological risks 
(ibid, p. 30). But, none of the regulatory literature focuses on changes in the ontology of 
risk or on subsequent changes in the performance of power-knowledge practices. 
Despite risk governance underlining the issues of power relations in regulating 
technological risk, risk governance theorists do not trace and re-trace the ontology of 
risk in relation to power relations. This thesis argues that, in cases where risk is not well 
understood, risk governance has been limited in improving regulatory practices and 
effectiveness, resulting in ineffectiveness in improving the process of risk regulation.  
The existing forms of regulatory practices and effectiveness (regulatory outcomes) used 
by pipeline regulators and pipeline industries need to be performed anew. As discussed 
throughout this thesis, the existing forms of regulatory outcomes are shaped by four 
relational assemblages (summarised in Table 8.1). The existing concept of regulatory 
effectiveness primarily refers to the good safety records of pipeline industries (discussed 
in Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2.1), embedded within the extant ontological stance (discussed 
in Chapter 4, Section 4.1.1.2).  
The process of performing a new form of power-knowledge process in relation to risk 
regulation so as to improve regulatory outcomes, justified earlier in this chapter, will be 
discussed throughout the remainder of this chapter. In brief, the process is to re-arrange 
the ontology of risk, co-perform power-knowledge practices with non-conventional 
actors so as to enhance co-accountability in regulating risks. The process is articulated 
with Actor Network Theory (ANT) rationalities, a concept of discursive power-
knowledge, deliberative democracy and six criteria of a hybrid regulatory forum (i.e., 
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equality, transparency, clarity, intensity of collaboration, openness, and quality of 
arguments).  
The findings of this thesis illuminate an alternative strategy related to the ontology of 
risk with contributions and inspiration from Actor Network Theory (ANT). ANT offers 
an analytical approach that can tackle ontological issues pertinent to regulation which 
are relatively unproblematised in the current theoretical literature on risk. The process 
of tracing the ontologies of risk implicit in various regulatory strategies has been a goal 
of this thesis. Without tracing the ontologies of risk related to power relations, what is 
being black boxed and what is assumed are not open to question. Therefore, a strategy 
of tracing the ontology of risk is fundamental as it questions what regulators do to treat 
risk in order to regulate it. Or, it asks not only what is the object of regulation, but also 
who has been involved in the process of risk regulation and how?  
The ontology of risk is dynamic; performed as a variable and relational effect in 
association with power-knowledge practices. The new strategy of the ontology of risk 
proposed in this thesis is built on both realist and constructivist perspectives that emerge 
through the process of unpacking the dualist character of risk in regulatory practice. 
Such an ontology of risk recognises the active role of risk regulation in producing risk 
both materially and discursively. Further, such an ontology of risk articulates how 
greater recognition of the dual character of risk might improve risk regulation in general 
and in relation to the pipeline industry more specifically.  
Zinn (2016) incorporates ontology into risk theory, surmising that the relationship 
between risk calculation and accident prevention is paradoxical. The concept of risk 
itself, the techniques through which risk is calculated and managed, and associated ideas 
such as the precautionary principle do not stop people from undertaking potentially 
hazardous activities. On the contrary, they enable and encourage us to undertake 
activities that may seem otherwise to be unknowably and unmanageably dangerous. 
Risks may be deemed acceptable in light of the material gains they offer and risks may 
also be considered as ends in their own right – signifiers of identity, power and control 
(Zinn, 2017). 
Risk regulation thus plays a key productive role in the construction and operation of 
hazardous facilities including gas pipelines. Further, as the findings of this thesis show, 
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risk regulation is performed through the interaction of myriad actors involved materially 
and discursively in shaping the notion of risk in practice.  
To regulate risk more effectively, this thesis proposes a reconfiguration of risk ontology. 
Drawing from the findings, risk characteristics are claimed to include incoherence, 
multiplicity and negotiation arising from the interactive effects of relational-
heterogeneous assemblages in regulatory networks (discussed further in Section 8.2.1-
8.2.3). The ontology of risk involves multiplicity and negotiation due to its production 
from incoherences within regulatory knowledge and practice both material and 
constructed. This thesis argues that by recognising risk regulation has these 
characteristics it becomes possible to develop a more inclusive concept of risk that can 
enable better ways to deal efficiently with risk. Such an ontology of risk is open for 
discussion, and for negotiation. Finally, examples of how the ontology of risk can be 
reconfigured in practice are in Section 8.3.1.   
8.2.1 Multiplicity 
The ontological multiplicity of risk was discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. For example, in 
Chapter 4, the findings revealed multiple and interactive non-human and human 
assemblages influencing power-knowledge practices. The dynamic assemblages are 
located at different social-political levels including international, national, state and 
local levels.  
The findings emphasise that each Australian state has different interactive assemblages 
performing power-knowledge practices, reflecting the ontological multiplicity of risk 
(see Table 4.2). Other examples of the ontological multiplicity of risk are discussed in 
Chapter 5. The findings reveal that the field safety practices employed to manage 
pipeline risks are different from those written in safety plans and submitted to regulators 
(discussed in Chapter 5). The field safety practices articulate with knowledge held by 
collective workforce groups. On the other hand, a safety plan is used by regulators and 
some external auditors to inspect pipeline industries. The different forms of safety 
practices reflect the multiple forms of managing and regulating pipeline risks employed 
and acknowledged by regulators and industrial actors within pipeline organisations.  
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8.2.2 Negotiation 
The ontology of risk involves negotiation. The ontology of risk emerges from a 
negotiating process of risk identification, risk assessment, risk communication and risk 
accountability. How risk is identified, assessed, communicated and made accountable is 
the result of the transactions of interactive entities throughout the negotiating process 
(or process of translation) (discussed throughout Chapter 4-7, summarised in Table 8.1). 
Pipeline risks are negotiated among actors through multiple entities across Australian 
states, through the establishment and implementation of safety plans, safety regimes and 
safety concepts, and through the implementation of measurement length, deregulation 
and energy privatisation.  
8.2.3 Incoherence (or disassociation) 
The nature of risk as multiplicity and negotiation is an effect of incoherence in 
regulatory knowledge and practice. In other words, the background characteristic of risk 
is incoherence. Such a characteristic was exposed throughout Chapters 4-7, summarised 
in Table 8.1. First, the multiplicity of the ontology of risk, described in Chapter 4, 
reflects a situation whereby regulatory practices are incoherent across Australian states. 
The ontology of risk is incoherent not only among pipeline regulators across Australian 
states, but also among actors within the pipeline industry (e.g., pipeline owners, pipeline 
contractors, pipeline subcontractors, pipeline engineers, field pipeline managers and 
field pipeline technicians), and among actors outside of pipeline industries and 
regulators (e.g., unions, the public, planning authorities, planning ministers, and 
developers). For example, Chapter 5 presented evidence for the incoherence of safety 
knowledge and practice among actors. Chapter 6 presented an incoherence of 
knowledge and practice about pipeline dangers among actors in risk accountability, risk 
assessment and risk communication. Last, Chapter 7 presented how knowledge and 
practice among these actors has become incoherent as shaped by neoliberalism. Such 
incoherence suggests that regulatory effectiveness is compromised because actors who 
should participate in decision making resist enrolment in regulatory networks. Reasons 
for this resistance include: (a) the current ontological stance of regulators; (b) 
unfamiliarity with union engagement; (c) mundane use of safety concepts between 
process safety and personal safety; (d) different sets of safety legislative frameworks 
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and institutions; (e) the obfuscated meaning of the blast zone through the use of 
‘measurement length’; (f) fear of public alarm if the public know about a danger zone of 
pipelines; and (g) insufficient knowledge about pipeline routes. To conclude, this 
incoherence of knowledge and practice are regulatory problems in the Australian energy 
pipeline industry and undermine regulatory effectiveness.  
8.3 Performing new power-knowledge practices in relation to risk 
regulation  
The extant ontology of risk, as it emerges from empirical findings in association with 
power-knowledge practices employed when regulating pipeline risks, is composed of 
three dynamic elements: multiplicity, negotiation and incoherence. The three 
ontological elements of risk contradict the ontological-epistemological logics of 
interconnected bodies, regulators and industries as discussed in Chapter 4 and 
summarised in Table 8.1.  
The ontological-epistemological logic identified in Chapter 4 is static and unable to 
cope with the multiplicity, negotiation and incoherence of the ontology of risk. 
Regulators have been captured by their own ontological-epistemological logic, a logic 
build around their understanding and regulating of pipeline risks, as a subtle and new 
form of regulatory capture. However, regulators are rarely aware of this new form of 
regulatory capture. In the Australian pipeline case, although scholars have highlighted 
the independence of regulators’ roles and actions as a crucial element in improving 
regulatory practices and effectiveness, the findings imply less independence and more 
dependence among regulators. The challenge is: how can regulators increase their 
independence and at the same time maintain their close relationships with industries? 
The constraints, in turn, can be the subject of research intending to improve the 
processes of power-knowledge practices that by extension will improve regulatory 
outcomes. I suggest three stages of improvement, discussed in Section 8.3.1-8.3.3. 
8.3.1 Re-arranging the ontology of risk regulation 
The first step is to re-arrange how risk is conceived within regulatory practice. 
Accepting that risk is characterised by multiplicity, negotiation and incoherence can 
facilitate a different way of regulating risk. A different way of understanding risk can 
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shape alternative approaches to regulating risk. One may ask: how can such a term as 
the ‘ontology of risk’ be interpreted by the regulatory community? I propose that the 
questions of who has been involved, what concepts have been used, and how power-
knowledge practices have been performed must be considered and investigated through 
the process of inspection. The ontology of risk is, therefore, dependent on the enactment 
of those ‘what’ and those ‘who’ questions in performing power-knowledge practices. In 
other words: 
• What are the regulatory tools used to identify, assess and communicate risk? 
• What are the rationales of using such tools? 
• What are the objectives of using such rationales and tools?  
• Who has been involved in the process of identifying, assessing and 
communicating risks through those tools? 
• What might alternative tools be? How are they different from the existing tools? 
How can such alternative tools help regulators to achieve positive outcomes 
compared to the tools that regulators currently use?  
The process of how to re-arrange the ‘ontology of risk’ in practice will be discussed 
drawing upon examples that have emerged from this thesis. 
8.3.1.1 Example 1 (Chapter 4): ontological-epistemological logics in 
regulating pipeline risks  
As suggested earlier, regulators are unlikely to improve regulatory practices and 
effectiveness without reconsidering their ontological-epistemological logic. 
Rearrangement of the ontology of risk as multiplicity, negotiation and incoherence will 
assist regulators to investigate pipeline risks differently. For example, regulators will 
ask questions in a different way with those whom they inspect and communicate with 
(e.g., industries, consultant companies, external auditors). Regulators may focus their 
questions around what, who and how, for example:  
Multiplicity: How do you assess risks and in what ways?  
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 How many ways do you have to access risk? 
 What tools and strategies have been using in assessing risk in your 
own practices? 
 What are the rationales behind the tools and processes of assessing 
risk? 
 What has influenced your field safety practices, apart from the tools 
and rationales you have been using? 
 What are the other tools and strategies that have been suggested in 
the safety plans? 
Negotiation: Who has been involved in the process of risk identification, risk 
assessment and risk communication?  
 Who has not been involved in the process of risk identification, risk 
assessment and risk communication? 
Incoherence: What are the similarities and differences between field safety 
practices and the practices written in the safety plans? 
 What tools and strategies do you think are needed in assessing 
risks? 
Such questions will assist regulators to go beyond their objective technical perspective, 
mapping out their in-depth analyses with other dimensions including social, economic 
and political dimensions. This example shows how the ontology of risk in relation to 
power relations may be rearranged in practice: the power relationships among and 
between regulators, industries, consultant companies, external auditors etc. throughout 
regulatory processes being emphasised. 
Regulators must triangulate with those who have not been formerly involved, but have 
nonetheless been affected by, pipeline risks. Regulators can begin by communicating 
with others (e.g., those who write safety plans, field pipeline staff, managers of the 
operation and maintenance division, as well as the OHSE division and unions). These 
others will become enrolled in what become new assemblages. This will allow 
regulators to re-arrange the existing power-knowledge practices throughout the 
processes of risk identification, risk assessment, risk communication and risk 
accountability. Regulators will not only be able to expand and rearrange their own 
knowledge and practices in regulating risks and build trust with others, but regulators 
can use this alternative knowledge and new practices to negotiate their resource and 
technical skills. 
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8.3.1.2 Example 2 (Chapter 5): ontology of risk around process safety  
This example presents how the ontology of risk may be rearranged in practice by 
focussing on the power relationships involving regulators and the use of process safety. 
This is different from the existing process safety literature where indicators are the main 
focus.  
The empirical evidence indicates that regulators have focused on process safety 
indicators, not on personal safety indicators (as discussed in Chapter 5). Although a 
distinction between the two safety concepts has been helpful in that it emphasises the 
prioritisation of appropriate indicators to assess major hazardous risks (see for example: 
Hopkins, 2009), this distinction has increased the incoherence of knowledge and 
practices in the process of assessing pipeline risks. Collective pipeline workforces have 
contributed little towards identifying and assessing pipeline risks. On the other hand, 
pipeline risks, at the process safety level, have not been properly communicated to 
collective workforces. Therefore, the disassociation reflected in the distinction between 
the two safety concepts can interfere with changes in the ontology of risk regulation.  
This thesis contends that restructuring the ontology of risk in a way that addresses the 
incoherence of process and personal safety may help regulators to re-organise safety 
concepts in relation to safety procedures. However, questions remain concerning which 
indicators need to be included and who needs to be involved in identifying and 
assessing risks and re-analysing the safety concepts. The reorganisation of the process 
of risk identification and risk assessment will improve the way risk is communicated, 
which should result in the reduction of pipeline risks. The processes of re-analysing 
safety concepts and the distinction between process safety and personal safety may 
subsequently be dismantled in favour of shifting the focus to the questions of what 
major hazardous risk is and how to prevent it. 
This shift in focus will result in changes in how risk is assessed. There will be 
exploration, expansion and inclusion of new actors (previously excluded) involved with 
major hazardous risk in the process of risk assessment; and controls already put in place 
will be revisited. The shifting focus and exploration will allow a shift of power-
knowledge practices critical to assessing risk. It is likely that inequalities in knowing 
and accessing knowledge of risk and safety will be reduced among actors. Nevertheless, 
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one may argue that according to the existing legislative framework, technical regulators 
do not have responsibility for worker safety, only process safety. How can they be held 
accountable for this? The argument is framed under traditional forms of power-
knowledge practices with a routine and uncritical approach to the existing regulatory 
knowledge and practices (see Chapter 5, Section 5.3). I argue that the routine and 
uncritical approach of technical regulators needs to be re-arranged. This will involve co-
performing their power-knowledge practices with non-conventional actors and 
articulating with alternative concepts (see Section 8.3.2.). 
8.3.1.3 Example 3 (Chapter 6): ontology of risk in regulating the 
incoherence of pipeline risks around public safety  
This third example explains how the ontology of risk can be rearranged to recognise 
relationships between regulators and practical knowledge that are pertinent to pipeline 
risk and public safety. As evidenced in Chapter 6, knowledge about pipeline risks 
relevant to public safety is incoherent among associated parties. One of the reasons for 
this incoherence is the obfuscation of what a ‘measurement length’ is, established 
primarily by pipeline experts enacting the measurement length in AS2885, and pipeline 
licensees with whom regulators are closely associated. By rearranging a new form of 
ontology, regulators may find a new way to communicate risk and cooperate with others 
outside of the regulator-industry binary. Examples of other actors that emerged from 
interviews include independent planning panels who act in a way that suggests their role 
as ‘interactors’, and actors who practice in the regulatory institutions including safety 
regulators, economic regulators, and even pipeline regulators across states. Unless they 
can engage in a process of co-performing power-knowledge practices with other actors, 
regulators will remain ensconced in traditional forms of power-knowledge relationships, 
limiting their capacity to identify, assess and regulate risk. The co-performance of 
power-knowledge practices with others will be elaborated later (in Section 8.3.2). 
8.3.1.4 Example 4 (Chapter 7): ontology of risk in regulating 
unacknowledged assemblages associated with invisible risk 
This example emphasises the rearrangement of risk ontology through relationships 
between regulators and broader trends in governance such as deregulation and 
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privatisation – assemblages that are positioned outside of conventional safety 
knowledge and practices and which may lead to increased risk. These assemblages are 
reflected in specific techniques and practices including contractual arrangements, KPIs, 
red tape reduction, external auditors, building blocks and other entities. The interaction 
of these assemblages with pipeline industries has created a new form of risk, which has 
not been empirically documented in contemporary research.  
In the process of re-arranging the ontology of risk, regulators will be aware of new types 
of risks which may emerge in any situation with the potential to precipitate energy 
pipeline accidents. For example, one of the emergent findings of this thesis is that at 
least a few regulators are aware that their regulatory practices are shaped and 
constrained by contractual arrangements, a practice that can result in a complex form of 
stewardship complexity among pipeline actors (discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.2). 
A technical regulator revealed that he was unable to access information about operation 
and maintenance from pipeline licensees who own pipelines that cross more than one 
state. To overcome this difficulty, regulators need to answer further questions about the 
influences that obstruct them when accessing information, and about who else has been 
impacted by such influences. For example, a few regulators raised their concerns in 
relation to consequential outcomes from highly a complex pipeline ownership structure. 
They indicated that: (a) members of the public face difficulties when seeking 
information about the additional charges for their consumable goods or services, or 
where to seek advice about relevant gas repairs; and (b) pipeline engineers and 
workforce collective groups face difficulties with the continuity of knowledge 
transferral on risk-safety among them.  
To conclude, new types of risks which are unacknowledged and unimagined can emerge 
when regulators rearrange their ontology of risk. Rearrangement will assist regulators in 
being aware of new types of risks. New types of risk can emerge during the process of 
asking questions during regulatory inspection. For example, questions can be asked of 
who has been involved in and who has not been involved in the regulatory process of 
risk identification, risk assessment and risk communication, and what are the influences 
of obstructing them from the process?  
Those who have not been involved in the regulatory process are considered non-
conventional actors (examples of non-conventional actors are presented in Table 8.3). 
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Regulators need to include non-conventional actors in a co-performance of power-
knowledge practices to rearrange the existing form of power-knowledge practices in 
risk regulation both formally and informally (discussed further in Section 8.3.2), with 
the goal of improving regulatory practices and effectiveness.  
8.3.2 Co-performing power-knowledge practices in co-regulating risk  
The second step in improving the process of risk regulation is to employ the concept of 
co-performativity (or co-production) of power-knowledge practices in regulating 
technological risk. The process of co-performing knowledge with others outside of the 
dominant groups has been emphasised extensively in the existing literature that deals 
with risk problems (see for example: Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016; Lindøe et al., 2014; 
Mansbridge, 2003; Niemeyer, 2004; Renn & Schweizer, 2009; Wong, 2015). However, 
I argue that without further development in the ontology of risk, the mechanisms of 
conventional power-knowledge practices may repeat in the same cycle involving the 
same political actors. And, it may negate the possibility of better outcomes in regulating 
risk.  
This thesis provides new insights into gaps in the existing knowledge by expanding on, 
from empirical evidence, alternative concepts in the ontology of risk related to power 
relationships – known as multiplicity, negotiation and incoherence. Based on this 
alternative view, risk can be performed anew through an ongoing and negotiated 
process among interactive assemblages. When re-enacting both human and non-human 
actors, the process of re-arranging the ontological identity of actors in a way that 
eschews conventional and hierarchical forms of power-knowledge in favour of 
discursive power-knowledge assemblages is a pivotal step (discussed in Section 8.3.2.1). 
8.3.2.1 Ontological identity of actors: from conventional and hierarchical 
power-knowledge forms to discursive power-knowledge assemblages 
In the process of re-arranging the ontological identity of actors, I propose that the 
concept of power-knowledge is defined as a performative effect rather than as an 
existing property, as articulated in this thesis – by utilising ANT together with 
Foucauldian power-knowledge. The transition of power-knowledge as a performative 
effect can assist regulators in dismantling and re-arranging the conventional and 
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hierarchical notions of power relations towards discursive power-knowledge 
assemblages. The new form of discursiveness of power-knowledge assemblages can 
assist regulators to connect and communicate with those who have been excluded from 
conventional power relationships.  
Actors who are omitted can be diverse and are not limited to the public or affected 
groups – as generally suggested in the literature on risk from science and technology 
(Callon, 1999; Callon et al., 2009; Callon & Rabeharisoa, 2008; Chilvers & Kearnes, 
2016; Wong, 2015). The tendency to address only public and affected groups at the 
expense of others can become problematic because it can limit the exploration of actors 
outside of conventional actors. Some non-conventional actors were discovered in this 
thesis. They are either those who are involved with and attempt to voice the position of 
affected groups, or those who are part of regulatory and industrial institutions. An 
example of a non-conventional actor is the independent planning panel, referred to as an 
interactor (discussed in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.2)).  
The concept of the discursiveness of power-knowledge assemblage can assist regulators 
to recognise the diversity of actors who are outside of the conventional network with 
whom regulators are familiar. The multiplicity of actors has been captured by semiotic 
materiality ANT (see Chapter 4-7). I have categorised these actors into two groups: 
conventional actors and non-conventional actors (presented in the Table 8.3). Besides 
co-producing knowledge and practices in risk regulation with conventional actors, 
regulators need to re-enact non-conventional actors in the process of co-performing 
knowledge and practices in regulation. This way, regulators can assist in the distribution 
of power-knowledge relationships, which should lead to improvement in how 
technological risks are identified, assessed, communicated and made accountable. 
Table 8.3: Examples of conventional and non-conventional actors. 
Groups  Types of actors  
Conventional actors  
 Some members of pipeline companies (e.g., managers 
who are at the higher levels of pipeline organisations 
involved with the process of developing, writing, and 
submitting safety systems and the process of managerial 
arrangements and safety) 
 AS2885 committee 
 External auditors 
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 Consulting companies undertaking pipeline design, 
writing safety plans, and conducting Safety 
Management Studies (SMS) 
 Pipeline lobbyist groups 
 Developers, local councils, land use planners and 
planning authorities, who have been in association and 
communication with conventional actors (e.g., pipeline 
companies, AS2885 committee) so as to be persuaded to 
maximise separation from pipeline assets  
Non-conventional actors  
Interactors OHSE industrial team connected with workforce groups 
 Independent planning panels connected with the public 
 Pipeline patrol operators and pipeline technicians 
connected with the public 
 Workplace health and safety representatives 
 Researchers who have undertaken research into 
Australian pipeline industries 
Silent actors Workforce collective groups who work for pipeline 
industries (e.g. pipeline field managers, pipeline patrol 
officers, pipeline technicians) 
Affected actors The public who live and work within and close to the 
measurement length zone 
 The vulnerable groups whom live, study and work 
within or close to the measurement length zone; 
including schools, hospitals, aged care facilities and 
prisons (described in Chapter 6, Section 6.1, 6.2.1) 
 Workforce collective groups who work under 
contractors and sub-contractors for ‘third party groups’ 
(described in Chapter 6, Section 6.1) 
Unwelcome actors Unions 
Other regulators Safety regulators regulating major hazardous facilities 
 Economic regulators 
Other actors managing 
catastrophic accidents, or 
with an interest in them 
Emergency response actors 
Media  
So, who are these non-conventional actors? I have sub-categorised non-conventional 
actors into six categories, including interactors, silent actors, affected actors, unwelcome 
actors, other regulators, and other actors managing catastrophic accidents or expressing 
interest in them such as emergency response teams and media. They are a diverse cohort: 
some of them work in the pipeline industry; some are independent; and some have 
changed their identity. I have arranged them into diverse categories to avoid a 
dichotomy trap (e.g., laypeople and experts, as discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2), 
and actors who have been categorised as stereotypical victimised groups by the existing 
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literature (e.g., laypeople, the public, communities, workers, non-governmental 
organisations) (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).  
The interactors, who are defined in Chapter 6 (Section 6.2.2), are crucial because they 
sympathise with affected actors and silent actors, and they attempt to make changes to 
reduce the technological risk towards these actors. Some interactors work within 
pipeline companies such as the OHSE team. Another group of interactors comprises the 
independent planning panels. They are independent parties who have taken the initiative 
to re-arrange the ontology of power-knowledge, by setting up a model to inform about 
the dangers of pipelines to the public. The panel aims to re-affirm the right of the public 
to know about pipeline danger by integrating with the concept of public right to 
knowledge, openness and transparency.  
On reflection, researchers such as myself and those who undertake research in 
association with the Australian pipeline industries may be considered as another group 
of interactors, with whom regulators can connect and communicate. Although 
researchers may be seen as part of the pipeline actor network, their research work is 
relatively independent as it is aligned with the ethos of tertiary educational institutions 
and is not directly controlled by pipeline companies. In addition, researchers play their 
roles in contributing knowledge to prevent pipeline catastrophes.  
The groups of silent actors and affected actors are relatively interchangeable. A 
distinction between the two groups is made when a mismatch of safety concepts 
developed and used by pipeline practitioners isolates an enforced silent group. The 
affected groups, on the other hand, have been minimally engaged in the assessment 
process. The reasons are complex and related to power-knowledge, cost, complexity of 
regulations, and industries having concerns about public emotion and public action. 
Industries fear that the public may obstruct them when developing and constructing new 
pipelines, may force them to change pipeline routes, and may force the implementation 
of more physical controls in vulnerable places, which could interfere with their 
investment and profits. 
Here, it is important to note that the actors I have categorised are those that emerged 
from interviews. There might be other types of actors in other contexts, that have not 
been unveiled. Diversity requires openness to different types of actor. Regulators; 
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therefore, need to open up to any opportunity to meet, connect, and re-connect with 
alterative, non-conventional actors in the process of co-producing knowledge.  
The emphasis on co-performing power-knowledge practices with other groups (e.g., 
workforce collective groups, unions, the public) outside of the dominant actors is 
extensively discussed by the existing literature on risk (as discussed in the beginning of 
Section 8.3.2). Nevertheless, the Australian pipeline case is different in terms of its 
engagement with unions, the workforce groups (discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.3), 
and the public (discussed in Chapter 6). Regulators have omitted engaging with 
workforce groups regarding safety cases; instead, the pipeline industry workforce 
groups are restricted to discussions regarding personal safety. Regulators are 
additionally reluctant to engage with the public in co-producing knowledge. The 
reasons involve the invisibility of pipeline risks, costs, accountability and power-
knowledge (see Chapter 6). Interaction with these actors, as well as other non-
conventional actors and other concepts, must emerge to inform constructive rationales. 
How can regulators co-perform power-knowledge practices with non-conventional 
actors? Regulators need alternative rationales to support regulatory action. This means 
replacing the existing rationales with those having greater efficacy than the routine and 
bureaucratic-regulatory requirements around the ideals of ‘engagement’, ‘collaboration’ 
and ‘participation’ posited in the regulations. Two strategies: the deliberative 
democracy concept and the hybrid regulatory forum, may advance regulatory rationales 
in co-opting with others in the process of co-performativity (Section 8.3.2.2-8.3.2.3).  
8.3.2.2 Developing the concept of deliberative democracy 
To overcome the problems pertinent to incoherence of knowledge and practice in 
regulation, new regulatory concepts need to be identified and shared. This thesis 
deploys the concept of deliberative democracy in the process of co-performing power-
knowledge as the most plausible strategy and the foundation to improve regulatory 
practices and effectiveness. The integration of deliberative theory with relational 
concepts of power-knowledge promises practical ways of managing, governing and 
assessing risk in relation to science, technology and the environment (see for example: 
Callon et al., 2009; Chilvers & Kearnes, 2016; Lockie, 2004b; 2007; Lockie, 
Sonnenfeld, & Fisher, 2013; Wong, 2015; 2016). In addition, deliberation is a 
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component of the responsive regulation and risk governance frameworks, both of which 
draw on Habermasian discourse theory and its focus on public participation in the 
communication process (Habermas, 1984; 1987); in an attempt to manage conflict in the 
public sphere (Wardman, 2008, pp. 1623, 1628) (discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2).  
The deliberative concept of this thesis is based on Dryzek’s theoretical framework 
(Dryzek, 2000; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2010). The concept of deliberative democracy, 
which is extended beyond communicative rationality, aims to promote collective choice 
mechanisms so that actors in the democratic process can achieve fair and reasonable 
outcomes from decision making (Lockie, 2007, p. 790). The notion of a deliberative 
concept is supported by the concept of intersubjectivity as a discursive representation 
(Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008). The intersubjective discursive representation underlies the 
rationales of ontological entities, in which actors are equally and mutually justified and 
treated in the democratisation of making decisions (ibid, p. 483).  
The integration of a deliberative concept into the process of co-performativity remakes 
the notion of engagement and participation, used in the concepts of tripartite 
engagement and risk governance. The integrative concept of deliberation can assist 
regulatory practitioners to re-configure their focus onto a dialogic democratisation 
process of deliberative engagement, rather than on the routine process of engaging with 
bureaucratic stakeholders.  
A further step in co-performing power-knowledge practices utilising the deliberative 
concept involves actors being an integrative part of producing risk-safety knowledge 
and practices in safety cases, initiating, discovering and using safety procedures and 
safety concepts as well as setting up institutional and regulatory frameworks. Being part 
of the co-production of knowledge and practices, actors utilise their power relationships 
to maintain safety, reduce risk and increase resilience. 
Despite its salience, the concept of deliberation has been criticised as not practical and 
easily ignored by regulatory practitioners (Little, 2000). Deliberation is used to establish 
fairness as part of regulatory requirements and norms. But, it has become challenging. 
The challenge emerges as part of risk-based regimes whereby self-regulating industrial 
companies are unwilling to engage with – and share their safety information with – the 
public (Baram & Lindøe, 2014, p. 51).  
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To overcome these constraints, it is necessary to develop clear guidance for regulators 
regarding how they should involve the various stakeholders. The deliberative concept 
cannot be floated as just an ideology: it needs to be promoted and enacted in a 
regulatory framework (e.g., responsive regulation, risk-based regulation or co-regulation) 
so as to assist regulators and other actors in renegotiating their roles, ideology and their 
existing power-knowledge practices in technological-pipeline risks. To remedy the 
democratic deficits, Baram and Lindøe (2014) emphasise that regulators must ensure 
that the self-regulatory activities of companies are consistent with their implementation 
of other laws including the law that protects workers’ rights (p. 51), as well as public 
rights in the case of Australian pipelines. The possibility of enacting the deliberative 
concept can be discussed among regulators at the hybrid regulatory forum. The concept 
of a hybrid forum will be discussed in the next section (8.3.2.3). 
8.3.2.3 Developing the concept of hybrid forum 
A hybrid regulatory forum is an elaboration of the concept of hybrid forum (Callon et 
al., 2009). Hybrid forums are theorised as open spaces of direct engagement with actors 
which assume importance when controversies about science and technologies take place. 
Callon et al. (2009) stress that: 
the controversies take place in public spaces that we propose to call hybrid 
forums … forums because they are open spaces where groups can come 
together to discuss technical options involving the collective, hybrid because 
the groups involved and the spokespersons claiming to represent them are 
heterogeneous, including experts, politicians, technicians, and laypersons 
who consider themselves involved (p. 18).  
The hybrid forum may be seen as a theoretical trend (see for example: Irwin & Horst, 
2016; Wong, 2015) on offer for practical applications, ideally employed as an 
alternative platform to manage emergent risk from science and technologies. Hybrid 
forums emphasise two factors. First, the forum democratically facilitates the process of 
co-performing power-knowledge among actors, in particular, with non-conventional 
actors (Callon et al., 2009, p. 30). Second, it re-posits identity and differences among 
groups affected by science and technology (ibid, p. 33-34). The rationale of a hybrid 
forum contains two types of criteria: one is about procedure and the other is about 
involving actors (presented in Table 8.4). These criteria are employed to strengthen a 
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hybrid regulatory forum, in particular to facilitate dialogic and non-hierarchical 
democracy. 
Table 8.4: Rationales to strengthen a hybrid regulatory forum, containing six criteria.  
Criteria Purposes  
Criteria about procedures1  
1. Equality  Providing necessary resources for non-conventional 
actors to co-produce knowledge  
2. Transparency Setting up transparency of debates  
3. Clarity  Setting up clear rules of debate and the goal of process  
Criteria about how to involve actors2 
4. Intensity  Emphasising the intensity of collaboration among actors 
5. Openness Openness of a forum to a variety of groups 
6. Quality  Emphasising quality of arguments among actors and the 
continuity of deliberation  
Sources: (1) Callon et al. (2009, pp. 162-263), (2) Callon et al. (2009, pp. 171-176). 
Some of the findings that were revealed in thesis interviews indicate a need for setting-
up forums where regulators can learn, share their knowledge, and network with 
industries, as suggested by a regulator participant here:  
We have our liaison meetings and all that sort of thing but we should have 
more like a yearly forum with industry, all representatives from industry so 
… I think that’s somewhere where that could be an improvement. … If there 
was a forum where we can all go and representatives from each operation 
can go, and they can discuss it openly, what any issues that they’ve had just 
to ensure that there’s consistency but we’re doing the right job. 
The forums, as recommended by the participants, can be either formal or informal. 
Irrespective of form, participants have limited scope in their roles as actors within the 
boundary between regulators and industries. The participants’ recommendation above, 
however, confirms that the existing regulatory practices have fallen into an ontological-
epistemological logic that is unable to cope with pipeline risks. 
The notion of a hybrid forum can be employed to assist regulators in setting up a hybrid 
regulatory forum that will enhance the ongoing process of collective exploration and 
collective learning in mitigating risk (Callon et al., 2009, pp. 34-35). The core aim of 
the hybrid regulatory forum is to establish a learning system among actors which 
requires the regulatory system to be open for criticism and to be self-critical itself 
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regarding regulatory performance, structure and function (Hale, 2014, p. 422). In 
addition, the forum may be structured in a way that enables discussion, and encourages 
the mandate of regulatory instruments and regulatory indicators in response to change 
and learning processes so as to reduce risk and prevent catastrophic accidents (ibid).  
A new form of deliberative democracy can be established in the form of collective 
alliances and assemblages that will improve mutual understanding among actors (Callon 
et al., 2009, p. 34) about pipeline risks. Regulators can use this concept of hybrid forum 
to set up a regulatory forum, which can be either a formal or informal platform for 
discussing and developing solutions to any concerns about pipeline risks. Regulators 
can use the six criteria (see Table 8.4) to evaluate whether the regulatory processes in 
identifying, assessing and communicating pipeline risks have been democratically 
achieved among actors. Similar criteria, for example, have been used to assess the 
processes of setting a radiation standard by three actors (government, private sector, and 
a consumer cooperative) in response to Fukushima-related food contamination (Kimura, 
2013). Kimura’s article shows that both the government and the private sector standard-
setting processes failed to engage with meaningful opportunities for democratic debate 
compared with the standard-setting process set up by a consumer cooperative (ibid). 
The article argues that democratic dialogue can be used as an important part of 
evaluating the standard.  
The notion of a hybrid forum is an alternative to increase the independent roles of 
regulators by co-performing power-knowledge practices with diverse actors. The 
anticipated outcome is that traditional power relations will be partially dismantled and 
repositioned. Regulators may start the process of co-performing knowledge and 
practices with actors involving issues with which the actors are concerned, and to which 
they are closely related. The forum will allow actors to discuss, negotiate and find new 
safety procedures, new safety indicators, new safety concepts as well as new 
institutional arrangements that will enhance regulatory practices and effectiveness. This 
is what I refer to as the hybrid regulatory forum.  
It is important to note that there is a large amount of existing literature on preventing 
risk through studies of technological disasters. To a certain degree, the existing 
literature and the hybrid forum share similar elements, in particular their emphasis on 
integrating the views of various stakeholders. Specifically, the existing literature tends 
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to set up tools or concepts for aiding decision making processes for risk prevention, risk 
assessment and risk management (see for example: Merad, Dechy, Llory, Marcel, & 
Tsoukias, 2014; Merad, Rodrigues, & Salvi, 2008) or for aiding experts to set up a 
critical system of thinking and a rationale to promote equality and mutual 
communication with ordinary citizens (see for example: Midgley, 1997; Ulrich, 1987). 
In contrast to the extant literature, this thesis foregrounds the concept of co-producing 
or co-performing power-knowledge practices to re-arrange the existing power 
assemblages among actors. Despite the differences, the tools and concepts developed by 
the existing literature about aiding decision-making processes and aiding experts can be 
useful for pipeline regulators to employ in their practices, in particular, with those who 
attempt to develop an integrated framework, based on expertise analytics and ethics 
pertinent to safety, security and the environment (see for example: Merad et al., 2014). 
8.3.3 Co-accountability 
The third element of performing new power-knowledge practices is co-accountability. 
Who will be accountable for what? In the risk-based approach and in co-regulation, 
conventional actors: regulators and industries, are required to substantially share their 
accountability (Baram & Lindøe, 2014, p. 53). The accountability of both actors is 
substantively ambiguous and negotiated, as indicated by the emerging discourses in this 
thesis.  
To ensure accountability, not only the establishment of essential features is required, but 
accountability needs to be contested in a political sense by both conventional actors and 
non-conventional actors (Baram & Lindøe, 2014, pp. 50-51). The essential features, 
which are framed in the process of regulatory function, include: (a) criteria and 
standards for regulators to apply when evaluating companies’ performance; (b) 
authorisation of regulators to evaluate companies’ performance; (c) setting up goals that 
need to be met by companies; (d) authority for regulators to inspect and have access to 
information needed for evaluation; (e) authority for regulators to take actions against 
deficiencies in a companies’ performance; and (f) documentation and reporting 
requirements for regulators and companies (Baram & Lindøe, 2014, pp. 49-50). The 
essential features were developed and are used in the UK, USA, and Norwegian regimes 
(Baram & Lindøe, 2014, p. 49), as well as in Australia. They can be produced through 
the process of co-performing knowledge. The challenge for Australian pipeline 
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regulators is to set up a platform where the accountability of industries and regulators in 
the Australian pipeline case can be contested. The process of contestation will occur 
when regulators start to communicate with non-conventional actors. Such a process is 
contingent to and enhanced by the current push for transparency by the Australian 
Commonwealth government, emphasising that ‘people who will be affected by a 
proposed decision must be given an opportunity to express their views to the decision 
maker’ (Administrative Review Council, 2007, p. 1).  
The process of co-accountability can be integrated with the concept of discursive 
accountability (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008, p. 490); and also with responsive regulation 
which argues for a link between deliberation, accountability and regulation (Braithwaite, 
2006). Actors need to be accountable for the knowledge they co-produce (e.g., safety 
plans, emergency response plans, et al.). Although the accountability among 
conventional actors in the Australian pipeline case can be negotiated, the accountability 
of conventional actors will become less ambiguous and strengthen as a result of the 
ongoing process of co-performativity of knowledge among actors.  
An ongoing process of co-performativity is expected to increase transparency and 
establish more trust. Actors will be more aware of what knowledge they produce. In 
addition, any issues concerning the inequality of knowledge, skill and financial 
constraints may be discussed and solutions found. For example, one solution is for 
regulators to be able to collect an increased amount of royalty fees from industries to 
facilitate the process of co-producing knowledge (a strategy suggested by regulator 
participants in this research). The process of co-performativity can assist regulators to 
be more efficacious, which could by extension lead to the mitigation of technological 
pipeline risks, improved regulatory practices and effectiveness, improving the process 
of risk regulation as well as reducing the inequalities of knowledge and power among 
actors. The process of performing new power-knowledge practices and the potential 
outcomes are presented in Figure 8.2. 
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Figure 8.2: The process and potential outcomes of performing new power-knowledge practices in 
the process of risk regulation. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an alternative approach to improving the process of risk 
regulation with a goal to improve regulatory practices and effectiveness. The approach 
attempts to remedy empirical challenges arising from the performativity of incoherent 
power-knowledge practices throughout the process of risk regulation (i.e., risk 
identification, risk assessment, risk communication and risk accountability). These 
practices generate from power-knowledge relationships that shape knowledge and 
practices associated with regulatory outcomes. The three stages of the process proposed 
for performing new power-knowledge practices include: (a) re-arranging the ontology 
of risk; (b) co-performing power-knowledge practices with diverse groups of actors; and 
(c) strengthening the co-accountability of conventional actors by integrating with the 
concept of discursive accountability.  
First, the ontology of risk must be re-arranged and extended. The new ontology of risk 
involves a dynamic, relational approach – not a fixed model. The ontology of risk that I 
propose is an open approach with questions to be discussed and negotiated (I am not 
proposing a new form of ontology but a rearrangement and extension). The ontology of 
risk involves questions not only about what is but also about who has been involved and 
how? These have become the key questions in re-theorising the ontology of risk. As 
influenced by empirical findings and ANT rationalities, the current ontology of risk 
exhibits multiplicity, negotiation and incoherence (becoming disassociated by 
obfuscation and fragmentation). This ensemble can be modified in a revised form of 
ontology that re-arranges the ontological-epistemological logic of regulators, re-
arranges mismatched safety concepts and extends to developing an awareness of 
unacknowledged assemblages.  
Second, the process of co-performativity of power-knowledge practices with others 
outside of conventional entities needs to be organised. In order to co-perform power-
knowledge practices, regulators need alternative rationales to change their normative 
practices. First, the power relations of conventional institutions need to be re-arranged 
to reflect the discursiveness of power. Regulators need to co-perform their knowledge 
and practices in relation to risk regulation with diverse groups of non-conventional 
actors (e.g., silent actors, affected actors, unwelcome actors, other regulators and 
emergency response actors). The process of co-performing power-knowledge practices 
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with these actors can be co-opted with interactors who sympathise with and are willing 
to work to reduce the risks that threaten affected actors in non-conventional ways. 
Interactors can be posited both within and outside industry pipeline institutions. 
To strengthen the co-performativity of power-knowledge practices with non-
conventional actors, two concepts are required: the concept of deliberative democracy 
and the concept of a hybrid regulatory forum. Both of these concepts should be enrolled 
in the regulatory network. Deliberative democracy, which is employed to re-make the 
concept of engagement and participation, is widely alluded to in the contemporary 
literature along with the concepts of tripartite engagement and risk governance. The 
ideal of engagement and participation in the Australia pipeline case is muddled because 
it is variously involved with traditional forms of power relations, the cost of 
implementation, and the complexity of the regulatory framework. The concept of 
deliberative democracy is underlined with intersubjectivity whereby actors are equally 
treated in order to achieve fair and reasonable decision-making from the collective 
choice mechanisms. The concept of deliberative democracy will assist regulators to 
mutually engage with others to co-produce knowledge and practices appertaining to the 
process of risk regulation.  
The last rationale is the concept of a hybrid regulatory forum. This concept comprises 
six criteria designed to assist regulators in facilitating dialogic and non-conventional 
democracy. The process of co-performing knowledge and practices with diverse actors, 
both conventional and non-conventional, using these three alternative rationales will 
assist regulators to remedy the challenge of being subtly trapped by their own 
deleterious practices during engagement in bilateral relationships with industry.  
Last, a process of strengthening co-accountability between conventional actors is 
required, and can be achieved through integration with discursive accountability. 
Conventional actors need to be accountable for knowledge and practices that they 
produce in safety plans, emergency plans, et al. Conventional actors who use discursive 
accountability will be aware of and accountable for any and all of the knowledge and 
practices they produce to prevent catastrophic accidents.  
Performing new power-knowledge practices within three stages is an on-going process 
of collective exploration and collective learning in mitigating technological risk. The 
on-going process of performing new power-knowledge practices may lead to lessened 
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ambiguity in accountability, increased transparency of power-knowledge practices, 
increased independency of regulators, and improved processes of risk identification, risk 
assessment and risk communication. These will putatively lead to a reduction of risk 
and improvements in the process of risk regulation, resulting in the improvement of 
regulatory practices and effectiveness. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusions and the future 
Questions of regulatory effectiveness arise in the wake of catastrophes and associated 
risks associated with science and technology. The mainstream is critical of the failures 
of regulators and their objectivist-realist approach in regulating and controlling risk. 
The criticism reproduces certain discourses of responsibility. This thesis challenges 
mainstream criticism. It argues that such discourses of responsibility black box the roles, 
actions, and inactions of regulatory experts (or ‘elite-expert institutions’), obstructing 
exploration of how power-knowledge and the practices of regulators are performed. 
These issues were put forward for questioning in this research. 
This thesis has taken a critical and empirical approach, inspired by ANT and the 
concept of Foucauldian power-knowledge as a theoretical and methodological 
framework. It has aimed to improve the process of risk regulation by investigating: (1) 
how power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation is performed by and around 
regulators in the case study of pipeline industries in Australia; and (2) how the process 
of power-knowledge in relation to risk regulation can be improved? The inquiry into 
these research questions has led to a re-configuration of the understandings of scholars, 
regulators and practitioners about how realities (power, knowledge, and practices) are 
formed in relational effect, leading to an improvement in risk regulation (i.e. risk 
identification, risk assessment, risk communication, and risk accountability).  
The findings indicated that the actions and inactions of regulators are the effect of 
multiple complex relational assemblages, situated within, between and outside of 
organisations. The technical-regulatory actants (e.g., safety plans, risk-based regulations, 
and technical-regulatory specifications of the Australian pipeline standard) are part of 
the heterogeneous assemblages that influence the actions of regulators. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the objectivism-realism of regulatory practice was found to limit its 
effectiveness in a number of ways. Further, the thesis provides insight into: how 
regulatory knowledge and practices (or actions), in specific instances, are performed; 
and who and what material entities are involved. Various research themes and 
assemblages, which have been disassociated from and remain unacknowledged in the 
existing literature, were gradually revealed throughout the investigation of a series of 
material-social assemblages (discussed in Chapters 4-7 and summarised in Table 8.1). 
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The assemblages that shaped regulators’ action and inaction were beyond 
organisationally-based factors and the politics of what scholars, regulators, and 
practitioners understand and imagine through the reproduction of discourses in relation 
to regulatory responsibility in the contemporary literature. Regulatory actions, roles and 
accountability have been shaped not only by the technical-regulatory entities, the 
regulatory-organisational structure, the decision-making processes within their 
organisation, and the resource insufficiency of skills, capacities and finance as key 
organisational factors; but also shaped through regulatory dependency on industrial 
knowledge and activities. Such dependency is embedded within their risk-based 
regulatory regime despite the usefulness of risk-based regulations and advances in 
replacing prescriptive regulations.  
The assemblages that influence regulatory action and inaction also include the 
complexity of pipeline regulations and regulatory arrangements across Australian states. 
The intention of regulation is misunderstood and misused by the industry, an intention 
most pronounced when a pipeline crosses the boundary between two states. Pipeline 
industries choose to follow the regulation of one state and not the other due to the cost 
involved and the complexity of regulations that allow industries to obfuscate their 
obligations.  
Other influences affecting regulatory actions, roles and accountability are associated 
with regulatory interpretations of the technical concepts they have created, such as 
measurement length, as well as with their own interpretation of public engagement and 
their discomfit when engaging with unions. The findings further indicate that regulators 
largely omit to acknowledge the outside influences that drive their inaction, derived 
from their own technologies of government, such as deregulation and energy 
privatisation which constitute part of neoliberalisation. Regulators struggle with the 
technical-regulatory approaches they have created to leverage their power-knowledge 
relationships and their existing power-knowledge practices.  
In the main, the findings show that the knowledge and practices appertaining to risk, 
safety and regulation that actors hold are incoherent throughout the regulatory process 
from regulators through to pipeline managers, pipeline engineers, pipeline technicians, 
their contractors and sub-contractors, planning authorities, as well as the public. The 
reasons for this incoherence of knowledge and practice are multiplex. They include 
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obfuscation through the concept of measurement length and its late enactment in 2007; 
misused and misunderstood concepts of safety in the literature, especially the distinction 
between process safety and personal safety, and the re-structuring of pipeline companies 
as a result of pipeline energy privatisation. 
The disassociated knowledge and practices related to risk, safety and regulation in elite-
expert institutions are reframed to improve the process of risk regulation. The empirical 
findings (e.g., limitations of regulatory skills and regulatory capacities, limitations of 
regulatory resources, complexities of regulations) can be put forward as straight policy 
amendments in the decision making process of regulatory institutions. The enhancement 
of technical skills and regulatory capacities can be strengthened by a training system. 
The financial resources can be increased though the development of the pipeline 
licensee’s fee process. The decision makers can alter the complexities of pipeline 
regulations by involving third parties to oversee and mandate the review of regulation. 
The policy amendments are not the only way to improve the process of risk regulation. 
This thesis has proposed more in-depth exploration of changes concerning the root or 
origin of risk (described here as ‘what is’ risk), drawn from the empirical and theoretical 
implications of this thesis. These implications are composed of three dynamically-
related stages: (a) re-arranging the ontology of risk in association with power-
knowledge practices; (b) co-performing power-knowledge practices with diverse actors; 
and (c) co-accountability.  
These three steps, involving a new performance orientation, offer an alternative 
approach to improve the process of risk regulation. The rationales of performing new 
power-knowledge practices revolve around rearranging the ontology of risk, re-
identifying actors, and re-positioning the form of power-knowledge traditions and 
hierarchies to discursiveness. The reconfigured ontology of risk is not merely focussed 
on technical-regulatory aspects in regulating risks, as part of the existing Australian 
regulatory practices, but the ontology of risk is related to power relations that are 
incoherent, multiple and negotiable. 
The process of co-performing power-knowledge practices with diverse actors is 
supported by the concepts of discursive power-knowledge assemblages, deliberative 
democracy and the hybrid regulatory forum to re-make the concepts of risk governance, 
engagement, collaboration and participation. Diverse actors will be mutually treated so 
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as to gain fair and reasonable outcomes from decision-making processes. Through the 
process of co-performing power-knowledge practices, diverse actors will be able to 
negotiate and re-negotiate how risk is identified, assessed, communicated and made 
accountable. The re-negotiating process among actors will perform new, diverse and 
different forms of power-knowledge practices and strengthen the co-accountability of 
conventional actors, playing their roles to regulate and mitigate technological risk. 
The on-going co-performance of power-knowledge practices may lead to these 
following positive outcomes: assisting regulators to lessen the ambiguity of 
accountability; increase the transparency of power-knowledge practices; increase the 
role-independence of regulators; and improve the process of risk regulation. These 
processes should lead to a reduction in technological risk. The new approach will assist 
regulators in improving the process of risk regulation (i.e., risk identification, risk 
assessment, risk communication and risk accountability), resulting in positive changes 
in regulatory outcomes. Such an approach can be employed to regulate risk that 
involves science and technologies at large, or at least to regulate the Australian Pipeline 
energy industry for the sake of balancing power-knowledge practices. It cannot merely 
be used to optimise regulatory effectiveness and practices for industrial benefit, but 
more importantly, to reduce inequality and the inaccessibility of knowledge on risk, 
safety, and regulation for affected, marginalised and silent actors within, in between and 
outside organisations. 
Before concluding, this thesis suggests that in order to better improve the process of risk 
regulation, mitigate pipeline risks and prevent catastrophic pipeline accidents, further 
research is needed. Potential research could study relationships among these following 
assemblages: (a) relationships of assemblages among the collective workforces of 
pipeline industries; (b) relationships of assemblages within and connected to emergency 
response organisations; (c) relationships of assemblages associated with regulatory 
regimes used successfully in other countries (e.g. UK and Norway) that serve as ideal 
cases by participants; (d) relationships of assemblages associated with economic 
regulators; and (e) relationships of assemblages connected to process safety and 
personal safety.  
The research can be explored both theoretically-methodologically and empirically with 
the following research questions. 
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First, how can workforce collective groups contribute their roles and knowledge to the 
improvement of processes of risk identification, risk assessment, risk communication 
and risk accountability in reducing technological risk?  
Second, how can emergency response actors perform their safety knowledge to prevent 
and manage energy pipeline accidents? What concepts have they used and how can such 
concepts be improved to reduce technological risk and improve resilience?  
Third, what are the UK and Norway regulatory strategies and how they have been 
performed in negotiating-regulating energy industries in these places to enhance their 
regulatory practices and effectiveness? 
Fourth, what can be improved to enhance regulatory practices and effectiveness to limit 
risk associated with neoliberal structures and processes relevant to energy industries?  
Fifth, how can the mismatch, misunderstandings, and misuse of safety concepts in the 
division between process safety and personal safety be improved?  
Research into these disassociated relationships can potentially reveal new knowledge, 
practices, and assemblages from the existing literature. This type of research can assist 
scholars and practitioners in widening the ways of coping with pipeline risk and 
improving the process of risk regulation. It is hoped that the outcomes from the present 
and future research will lead to the better prevention of pipeline-related risk that affects 
humans, society, environment, and their associations. 
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Appendix. Interview Protocol (sample) 
Interviews of regulators: potential interview questions, themes, and subthemes. 
1. Icebreaker questions. 
1.1. Regulatory background. 
• What is your background (e.g. science, policy, management)? 
• What is your role? 
• How does your role fit into the overall role of your agency/department? 
• How many years have you been working in this position? 
 
2. Introduction, main themes and follow-up questions. 
2.1. Regulatory challenges. 
• What is the most important issue or challenge that regulators encounter these 
days?  
• How do you see your role in dealing with this issue?  
• Are there other issues you would like to mention as well?  
• How well equipped do you think regulatory frameworks and agencies are to deal 
with new industries or policy settings? 
2.2. Regulatory trends. 
• What about regulatory approaches? Have you seen any major changes in 
approaches to regulation? If you have, what are they? What has worked well and 
how? What has not worked and why? 
• In your opinion, what are the main reasons behind the changes?  
• Who has been involved in those changes (governments/ regulators/industries/the 
public or workers)? Who are the key actors among them who create change and 
how? 
2.3. Knowledge construction and regulatory actions. 
• Based on your own role, what knowledge do you use to cope with the problems 
you have mentioned (e.g. assessing submissions, inspecting, or (x))?  
o (or asking a more practical version) You’ve said that your main job is 
(assessing submissions, inspecting, or (x)). Can you talk me through a 
recent (assessment, inspection or (x)) and describe how you decided what to 
do?  
o Can you explain why you chose to do that? What else might you have done? 
How did you know? 
• How do you obtain such knowledge? 
• Who is involved? 
• What do you read (or hear, or watch)?  
• What might have shaped or influenced the knowledge you used, your 
knowledge-capacity and actions? 
o These influences may include the following:  
 (a) regulatory apparatus (e.g. changes in regulatory approaches, 
development of new regulatory standards or new regulatory devices) 
 (b) policy changes (e.g. cutbacks, new industrial policies introduced (e.g. 
for coal seam gas fracking, carbon dioxide pipelines) 
 (c) firms (e.g. roles and actions of firms, interaction with corporations, 
subtle forms of regulatory capture, regulatory enforcement, different 
perspectives from firms) 
 (d) risk characteristics; embedded in uncertainty, ambiguity and 
complexity 
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 (e) non-governmental bodies (e.g. roles and actions of non-governmental 
bodies, participatory actions, different views) 
• How have these influences shaped the knowledge you used, your knowledge-
capacity and actions? Who was involved? 
2.4. The influence of risk characteristics; embedded in uncertainty, ambiguity and 
complexity. 
• When there is potential for accidents in hazardous industries (including the 
pipeline industry), what knowledge do you use to cope with uncertain situations 
that may occur? 
• When you have a problem, who do you ask for advice?  
2.5. Opportunities for improvement.  
2.5.1. Improvements in the knowledge that regulators used and their knowledge-
capacity. 
• What do you think could be changed to improve the knowledge you used and 
your knowledge-capacity and actions? For example, what could be changed 
in dealing with uncertain situations? 
2.5.2. The improvement in regulatory actions.  
• What about regulators themselves? Where do you see opportunities to 
improve what you and other regulators do? 
2.5.3. The improvement in regulations.  
• What about regulation? What do you think could be done to improve 
regulations? 
• Where do you see opportunities to improve the effectiveness of regulations? 
 
3. Finishing-up question. 
• Are there any important issues that have not been addressed through this 
interview session? If there are, what are they and would you like to discuss them? 
4. Potential probing questions. What influences knowledge, knowledge-capacity 
and regulatory action? 
4.1. How have changes in regulatory approaches influenced the knowledge you used, 
your knowledge capacity and regulatory action? 
• What was your experience when there was some change in regulatory approach?  
• Have these changes affected your roles, knowledge and actions? If they have, 
how?  
• Who was involved? 
4.2 The influence of policy changes. 
4.2.1. Cutbacks. 
• Were there any cutbacks that affected your knowledge and capacity to deal 
with regulatory problems? If there were, what were they and how have these 
affected your knowledge and actions?  
4.2.2. Industrial policy changes. 
• When new industrial policies are introduced (e.g. for coal seam gas fracking, 
carbon dioxide pipelines), have they affected regulations? If they have, how?  
• Has the introduction of new industrial policies affected your role, knowledge 
and responsibility? If they have, how?  
• Who was involved? When did it occur? 
4.3. The influence of firms. 
4.3.1. Influence of the roles and actions of firms.  
• How do you see the role of firms?  
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• Has their role and actions affected your roles, your knowledge and actions? If 
they have, how have they been affected and in what way? 
4.3.2. The influence of interaction with corporations 
• How many firms do you need to inspect?  
• How many regulators do you have in your team?  
• Would you like to share some of the difficulties around your regulatory task 
in dealing with firms? If so, what are they? Have these difficulties affected 
your knowledge and actions in enforcing the firms? If they have, how can 
these be improved? 
4.3.3. The influence of subtle forms of regulatory capture. 
• When you first started your job, and needed to deal with big corporations, 
how did you feel about it?  
• What about now - how have you considered your position in dealing with 
them? 
• Has this interaction affected your knowledge and action in dealing with the 
firms? 
• Have you ever come across firms that use loopholes in the legislation to take 
advantage over workers or communities? If you have, what are they and how 
did you cope with this problem? How could it be improved? 
4.3.4. The influence of regulatory enforcement. 
• What are the best knowledge-strategies you have used to enforce 
noncompliant firms?  
• How did you use them to enforce the compliance of firms?  
• Have you revised them at any point? 
• What kind of support do you need to improve your knowledge-capacity in 
helping you deal with firms? 
• Do the firms require support from you to improve their knowledge-capacity? 
If they do, what kind of support do they need from you? 
4.3.5. The influence of different perspectives from firms. 
• Have the firms’ views affected your knowledge production and actions? If 
they have, how have they been affected, and in what way? 
4.4. The influence of non-governmental bodies.  
4.4.1. The influence of roles and actions of non-governmental bodies. 
• How do you see the role and action of non-governmental bodies? 
• Has their role and actions affected your role, your knowledge and actions? If 
they have, how? 
4.4.2. Influence by the participatory actions of non-governmental bodies. 
• Have you been involved with non-governmental bodies in enforcing and 
monitoring regulations? If you have, who are they and how did the 
involvement take place?  
4.4.3. The influence of different perspectives from non-governmental bodies. 
• Have the views of non-governmental bodies affected the knowledge you used, 
knowledge-capacity and actions? If they have, how have they been affected, 
and in what way? 
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Interviews of operating company staff: potential interview questions, themes and 
subthemes 
 
1. Icebreaker questions. 
1.1. The background of operating company staff. 
• What is your background (e.g. science, policy, management)? 
• What is your role? 
• How does your role fit into the overall role of your agency/department? 
• How many years have you been working in this position? 
 
2. Introduction, main themes and follow-up questions. 
2.1. Regulatory challenge. 
• What is the most important issue or challenge that you encounter with 
regulations these days?  
• How do you see your role in dealing with this issue? 
• Are there other issues you would like to mention as well? 
• How well is your agency/department equipped with regulatory frameworks and 
compliance processes/policies? 
2.2. Regulatory trends. 
• What about regulatory approaches? Have you seen any major changes in 
approaches to regulation? If you have, what are they? What has worked well and 
how? What has not worked and why? 
• In your opinion, what are the main reasons behind the changes? 
• Has the industrial sector been involved in those changes? If it has, how? If it has 
not, why? Who else has been involved with those changes? What are their roles? 
Who are the key actors among them, who create change and how? 
2.3. Regulatory actions towards risk characteristics; embedded in uncertainty, ambiguity 
and complexity. 
• Do you feel that regulators have the same view of key risk issues in your 
workplace as you do? Do you think they focus on the right thing?  
2.4. Regulatory engagement.  
• How do you see the roles of regulation?  
• What about the regulators? How do you see their roles? 
• Have you discussed contentious issues with them? If you have, what were the 
issues you raised? What were their responses or actions? 
• Have you shared any difficulties you have encountered with regulators? If you 
have, what were their responses or actions?  
2.5. Third parties engagement (e.g. workforce unions and communities) 
• What about third parties? How do you see their roles?  
• Have you involved them in maintaining your safety system? If you have, who 
were they and how did you engage them? What contentious issues have been 
raised and resolved? 
2.6. Opportunities for improvement  
2.6.1. Improvement in the operating staff’s actions. 
• Where do you see opportunities to improve what you and other operating 
staff do? 
2.6.2. Improvement in regulations. 
• What about regulation? What do you think could be done to improve 
regulations? 
 269 
• Where do you see opportunities to improve the effectiveness of regulations?  
 
3. Finishing-up questions. 
• Are there any important issues that have not been addressed through this 
interview session? If there are, what are they, and would you like to discuss 
them?  
 
Interviews of workforce health and safety representatives: potential interview 
questions, themes and subthemes 
 
1. Icebreaker questions. 
1.1. Background of workforce health and safety representatives 
• What is your background? 
• What is your role?  
• How many years have you been working in this position? 
• How does your role fit into the overall role of your agency/department?  
 
2. Introduction, main themes and follow-up questions. 
2.1. Workforce challenge. 
• What is the most important issue or challenge that you encounter with the firm 
these days? 
• How do you see your role in dealing with this issue? 
• Are there other issues you would like to mention as well? 
2.2. Regulatory challenge. 
• How do you see your regulatory role in protecting the workforce? 
• How well is the firm you have worked for equipped with regulatory frameworks 
and compliance policies and processes? 
2.3. Regulatory trends. 
• Have you see any major changes in approaches to regulation? If you have, what 
are they? What has worked well and how? What has not worked and why? 
• In your opinion, what are the main reasons behind the changes? 
• Have you been involved in those changes? If you have, how? If you have not 
why? Who else has been involved in those changes? What are their roles? Who 
are the key actors among them, who create change and how? 
2.4. Regulatory actions towards risk characteristics, embedded in uncertainty, ambiguity 
and complexity  
• Can you give me some examples of when regulators have made a difference to 
safety in your workplace? Are there other things they might have done?  
2.5. Interaction with regulators and firms (workforce engagement).  
• Have you discussed contentious issues with the regulators or the firms? If you 
have, what were the issues you raised? What were their responses or actions? 
• Have you ever been consulted by the regulators or the firms? If you have been, 
what were the issues they raised? If you have not, why? 
• Have you ever been involved in the regulatory process? If you have, what did 
you do? If you have not been involved, what do you think about it? Do you want 
to be involved? If you do, can you please give me your reasons? If you do not, 
can you please give me your reasons as well? 
• Have you ever been involved in maintaining the safety system of the firm? If 
you were, how were you involved and what did you do? If you were not, what 
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did you think about it? Do you want to be involved? If you do, can you please 
give me your reasons? If you do not, can you please give me your reasons as 
well? 
2.6. Opportunities for improvement  
2.6.1. Improvement in workforce actions. 
• Where do you see opportunities to improve what you and other workers do? 
2.6.2. Improvement in regulations. 
• What about regulation? What do you think could be done to improve 
regulations? 
• Where do you see opportunities to improve the effectiveness of regulations?  
 
3. Finishing-up question. 
• Are there any important issues that have not been addressed through this 
interview session? If there are, what are they, and would you like to discuss 
them?  
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